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Humans largely owe their dominant role on Earth to their social nature. 
The cooperation and coordination of actions in groups has enabled 
humans to surmount adaptive challenges that would be impossible for any 
individual to cope with on its own. Whereas cooperative action appears to 
be an obvious part of human life, it is a puzzling phenomenon from an 
evolutionary viewpoint. Namely, natural selection generally favours 
selfish over cooperative behaviour. Nevertheless, in countless kinds of 
social contexts, human interactions lead to outcomes that benefit all 
parties involved. Both in human prehistory and in modern day, 
sophisticated forms of team work has facilitated fruitful outcomes of 
human collective action: from cooperative hunting of mammoths on the 
Pleistocene tundra, to the coordinated creation of high-tech products in a 
modern factory.  
In addition, humans are champions of social learning. People pass on 
useful information through teaching and often improve their behaviour by 
observing others. The transmission of socially learned information can 
change the distribution of behaviours in a population. Compared to 
genetic evolution, this process of ‘cultural evolution’ through social 
learning can enable a population to rapidly adjust to the environment as 
adaptive information spreads between its members. Cultural evolution 
can also have a cumulative character: over time, populations can build up 
large bodies of adaptive knowledge that individuals can use and refine. 
Gradually, this process generated technologies that enhanced the 
opportunities to adapt to a vast array of habitats across the world, and 
culminated in the largely self-constructed environments we inhabit today.  
Cultural evolution also shapes human social behaviour. In determining 
their behaviour in social contexts, people attend to the behaviour or their 
peers, and regard the social norms established in the population. The 
direction and outcome of cultural evolution depends on the forms of social 
learning that people use; depending on those forms of social learning, 
cultural evolution of social behaviour can lead to outcomes different from 
genetic evolution by natural selection.  
In this thesis, I investigate the interplay between human cooperation and 
social learning. First, I develop a set of conceptual models to map out how 





cultural evolution in a range of interaction contexts (Chapters 2 and 3). 
Second, with a series of decision making experiments, I assess what forms 
of social learning people use when they are confronted with such contexts 
(Chapters 4 and 5). Third and finally, I turn to the question of how people 
condition their cooperative behaviour on past actions of their interaction 
partners, shedding light on how human cooperation can be sustained by 
reciprocal helping (Chapters 6 and 7).   
 
The puzzle of cooperation 
In numerous forms of social interaction, humans cooperate in groups to 
the benefit of all group members. No other animal can successfully 
coordinate efforts in such a vast array of social situations, ranging from 
helping to raise each other’s kids to hunting big game, and from tending 
for the sick to defending a village against outside threats (e.g., (Boyd and 
Richerson 1985; Mace and Sear 2005; Stiner et al. 2009). The benefits 
produced by such forms of cooperation broadened the range of 
environments in which humans can survive, thereby allowing our species 
to colonise virtually all terrestrial habitats around the world. Over 
evolutionary time, humans did not only vastly grow in numbers, but also 
societies have grown from hunter-gatherer societies consisting of a few 
tens of people, to large nation states harbouring millions of inhabitants 
living together without being continuously in conflict with each other.  
Despite the variety of different contexts in which humans cooperate, 
scientists across disciplines tend to focus their studies of social interaction 
on situations in which the interests of an individual are opposed to the 
interests of the group. In these so-called ‘social dilemmas’, cooperative 
behaviour comes with a cost for the actor and benefits others. 
Evolutionary theory, based on natural selection through differential 
reproduction, predicts that in such situations cooperation is not a 
straightforward outcome. Take, for example, the defence of a tribal village 
against a threat from the outside. The men who step forward and risk 
their lives to protect their tribe have a higher chance of being injured or 
even killed due to their bravery. All other things being equal, these men 




generations, compared to the more cautious and cowardly members of 
their tribe. Evolutionary theory thus predicts that in the absence of other 
selective pressures, bravery tends to disappear over time due to 
differences in reproductive success (Darwin 1859; Darwin 1871). When 
social traits such as bravery or a tendency to cooperate are passed on by 
social learning rather than by genetic inheritance, the direction and 
outcome of evolution might be different. This subject will be discussed at 
length below. In this section, my main focus will be on natural selection.  
Whereas the logic of natural selection seems to dictate that the selfish will 
prevail, costly cooperation is found not only in humans, but in many 
species throughout nature. For instance, when the bacterium 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa suffers from shortage in iron (which it needs to 
survive), it can secrete substances called ‘siderophores’ into the 
environment to bind otherwise insoluble iron, making the iron available 
for bacterial uptake. Producing these substances is costly for the 
individual bacterium, but all bacteria in the neighbourhood can take up 
the iron molecules when bound to siderophores (Guerinot 1994). Mutant 
bacteria that do not produce siderophores can reap the benefits of the 
cooperative efforts of others without paying the costs; in the light of 
natural selection, it is surprising that these siderophore-producing types 
are not driven to extinction. Another example of such costly cooperation is 
given by Beldings ground squirrels (Spermophilus beldingi), who exclaim 
alarm calls when a predator approaches their group (Sherman 1977). 
These calls alert others, but are risky for the caller who attracts the 
attention of the predator and runs the risk of being injured, or even killed. 
Individuals that refrain from emitting alarm calls can benefit from the 
alarm calls of others, and will have relatively better chances to survive and 
reproduce than their group mates that do take the risk. Emitting alarm 
calls thus decreases the fitness of an individual compared to its group 
mates, and is as such disfavoured by natural selection. In both these 
examples, costly cooperation (producing siderophores and emitting alarm 
calls) tends to lead to a lower reproductive success for an individual but 
benefits the group. This presents the puzzle of evolution of cooperation by 
means of natural selection: how can costly cooperation emerge and 
persist through evolutionary time when ‘cheaters’ can benefit from 





briefly review a few factors that may explain the evolution of cooperation 
despite immediate selection against it.   
Darwin (1871, chapter 5) already realised that cooperation poses 
fundamental problems for his theory, and he proposed a number of 
mechanisms that could explain how costly cooperation could be favoured 
over selfish behaviour. Currently, the mechanisms mentioned by Darwin 
are still at the core of research on the evolution of cooperation (see, for 
example, (Lehmann and Keller 2006) for an overview). Darwin pointed 
out that natural selection can take place not only between individuals, but 
also between groups (Darwin 1871), chapter 5). Throughout human 
evolutionary history, different tribes have constantly been in conflict with 
each other, and archaeological and ethnological evidence suggests that 
warfare contributed greatly to the total mortality of our ancestors in 
hunter-gatherer populations (Darwin 1871; Soltis et al. 1995; Bowles 
2009). It is plausible that tribes with a lot of brave (i.e., cooperative) 
individuals have been more likely to win conflicts and to supplant other 
tribes, or able to get control over the most fertile pieces of land that could 
sustain a larger number of people. The importance of group selection in 
human prehistory and its effects on the evolution of cooperation are, 
however, controversial issues. In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis I take up 
this subject, and discuss potential effects of group selection in the light of 
cultural evolution. 
Darwin (1871) also recognised that reciprocity might lead to cooperation: 
when individuals interact repeatedly, a cooperative act might be returned 
at a later point in time. Reciprocal helping can lead to cooperation among 
pairs of individuals: scratching someone’s back may pay off if he scratches 
yours at some later point in time (Trivers 1971). Human social 
interactions frequently involve forms of such ‘direct reciprocity’, and this 
mechanism is believed to occur in some animal species as well (Dugatkin 
and Reeve 1997; Clutton-Brock 2009). Reciprocal cooperation can also 
work in a more indirect manner. Darwin noted that humans are 
particularly sensitive to the praise and blame of their fellows (Darwin 
1871), p. 164). Interactions between individuals are often observed by 
others, and people like to talk about the behaviour of their peers. Through 
eavesdropping and gossip, social information propagates through human 




friendly, or nasty and selfish. When, as a consequence, individuals with a 
good reputation are more likely to receive help, indirect reciprocity can 
promote cooperation (Alexander 1987). Models suggesting that 
cooperation can be supported by reputation-based reciprocity, however, 
often reflect a rather simplistic view of how individuals account for past 
behaviour about their peers to allow for mathematical tractability (e.g., 
(Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Panchanathan and Boyd 2003; Nowak and 
Sigmund 2005). Also, and the mechanisms of direct and indirect 
reciprocity are typically studied in isolation. In Chapters 6 and 7 of this 
thesis I will show experimentally how people react to historical 
information about the cooperativeness of their interaction partners 
(stemming from both direct experience and reputations), and assess how 
accounting for peers’ motivations behind decisions making affects 
reputation-based cooperation.  
Many decades after Darwin’s books, researchers have proposed additional 
mechanisms that can help explain how natural selection can favour 
cooperation over selfishness. These mechanisms do not take the centre 
stage in this thesis, but it is worthwhile to highlight a some of them here 
since they play a role in discussions related to the topic. Partner choice is 
one of them (Noë and Hammerstein 1994): when individuals can choose 
who to interact with, cooperators can avoid defectors and exclude them 
from the benefits arising from their cooperative efforts. Interaction 
partners may even specialise in specific tasks and both profit from the 
exchange of products, increasing the benefits of mutual cooperation. 
Another mechanism that can promote cooperation is kin selection 
(Hamilton 1964; Maynard Smith 1964), in which cooperation can be 
favoured if its costs are compensated by the benefits for related recipients. 
It has been hypothesized that this mechanism works in P. aeruginosa, 
where higher levels of relatedness lead to higher levels of siderophore 
production (Griffin et al. 2004). Since cooperation is channelled mainly 
towards kin, the costs it entails to an individual are compensated for by 
enhanced benefits for its relatives. Another class of mechanisms that can 
promote cooperation involve punishment. When individuals can be 
punished if they fail to cooperate, the advantages of selfish behaviour can 
be offset, making cooperation favoured through force. Physical 





human societies (Guala 2012; Van den Berg et al. 2012), partly to ‘correct’ 
those who fail to cooperate and harm the interests of society. Punishment 
of defectors also occurs in other species. For instance, in many social 
Hymenoptera (bees, wasps, ants and termites) the eggs laid by worker 
bees are actively killed by others (for a recent overview, see (Ratnieks and 
Wenseleers 2008).  
Social dilemmas, in which individual interests of an individual are 
opposed to that of the group, have attracted most of the attention in 
cooperation research. However, in this thesis I will not restrict myself to 
this specific form of social interaction. Humans are involved in many types 
of social interaction that are structured differently. For instance, 
individuals frequently have to coordinate a specific course of action; some 
outcomes may lead to higher payoffs than others, but it is in the interest of 
each individual to perform the same behaviour. Examples of such 
‘coordination games’ range from the Stag-Hunt game to driving on either 
the left or the right side of the road. In other types of interactions, it is 
beneficial to deviate from the behaviour of others. For instance, in 
deciding between two patches to forage in, competition can be avoided by 
choosing the least popular one. Another example of such an ‘evasion 
game’, in some situations costly cooperation is the only way to achieve a 
positive outcome for all involved parties, and forms of specialisation can 
play a role (e.g., in obtaining a resource, where partners can benefit from 
trading what they have produced). Each of these social contexts involves 
forms of cooperation, but each of them has its own underlying structure, 
calling for specific strategies to reach an efficient outcome.  
 
Social learning and cultural evolution 
Cooperation may have been essential in human evolution by allowing us 
to deal with complex adaptive problems, but our capacity for social 
learning perhaps contributed even more to our success. The colonisation 
of the globe by modern humans started from Africa, some 60,000 years 
ago. Within 20,000 – 30,000 years, humans had spread out across Asia and 
Australia, with populations living in the arctic (Klein 1989). In the process 




different environments each presenting a unique combination of adaptive 
problems; newly encountered habitats called for new knowledge, new 
tools, and new social arrangements in order to survive (Boyd et al. 2011a).  
Our ability to adapt to such a wide range of environments is often 
attributed to our intelligence (Barrett et al. 2007; Pinker 2010), and it is 
hardly disputable that our ability to make inferences about the world 
helped to invent new technologies and refine them. This explanation, 
however, is far from complete. Dramatic examples illustrating that being 
smart is not enough, are given by expeditions that are stranded in some 
alien habitat. Despite elaborate efforts and plenty of time to experiment 
and learn, the expedition members often suffer badly or even die because 
they lack essential information about the environment, and are unable to 
make a living on their own. The expedition members that survived such a 
stranding often survive thanks to the indigenous population taking care of 
them (Boyd et al. 2011a); similar illustrations are found in (Henrich and 
McElreath 2003)). This highlights that the human ability to survive in the 
diverse range of environments that we inhabit critically hinges on 
adaptive information specific to a certain habitat. Through social learning, 
populations living in an environment can pass on and accumulate 
information over generations. This process makes it possible to create 
tools adapted to deal with specific combinations of adaptive challenges, 
and to develop technologies of a degree of complexity and sophistication 
that can never be developed by any individual within his or her life time 
(Boyd et al. 2011a).  
The term social learning refers to a process in which individuals are able 
to modify their behaviour through observing or interacting with other 
individuals (Galef Jr 1976; Heyes 1994). This modification of behaviour 
can take place through a range of different psychological mechanisms (see 
e.g., (Rendell et al. 2011) for an overview). In this thesis I will focus on 
social learning by imitation of behaviour performed by others. Just as with 
cooperation, social learning is by no means unique to humans, and is 
widely studied in a range of animal species. For example, chimpanzees 
(Pan trochlodytus), nine-spined sticklebacks (Pungitius pungitius), and 
even fruit flies (Drosophila melanogaster) have been observed to copy 
behaviour that is performed by conspecifics (Pike and Laland 2010; 





great value: by learning from others, individuals can acquire information 
about important aspects of their physical and social environment such as 
the location of food and water sources, the avoidance of predators and 
availability of potential mates (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Rogers 1988; 
Laland 2004). By gathering information through social learning, an 
individual can avoid the costs associated with individual (non-social) 
learning, in which individuals learn by directly interacting with their 
environment. Moreover, payoffs of behaviour are often subject to noise 
due to exogenous factors. Such chance effects can make it useful to 
aggregate information on peer behaviour, so that multiple noisy pieces of 
information can be turned into a reliable signal that points towards 
optimal behaviour in a given situation.  
Theoretical models suggest that specific strategies of social learning can 
be adaptive in specific kinds of situations (Laland 2004). Such strategies 
specify for an individual when to learn from others, from whom to learn, 
and what kinds of social information to attend to (Laland 2004; Rendell et 
al. 2011). A set of models suggests that an individual should use social 
learning when its current behaviour is unproductive, when non-social 
learning is costly, or when the individual is uncertain about which 
behaviour fits best in the current circumstances (Boyd and Richerson 
1985; Boyd and Richerson 1988; Feldman et al. 1996; Wakano et al. 
2004). Another set of models deals with strategies that specify from whom 
an individual should learn. In some situations, individuals can benefit 
from attending to the frequency of behaviour in a population, and may be 
inclined to adopt behaviour that is common (Boyd and Richerson 1985; 
Godin and Dugatkin 1996; Richerson and Boyd 2004). In other situations, 
individuals may prefer behaviour that is rare (Griskevicius et al. 2006). In 
case individuals can estimate the success or performance of their peers, 
they may even adopt more sophisticated strategies, such as payoff-based 
learning. Individuals can profit from imitating high-rank or prestigious 
peers, or copying those peers that do better than themselves (Schlag 
1998; Gintis 2000; Henrich and Gil-White 2001). In addition, the content 
of social information likely influences the probability that traits transmit 
between individuals. For instance, experimental evidence suggests that 




more accurately than information about individual behaviour or 
information about the environment (Mesoudi et al. 2006). 
The passing of socially learned information between individuals has 
interesting similarities with the process of the inheritance of genes from 
parents to offspring. In order to contrast this process with genetic 
transmission, it has been termed ‘cultural transmission’. The analogy 
between cultural and genetic transmission has been popularised by 
Dawkins (Dawkins 1976). Views, ideas or beliefs (or ‘memes’, as Dawkins 
calls them) can vary within a population, and be transmitted between 
individuals. From time to time, individuals experiment with their 
environment, try out new behaviours or invent new techniques. The 
resulting ‘innovations’ add to the variation of ideas in the populations, and 
may be viewed as cultural analogues of mutations. Moreover, cultural 
variants can be subject to forms of selection when individuals in a 
population use specific forms of social learning (e.g., conformism or 
payoff-based learning, or when some variants are more likely to be copied 
than others due to their content). Because cultural variants are heritable, 
vary within a population and can be subject to selection, it possible for 
cultural traits to evolve over time. In this light, it is not surprising that 
theories of cultural evolution take models of genetic evolution as the point 
of departure to analyse how the distribution of culturally inherited traits 
changes over time (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 
1985).   
While theoretical research on cultural evolution has lifted off since the 
1980’s, almost nothing is known about how cultural variants are 
represented in neural structures of the brains of their bearers. For 
instance, it is unknown whether cultural transmission involves the 
particulate inheritance of discrete units of information. It seems that 
cultural inheritance is in many cases not particulate; think of political 
beliefs that tend to vary continuously from left wing to right wing, or the 
width and length of arrow heads that vary on a continuum (Mesoudi 
2011b). However, it might be that – in similarity to the genetic inheritance 
system – phenotypes can vary continuously while the underlying units of 
transmission are particulate (think of the length or height of an organism 
as an example). Because of the lack of an empirical basis for the units of 





underlying cultural traits and the specifics of their realisation in different 
individuals. I will take cultural variants as behavioural traits that can be 
transmitted between individuals through social learning, and are able to 
affect individual behaviour.  
The direction and outcome of cultural evolution depend on the social 
learning strategies that individuals in a population use. For instance, when 
individuals in a population tend to learn from more successful peers (e.g., 
peers that more efficient in dealing with their environment), cultural 
evolution can have dynamics that are similar to those of genetic evolution 
by natural selection. In genetic evolution, natural selection leads to the 
preferential transmission of genetic variants that enhance the 
performance (or ‘fitness’) of their bearers. Similarly, when individuals 
tend to adopt traits by payoff-based learning, variants that enhance the 
performance of individuals are transmitted more frequently. As a result, 
adaptive behaviour can spread through a population. Alternatively, when 
individuals tend to follow the majority in determining their behaviour, 
common traits will tend to become even more common, whereas rare 
traits tend to decrease in frequency even more. The outcome of cultural 
evolution under such conformist learning thus depends on the initial 
conditions present in the population. The differences and similarities 
between genetic and cultural evolution are discussed further below. 
In this thesis I aim to contribute to our understanding of cultural 
evolution, both by developing models and by conducting experiments that 
test the assumptions and predictions of these models. First, I 
systematically map out the consequences of various forms of social 
learning – such as following a leader, or following the majority – for the 
direction and outcome of cultural evolution in a number of interaction 
contexts (Chapters 2 and 3). Second, I investigate what forms of social 
learning people actually use in such situations, and whether individuals 
are consistent in their use of their social learning strategies (Chapters 4 
and 5). Third, I assess what historical information about social 
interactions people use when cooperating with interaction partners 
(Chapters 6 and 7). The following section of this introduction will further 
introduce the connection between social learning and human cooperation, 




Social learning and human cooperation 
So far I have discussed social learning and human cooperation separately. 
However, these two processes are intimately linked. Sharing valuable 
information through communication presents a form of cooperation 
between individuals. Many forms of social learning depend on people’s 
willingness to take time to teach, demonstrate specific techniques and 
transmit social norms to others. Conversely, social learning can have a 
great impact on human cooperation. An influential view holds that when 
behaviours transmit culturally, rather than genetically, cooperation is 
more likely to evolve (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich 2004). The 
advocates of this view use models of cultural transmission that help to 
explain the high levels of cooperation between humans, as well as the 
diversity in norms of cooperation between cultures (Boyd and Richerson 
1985; Henrich and Boyd 1998; Henrich 2004; Richerson and Boyd 2004). 
This strand of models is built upon the insight that, despite the similarities 
between genetic and cultural transmission, the laws of inheritance 
between them differ in a number of ways. The most important difference 
is that cultural evolution is argued to be based not only on payoff-based 
transmission (which would lead to dynamics similar to those of genetic 
evolution), but also largely on other forms of social learning, and 
conformism in particular. As a consequence, genetic and cultural evolution 
can lead to very distinct outcomes.   
To see how these different outcomes are reached in contexts of human 
cooperation, consider a population of individuals involved in a social 
dilemma. For clarity of exposition, let us focus on a simple scenario in 
which individuals have two behavioural options: they can either choose 
whether or not to contribute to a joint project that benefits all group 
members (for instance, helping to defend a tribal village from an outside 
threat). In this interaction context, all individuals in a group obtain higher 
payoffs when they all contribute (where all members cooperate and 
benefit from a safe village), compared to a situation in which all 
individuals defect (where none of the members protects the village, 
resulting in frequent raids by bandits). Individually, however, the highest 
payoffs are acquired by refraining from contributing to the defence, 
reaping the benefits of safety without paying the costs of risking injuries. 





other. Now suppose that an individual’s tendency to cooperate is 
governed by a gene with two alleles: ‘cooperate’ and ‘defect’. Everything 
else being equal, natural selection would predict that the ‘defect’ allele 
increases in frequency due to its higher payoffs, and that cooperators will 
eventually go extinct. Similarly, if the tendency to cooperate is governed 
by a socially learned trait, and individuals use payoff-based learning to 
update this tendency, cooperation is likely to decrease. When individuals 
use other forms of social learning, however, cooperation might be stable. 
For instance, when a tribe mainly consists of cooperative individuals, 
conformist social learning is likely to lead to a situation where all 
individuals cooperate.  
The argument above sketches a scenario in which cultural evolution can 
lead to cooperation within one group. The advocates of this argument 
often invoke ‘cultural group selection’ as a mechanism of how cooperation 
can spread throughout a larger metapopulation structured into different 
groups (Henrich and Boyd 1998; Boyd et al. 2003; Henrich 2004). As 
already suggested by Darwin, selection is not by definition limited to the 
level of individuals, and anthropological evidence suggests that fierce 
competition between tribes of humans was quite common in our 
evolutionary history (Darwin 1871; Soltis et al. 1995). It is plausible that 
high degrees of cooperation enhanced the ability of prehistoric tribes to 
maintain superior systems of subsistence, sustain healthier warriors, and 
have a bigger army with superior war technologies. As a consequence, 
tribes of selfish individuals are likely to lose wars and to be supplanted by 
more cooperative tribes, or be taken up in these tribes and, over time, 
adopt their cultural traits. In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, I discuss to 
what extent cultural evolution can lead to stable cooperation within one 
group and how specific forms of between-group selection can lead to the 
spread of cooperation on a larger scale.  
In a social dilemma situation, within-group selection (through payoff-
based learning) favours defection, whereas between-group selection 
favours cooperation. So, at these two levels, selection works in opposite 
directions. The net direction of change depends on the relative strength of 
the selective forces, as well as on the amount of variation on each level 
(Price 1970). For group selection to facilitate the evolution of cooperation, 




the variation within groups. Since conformist social learning tends to 
reduce variation within groups, it can promote the cultural evolution of 
cooperation by group selection (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and 
Boyd 1998; Henrich and Boyd 2001; Bowles 2001; Richerson and Boyd 
2004). This argument suggests that in principle, specific forms of social 
learning (conformist learning in particular) may widen the range of 
conditions under which cooperation is likely to evolve. However, a range 
of studies taking a different modelling approach show that the cultural 
evolution of cooperation strongly depends on specific assumptions on the 
demographics of the population (e.g., the way the population is structured, 
and rates of migration between groups) and the way that cooperation can 
spread between groups (e.g., by differential migration or by replacement 
of groups; (Lehmann and Feldman 2008; Lehmann et al. 2008a; Lehmann 
et al. 2008b). Moreover, these authors conclude that conformism can 
hinder rather than promote the cultural evolution of cooperation. This 
strongly contrasting conclusion led to a hot debate which is still ongoing 
in the literature (Boyd et al. 2011b). This issue us taken up in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis, in which I offer a systematic comparison of the effects of 
various social learning strategies and forms of group selection within one 
modelling framework.  
Perhaps the largest obstacle for progress in understanding of cultural 
evolution is fact that model assumptions on how traits transmit between 
individuals generally lack a solid empirical justification. Assumptions on 
social learning strategies – and conformism in particular – are often based 
on theoretical considerations (e.g., (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich 
and Boyd 1998; Richerson and Boyd 2004). Elsewhere, assumptions on 
social learning are justified by appealing to their ability to explain a range 
of social phenomena, such as the persistence of maladaptive social norms 
(Bowles 2001; Henrich 2004). Most of the empirical evidence supporting 
these models derives from social psychological experiments in which 
students are confronted with decision making contexts different from 
cooperation or coordination problems, or not specifically targeted to 
measure social learning strategies (e.g., (Asch 1956; Insko et al. 1985; Wit 
1999).  
Over the last decade, however, a body of experimental data has started to 





(McElreath et al. 2005; Efferson et al. 2007; McElreath et al. 2008; 
Efferson et al. 2008; Mesoudi 2008; Mesoudi et al. 2008; Traulsen et al. 
2010; Mesoudi 2011a). These experiments on human social learning 
strategies are the first steps towards establishing an empirically grounded 
theory of cultural evolution. In a typical experiment, people are invited 
into a computer laboratory and repeatedly asked to make decisions under 
controlled conditions. Participants can choose between a number of 
different options, each of which is associated with a certain payoff. Payoffs 
are noisy, so it can be useful to collect social information to find out which 
behaviour leads to the best outcome. In the controlled circumstances of a 
decision making laboratory, aspects of social learning strategies can be 
estimated by documenting which social information people attend to 
before making their decisions, and how such information affects the 
choices they make. The picture of human social learning strategies 
emerging from these experiments shows that payoffs as well as 
frequencies of peers’ behaviour play a role in human social learning. The 
growing body of evidence is, however largely confined to situations in 
which individuals have to deal with a single non-social problem, such as 
finding out which technology works best in a newly encountered 
environment. However, to understand the role of cultural transmission in 
the evolution of human cooperation, it is crucial to know how people learn 
from each other in social situations where payoffs of behaviour depend on 
what others are doing. To the best of my knowledge, almost no empirical 
evidence exists for human social learning strategies in such situations. By 
studying experimentally how people learn from each other in a range of 
social contexts, I aim to contribute to the empirical groundwork for 
theories of the cultural evolution of cooperation. 
In this thesis I study the interplay between human cooperation and social 
learning. By theoretical investigation of the interactive effects of different 
forms of social learning and group selection I aim to shed light on the 
extent to which cultural evolution can lead to the evolution of cooperation 
(Chapters 2 and 3). Moreover, I provide experimental evidence on human 
social learning strategies in a variety of social contexts (Chapters 4 and 5). 
Additional analyses of strategic diversity in cooperative behaviour – in 
particular, with respect to reciprocal helping behaviour – can be found 





In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis I explore how various forms of social 
learning affect the distribution of behavioural social strategies over time. 
These two chapters provide the general theoretical framework for this 
thesis. The models presented in this part are conceptual in nature; their 
purpose is not to represent a complete and realistic image of how social 
learning works in humans. Rather, they single out factors that may be of 
importance in causing cultural change – and study their impact on the 
direction and outcome of cultural evolution.  
In Chapter 2, I offer a systematic survey of how two prominent forms of 
social learning – conformism and payoff-based learning – affect the 
outcome of cultural evolution in a number of interaction contexts. I offer a 
set of game theoretic models in which individuals interact in a range of 
different social settings, in each of which the payoffs of an individual’s 
behaviour depend on the behaviour of others in a different way. In 
determining their behaviour, individuals can occasionally update their 
behavioural strategy by imitating other members of their group. This 
updating occurs based on the payoffs or the frequency of a certain 
behaviour. In each of these games, I study how the direction and outcome 
of cultural evolution is affected by the relative frequency of either social 
learning rule. I conclude this chapter with an analysis of the effect of 
conformism on the evolution of cooperation by cultural group selection. I 
do this by focusing on a stochastic model of cultural evolution in a social 
dilemma in a group-structured population, allowing individuals to 
occasionally update their behaviour by comparing their payoffs to 
members from other groups, thereby introducing the group as a level of 
selection to the system.  
Chapter 3 takes up the latter issue and digs deeper into the dynamics of 
cultural group selection in populations of individuals that face a social 
dilemma. Using individual-based simulations, I further investigate how 
various forms of social learning affect the outcome of cultural evolution. 
More specifically, I intend to help resolve a hot issue in the current 
literature on whether, and to what extent, social learning promotes the 





Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis aim to support theories of cultural 
evolution and cooperation with empirical evidence. I study human social 
learning strategies and cooperative interactions – as well as the interplay 
between these two – using techniques borrowed from experimental 
economics. I present the results of a set of decision making experiments 
on human social learning strategies. These experiments aim to provide 
empirical support for theories of cultural evolution by studying the 
mechanisms of cultural transmission. Specifically, Chapter 4 focuses on 
the use of social information in a range of interaction contexts. I study how 
individuals make use of social information in making decisions under 
uncertainty, and focus on the consistency in their individual social 
learning strategies across interaction contexts. Chapter 5 complements 
these findings by investigating the extent to which these strategies are 
stable over time. In addition, I investigate potential links between social 
learning strategies and the outcome of group interactions in a social 
dilemma.  
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the issue of how reciprocity affects the outcome 
of cooperative interactions. When deciding to help someone, people often 
take into account this person’s history of cooperative behaviour towards 
themselves through direct experience (direct reciprocity), and towards 
others through reputations (indirect reciprocity). In Chapter 6 I 
investigate the interplay of direct and indirect reciprocity in an 
experimental setting. These mechanisms together governed human 
cooperation for most of our evolutionary history, but thus far, the effects 
of direct and indirect reciprocity were always studied in isolation. I 
describe the results of a decision making experiment shedding light on the 
concerted action of personal experience and reputations on the dynamics 
of cooperation in groups. Chapter 7 zooms in on the dynamics of indirect 
reciprocity. I present the results of an experiment designed to study how 
individuals condition their cooperation decisions on past behaviour of 
their interaction partners. In particular, our setup allows individuals to 
observe the information that their interaction partners had, when 
deciding to help others. By analysing how individuals react to such 
second-order information, I obtain insight into the extent to which 




consequences of individual variation in strategies on the outcome of social 
interactions.   
Chapter 8 summarises the main results presented in this thesis, and 
places these findings into a broader context. I conclude by delineating 
issues that remained unaddressed here, and describe potentially 





















Models of cultural evolution study how the distribution of cultural traits 
changes over time. The dynamics of cultural evolution strongly depends 
on the way these traits are transmitted between individuals by social 
learning. Two prominent forms of social learning are payoff-based 
learning (imitating others that have higher payoffs) and conformist 
learning (imitating locally common behaviours). How payoff-based and 
conformist learning affect the cultural evolution of cooperation is 
currently a matter of lively debate, but few studies systematically analyse 
the interplay of these forms of social learning. Here we perform such a 
study by investigating how the interaction of payoff-based and conformist 
learning affects the outcome of cultural evolution in three social contexts. 
First, we develop a simple argument that provides insights into how the 
outcome of cultural evolution will change when more and more 
conformist learning is added to payoff-based learning. In a social dilemma 
(e.g., a Prisoner’s Dilemma), conformism can turn cooperation into a 
stable equilibrium; in an evasion game (e.g., a Hawk-Dove game or a 
Snowdrift game) conformism tends to destabilize the polymorphic 
equilibrium; and in a coordination game (e.g., a Stag Hunt game), 
conformism changes the basin of attraction of the two equilibria. Second, 
we analyse a stochastic event-based model, revealing that conformism 
increases the speed of cultural evolution towards pure equilibria. 
Individual-based simulations as well as the analysis of the diffusion 
approximation of the stochastic model by and large confirm our findings. 
Third, we investigate the effect of an increasing degree of conformism on 
cultural group selection in a group-structured population. We conclude 
that, in contrast to statements in the literature, conformism hinders rather 
than promotes the evolution of cooperation. 




Social learning enables humans to survive in a broad array of different 
habitats across the planet. By learning from their peers, individuals can 
rapidly acquire adaptive information about which behaviour is optimal 
under a variety of environmental conditions. Models of cultural evolution 
use insights from theories of genetic evolution to study how cultural 
variants, such as ideas and beliefs, spread through populations of 
individuals by social learning. Social learning based on imitating the 
behaviour of successful individuals can lead to an evolutionary dynamic 
similar to the spread of alleles under natural selection, whereas learning 
by adopting behaviours from others more randomly leads to a process 
resembling genetic drift.  
Models of cultural evolution have to be adapted to the specific 
mechanisms by which cultural traits transmit between individuals. Traits 
can be transmitted not only vertically from parents to offspring, but in a 
range of different ways. For instance, traditional hunters may learn from 
their parents a social norm to share hunting revenues, and may learn the 
optimal design of an arrow from their fellow hunters. How humans learn 
from each other is a topic of extensive theoretical and empirical research 
(for a recent overview see Rendell et al. (2011)), and various specific 
forms of social learning (termed ‘social learning strategies’ (Laland 2004) 
or ‘learning biases’ (Boyd and Richerson 1985)) have been studied as to 
how they affect the spread of cultural traits through populations. Two 
forms of social learning received particular attention: conformism and 
payoff-based learning.  
When individuals can evaluate the payoffs of the behavioural strategies of 
others, the preferential imitation of high-payoff individuals can lead to the 
rapid spread of adaptive behaviours in a population (Henrich and Gil-
White 2001). However, such payoff-based learning is not always feasible. 
Getting insights in the payoffs received by others is not always 
straightforward, especially for newcomers in a population. In cases like 
this, imitating the majority (conformism) can be a good alternative form of 
social learning, in particular if the success of cultural traits strongly 
depends on the local circumstances (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich 




The role of conformism in cultural evolution has recently become the 
matter of considerable debate. In the context of a social dilemma, payoff-
based learning will tend to inhibit the spread of cooperation because 
defectors obtain higher payoffs by reaping the benefits of cooperation 
without paying the costs. Theory suggest that when payoff-based learning 
is complemented by other forms of social learning, the dynamics of 
cultural evolution can be strongly affected. For instance, adding random 
learning to payoff-based learning can facilitate the rapid solution of 
coordination problems (Vilone et al. 2012), and conformism can stabilise 
cooperative equilibria under specific conditions (Boyd and Richerson 
1985; Henrich and Boyd 1998; Henrich and Boyd 2001; Nowak et al. 
2004; Skyrms 2005; Traulsen et al. 2006; Andrés Guzmán et al. 2007; 
Peña et al. 2009). Moreover, conformism can homogenise groups 
internally, thereby augmenting the relative amount of variation between 
groups (Henrich and Boyd 1998). This decreases the scope for selection 
within groups (i.e., payoff-based transmission disfavouring cooperation), 
and increases the potential role of ‘cultural group selection’. In group-
structured populations, cooperation can spread when groups of 
cooperators have some advantage over groups of defectors. This 
advantage can manifest itself in a number of different ways; cooperative 
groups may send out more migrants, grow to larger sizes, or replace other 
groups (e.g., Boyd et al. 2003; Henrich 2004; Traulsen and Nowak 2006; 
Andrés Guzmán et al. 2007). Selection at the group level may also occur 
when individuals occasionally learn from members of other groups that 
perform better (Henrich and Gil-White 2001; Boyd and Richerson 2002; 
Lehmann et al. 2008; Lehmann and Feldman 2008). Through such a 
process, cooperation can be promoted since individuals in cooperative 
groups have higher payoffs than individuals in groups of non-cooperators.  
Experiments from psychology and behavioural economics suggest that 
humans indeed use both conformist and payoff-based learning in 
determining their behaviour (Asch 1956; McElreath et al. 2005; Efferson 
et al. 2008; Traulsen et al. 2010). When individuals are allowed to use 
both conformist and payoff-based learning, experimental evidence 
suggests that cultural traits can spread through a mixture of these two 
forms of social learning (McElreath et al. 2005; McElreath et al. 2008; 
Mesoudi 2011). This raises the question of how the interplay of 
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conformist and payoff-based learning affects the spread of cultural traits 
through a population.  
First, we develop a simple argument to delineate how the direction of 
cultural change is affected by the relative rate of conformist and payoff-
based learning. This will give us an intuitive insight in the effects of 
conformism in various contexts of social interaction. Second, we construct 
stochastic models that allow us to follow the spread of culturally 
transmitted behaviours in the course of time in a finite population. These 
models allow us to quantify how the relative degree of conformism (as 
opposed to payoff-based learning) affects the success of social strategies 
in reaching fixation. Third, we examine how cooperation can spread in a 
group-structured population by means of cultural group selection. With 
this model, we investigate whether conformism tends to promote – as 
often claimed in the literature – or hamper the spread of cooperation in 
populations that are structured into groups of finite size. 
 
Analysis and results 
2.1. Model structure 
We consider a population in which individuals are involved in social 
interactions. Individuals have a culturally acquired strategy that 
determines their behaviour in these interactions. We consider two 
variants of this behaviour (A or B). An individual has the inclination of 
playing either A or B, but this inclination can change over the course of 
time due to social learning. Learning is either based on payoffs 
(individuals tend to imitate successful individuals) or on conformism 
(individuals tend to imitate the majority of the population). The relative 
frequency γ of these two forms of social learning is the key parameter of 
interest. The value of γ ranges from 0 to 1. If γ=0, all learning is payoff-
based; if γ=1, all learning is based on conformism. If 0 < γ < 1, individuals 
use a mixture of these two forms of social learning. We assume that all 
individuals use the same mixture of conformist and payoff-based learning. 
Individuals acquire payoffs by social interaction with others in their 











. The payoff of A-individuals is  
(1 )A p a p b             (2.1a) 
and the payoff of B-individuals is  
(1 )B p c p d      .       (2.1b) 
There are three strategically different classes of games with two pure 
strategies, and we consider the evolutionary dynamics in each of these 
‘interaction contexts’. In the first class of games, one of the pure strategies 
(say B) is dominant over the other: a c  and b d . In the special case 
wherea d , this is a social dilemma. Collective interests are opposed to 
individual interests: when all individuals exhibit behaviour A 
(‘cooperate’), payoffs are higher than when all individuals exhibit 
behaviour B (‘defect’). Individually, however, B yields higher payoffs than 
A, irrespective of what others are doing. Second, we consider the class of 
coordination games, which are characterized by a c and b d . In this 
case, the payoff of a pure strategy increases with the number of 
individuals using this strategy. In a coordination game, both pure 
strategies are Nash equilibrium strategies. In addition, there is a 








.       (2.2) 
Third, we consider the class of evasion games, where a c and b d . 
Now the relative payoff of each pure strategy decreases with the 
frequency of this strategy in the population. In an evasion game, none of 
the pure strategies is a Nash equilibrium; instead an evasion game has a 
unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, which is given by eq. (2.2). The Hawk-
Dove game and the Snowdrift game are prominent examples of evasion 
games.  
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2.2. Representation of conformism by a coordination game 
Before studying the dynamics of cultural evolution in finite populations, 
we aim to get some intuition on how conformism might change the 
direction of cultural evolution. To this end, we represent conformism-










. In this coordination game, the payoff to each 
pure strategy is proportional to its frequency in the population:   A p s  
and (1 )   B p s ,where s is positive. Accordingly, the pure strategy with 
highest frequency is favoured by payoff-based learning, just as it is in case 
of conformism-based learning. Based on these considerations, a mixture of 
payoff-based learning (characterised by matrix G) and conformist learning 
(characterised by matrix K) can be described by the combined matrix 
(1 ) (1 )
( ) (1 )
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   
 . (2.3) 
It is now straightforward to characterise the expected direction of cultural 
change as a function of our key parameter γ by determining the Nash 
equilibrium strategies of the matrix game M(γ). This can be done with 
standard methods (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994): Pure strategy A is a 
















inequalities are more easily satisfied for larger values of s or γ and will 
always hold if γ approaches 1. When both inequalities are reversed, M(γ) 
has a (dynamically stable) mixed Nash equilibrium at  
(1 )( )
*
(1 )( ) 2
d b s
p
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.     (2.4) 
For each of the three interaction contexts, Figure 2.1 illustrates how the 
dynamics of cultural evolution (increase or decrease in the frequency of 




First, consider the extreme case 0  , at the bottom of the three panels of 
Figure 2.1. Here, all learning occurs on the basis of the payoffs in matrix G. 
In the social dilemma, A (cooperate) is disfavoured by payoff-based 
learning, and cultural evolution will lead to a decrease of the frequency of 
A (Figure 2.1A, bottom arrow to the left) and convergence to the sole Nash 
equilibrium * 0p  . The coordination game has two pure-strategy Nash 
equilibria ( * 0p   and * 1p  ) that are separated by the dynamically 
unstable mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (eq. 2.2). The two arrows at the 
bottom of Figure 2.1B indicate that cultural evolution will either lead to 
the fixation of A or to the fixation of B, and that the outcome depends on 
initial conditions. In the evasion game, the arrows at the bottom of Figure 
2.1C indicate that the system will converge to the mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium (eq. 2.2), where A and B stably coexist. Next consider the 
other extreme 1  , where all learning is conformism based, i.e. governed 
by matrix K (top of the three panels in Figure 2.1). Now the expected 
direction of change is identical for each of the three interaction contexts: 
since K is a coordination game, the two pure strategies are Nash equilibria 
and cultural evolution will either lead to the fixation of A or to the fixation 
of B, depending on initial conditions (top arrows in all three panels). Due 
to conformist learning, the strategy that is initially more abundant is most 
likely to spread to fixation.  
 







Figure 2.1. Effects of conformism on the dynamics of cultural 
evolution when conformism-based learning is represented by a 
coordination game. In three interaction contexts (social dilemma, 
coordination game, evasion game), colours and arrows indicate the 
expected change in the frequency of behavioural strategy A for a given 
value of γ, the relative frequency of conformism-based learning. In blue 
regions (arrows to the right), A tends to increase; in red regions 
(arrows to the left), A tends to decrease. When all learning is 
conformism-based (γ =1), cultural evolution will either lead to the 
fixation of A or to the fixation of B, depending on which strategy was 
initially most frequent in the population. When all learning is payoff-
based (γ =0), strategy A (‘cooperation’) will disappear in the social 
dilemma; either A or B will go to fixation in the coordination game; and 
A and B will stably coexist in the evasion game. Changing γ from 0 to 1 
leads to a smooth transition between these two scenarios. Parameters 























For intermediate frequencies of conformism 0 1  , we observe a 
gradual shift between the two extreme cases 0   and 1  . In the social 
dilemma (Figure 2.1A), cooperation becomes a stable equilibrium as soon 







): when a group 
mainly consists of cooperators, conformist learning leads to the 
maintenance and fixation of this most abundant strategy, despite of its 
payoff disadvantage. In the coordination game (Figure 2.1B), the direction 
of change remains qualitatively unchanged, but the unstable Nash 
equilibrium separating the basins of attraction shifts from eq. (2.2) to 
p*=0.5, the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the coordination game K. 
In the evasion game (Figure 2.1C), A and B coexist at equilibrium when 
learning is mainly based on payoffs (small γ). High frequencies of 
conformism γ decrease the scope for this coexistence. When conformism 
occurs at a sufficiently high frequency (moving towards the top of the 
panel), the direction of expected change is reversed, and the two 
monomorphic equilibria become stable.  
2.3. A stochastic model for cultural evolution in finite populations 
The approach taken above provides an intuitive understanding of the role 
of conformism in various types of interaction contexts. However, it is not 
clear whether, and to what extent, the features of conformism-based 
learning are captured by a coordination game. We therefore developed a 
dynamic model for cultural evolution where conformism is represented in 
a more mechanistic way. Cultural evolution takes place in finite (and often 
small) populations, where chance events may play an important role. 
Accordingly, we consider a stochastic model for cultural evolution in a 
finite population of fixed size n. Our model is event-based, where an 
‘event’ corresponds to a potential change in strategy by one population 
member. In each time step (i.e. when an event occurs) two individuals are 
chosen at random from the population, and one of them is allowed to 
update its behavioural strategy (A or B) by learning from the other. 
Updating occurs either through conformist or payoff-based learning. For 
each state of the population (i.e. each possible frequency of A-strategists), 
we calculate the probability that an A-individual switches to B, and that a 
B-individual switches to A. At the population level, each such switch 
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corresponds to a decrease or to an increase of the number of A-individuals 
by one. Since we neglect the spontaneous emergence of A- or B-strategists 
(the cultural equivalent of genetic mutations), the stochastic process will 
eventually lead to an ‘absorbing state’, where all individuals have adopted 
either of the two strategies. To assess the effects of conformist learning on 
the outcome of cultural evolution, we evaluate how our key parameter γ 
affects the fixation probability and waiting time to fixation for each of the 
two behavioural strategies (Karlin and Taylor 1975).  
Let i be the number of A-strategists in the population, and let iT
  and iT

 
denote the probability of gaining resp. losing one A-individual. We model 
the switching dynamics by using pairwise comparison (cf. Traulsen et al. 
2006). When an event occurs, two individuals are chosen at random from 
the population. A change in strategy can only take place when these two 








. In state i, switching from A to B (probability iT
 ) and 
from B to A (probability iT








   

            (2.5)
 
where C and P denote the probabilities of switching due to conformist and 
payoff-based learning, respectively. For both forms of social learning, we 
specify the switching probabilities as a logistic function of the differences 
in payoffs (in case of payoff-based learning) or frequencies (in case of 
conformist learning) between strategies A and B. In state i, payoff-based 
switching from B to A ( iP
 ), and from A to B ( iP
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where ( )A i and ( )B i (see equation (2.1)) refer to the payoffs of 
strategies A and B in state i, respectively. Parameter βP quantifies the 
strength and direction of the relation between the payoff difference and 
the probability of switching.  When βP=0, payoff-based learning is not 
biased in any particular direction, and is expected to lead to dynamics 
similar to genetic drift. When βP is large, payoff-based learning is strongly 
biased, favouring the spread of strategies with the highest payoff (see 
Figure S2.1 in the Appendix for an illustration).  
Conformist learning is represented in a similar way. In state i, conformist 
switching occurs with probabilities 
 
1
Pr( | ) 1 exp ( ( ) ( )i C B AC B A i f i f i




Pr( | ) 1 exp ( ( ) ( )i C A BC A B i f i f i











 refer to the relative frequencies of 
strategies A and B, respectively. Parameter βC quantifies the strength and 
direction of frequency-based social learning. When βC=0, such learning is 
not biased in any particular direction; when βC is large, individuals are 
strongly inclined to adopt the more frequent strategy in the population 
(see Figure S2.1).  
Now we have specified T  and T 
 
for all states i of the population, we can 
use standard methods (Karlin and Taylor 1975) to calculate fixation 
probabilities φ and waiting times to fixation, for various initial 
abundances of strategy A and B, as a function of the relative frequency of 
conformism γ. In the Appendix, section 2.2, we show how explicit 
equations for the fixation probabilities can be derived on the basis of a 
diffusion approximation of the stochastic model.  
We assess the influence of the social learning rules on the outcome of 
cultural evolution by comparing the fixation probabilities φk of A for a 
given initial abundance k of this strategy to that of a ‘neutral’ process, 
where all switching occurs randomly. It is well known that in the latter 
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case φk equals the initial frequency k/n of A (Karlin and Taylor 1975). 
Panels A to C in Figure 2.2 illustrate the effects of conformism on the 
fixation probability of A (cooperate) in a social dilemma. When all 
switching occurs on the basis of payoffs (γ=0; 2.2A), cooperation is always 
disfavoured. Accordingly, fixation of A is very unlikely unless the initial 
abundance of A is relatively large. In fact, all fixation probabilities (red 
dots) are below the diagonal, indicating that fixation of A is for all values 
of k less likely than ‘neutral’ updating. If social learning is partly based on 
conformism (γ=0.25, 2.2B; γ=0.5, 2.2C), the fixation curve becomes more 
S-shaped. Strategy A is increasingly likely to fixate when its initial 
abundance is high, which agrees with our earlier findings (Figure 2.1A).  
In the coordination game without conformism (Figure 2.2D), payoff 
differences near the A equilibrium are relatively small. This means that 
switching from A to B can frequently occur, despite the fact that strategy B 
yields lower payoffs. When the state of the group is close to the unstable 
equilibrium, such stochastic events can tip the group into the basin of 
attraction of B. As conformism increases in frequency, the pure A 
equilibrium tends to be more stable; the fixation probability rises above 
the diagonal k/n line when the initial abundance of A is high (Figure 2.2E, 







In the evasion game, payoff-based learning tends to favour the spread of 
rare strategies. When conformist learning is absent (γ=0, Figure 2.2G), 
fixation of B is often more likely. The polymorphic equilibrium is located 
at n/3, and a group is expected to spend most of the time close to this 
 
Figure 2.2. Effects of conformism on the outcome of cultural 
evolution in a small group. Each panel shows the fixation probability 
of strategy A as a function of its initial abundance (k) in a group of n=30 
individuals. Columns of panels correspond to three different 
frequencies γ of conformism. Symbols represent fixation probabilities 
from the exact stochastic model, and lines represent a diffusion 
approximation to these fixation probabilities (see Appendix, section 2). 
The diagonal dashed lines indicate the fixation probability of a strategy 
under random drift (φk=k/n). Parameter settings: βP=1 and βC=2; 
payoff matrices of the games as in Figure 2.1. 
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equilibrium. Since this state is closer to the absorbing state where all 
individuals play strategy B (relative to the other absorbing state, where all 
individuals play strategy A), stochastic events will more likely lead to 
fixation of B rather than fixation of A. When conformist learning occurs at 
higher frequencies (Figure 2.2H, I), cultural evolution tends to lead to 
fixation of the strategy that was more abundant initially; again, this is in 
line with our earlier findings (Figure 2.1C).  
Conformism also affects the time it takes until a strategy fixates in the 
evasion game (Figure 2.3). In an evasion game, each behavioural strategy 
has higher payoff when rare. Accordingly, payoff-based learning causes a 
group to spend a lot of time in polymorphic states before it reaches one of 
the absorbing states. Increasing the frequency γ of conformist learning has 
two effects: first, the frequency of payoff-based switching decreases, 
which hampers the spread of rare strategies, thereby destabilising the 
coexistence equilibrium. Second, conformist switching accelerates 
fixation, because individuals preferentially adopt common strategies.  
By breaking down polymorphism in the evasion game, conformism affects 
the average payoffs of the group members. A simple calculation shows 
that the average payoff at the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (eq. 2.2) of 




a b c d
. This can be considerably higher 
or lower than the payoff a in case of fixation of behavioural strategy A or 











Figure 2.3. Effects of conformism on the persistence of 
behavioural polymorphism in an evasion game. Lines represent the 
expected number of updating events (i.e. the ‘waiting time’) until a 
group fixates in either A or B, as a function of the frequency of 
conformist updating γ. The dashed blue line indicates waiting times 
when all updating occurs randomly (βP=0; βC=0). The dashed red line 
reflects waiting times when conformism occurs at rate γ, and payoff-
based learning is absent (βP=0; βC=1; random updating occurs at 
frequency 1–γ). The solid blue line reflects waiting times when payoff-
based learning occurs at frequency 1–γ, and conformism is absent 
(βP=1; βC=0; random updating occurs at frequency γ). The solid red line 
represents waiting times in the full model, where payoff-based learning 
is complemented by conformism at rate γ (βP=1; βC=1). Groups were of 
size n=30 and initialised at the coexistence equilibrium p=p* (10 A-
individuals). Payoff matrix as in Figure 2.1. 
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2.4. Evolution of cooperation by cultural group selection 
Finally, we consider a multilevel scenario in which a metapopulation is 
subdivided into m groups of size n. Within groups, individuals face a social 
dilemma. As described above, payoff-based learning within groups tends 
to disfavour cooperation. Once in a while, individuals from two different 
groups are paired for updating by comparing their payoffs. This reflects a 
scenario where individuals occasionally copy behaviours from groups that 
are performing well. It might be that individuals from other groups are 
considered to be healthier, or have more wealth. We assume that 
conformism does not play a role in between-group updating (i.e. 
conformism is a strictly local social learning rule, allowing to cope with 
local conditions). Further, in our model, updating outside the group occurs 
at a much lower rate than within-group updating: in between two outside-
group updating events. This implies that when a new strategy is newly 
introduced into a group, this strategy will either have gone locally extinct, 
or reached fixation before the next between-group event occurs. This 
‘separation of time scales’ allows us to calculate the probability of fixation 
of a ‘cooperative’ A strategy in the metapopulation, by tracking the 
number of groups in the cooperative state. In each time step of this group 
level process, the abundance of cooperator groups can go up by one or go 
down by one, or can stay the same. 
When two individuals from different groups are chosen from the 
population, switching probabilities are defined analogously to updating 
within groups. Switching probabilities depend on the payoff difference 
between groups where cooperation is fixated and groups where defection 
is fixated. This payoff difference is given by a – d.  For this between-group 
process, we again use logistic functions to specify the relationship 
between payoff differences and the probability that one defector switches 
to cooperation Pr( )GB A  and the probability that one cooperator 
switches to defection Pr( )GA B . 
 
1
Pr( ) 1 exp ( )G GB A d a

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





Parameter βG specifies the relation between the payoff difference of the 
members of the two different groups, and the probability of switching. 
Since payoffs are higher in cooperative groups than in defector groups (a 
> d), this process is expected to lead to the spread of cooperation between 
groups. Let j be the number of groups at the cooperative state, and let m–j 
be the number of groups at the defector state. At state j, the probability of 
gaining ( jU

) or losing ( jU

) a cooperative group (by one defector taking 
over a cooperative group, or vice versa, by one cooperator taking over a 
























,      (2.9b) 
where 1  refers to the fixation probability of a single cooperator in a 
group of defectors, and 1 – φn–1 reflects the fixation probability of a single 
defector in a group of cooperators (which is complementary to the fixation 
probability of cooperation starting from state n–1). Using the same 
techniques as before, we can calculate the probability Φ1 that eventually 
all groups have reached the cooperative state, given that we start out with 
1 group of cooperators. The product φ1·Φ1 then denotes the probability 
that cooperation reaches fixation in the metapopulation, given that we 
start out with one individual with the cooperative strategy.   
Figure 4 gives an overview of the fixation probability of cooperation in 
case of a single cooperator in a population structured in m groups of fixed 
size n, under varying population structures and varying frequencies of 
conformism γ. When looking at Figure 2.4B only, one might conclude that 
conformism has a favourable effect on the cultural evolution of 
cooperation, since the fixation probability of cooperation tends to increase 
with γ. In our view, however, this conclusion would be misleading. The 
increasing scope for cooperation is not caused by conformism per se, but 
rather by the associated decrease in frequency of payoff-based learning. 
Decreased frequencies of payoff-based learning weaken selection against 
cooperation within the group. To assess the net effects of conformism, one 
therefore has to compare the results of Figure 2.4B with a benchmark that 
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takes this weakening of payoff-based learning into consideration. This 
benchmark is presented in Figure 2.4A where, with probability γ, 




Figure 2.4. Effects of conformism on the evolution of cooperation 
by cultural group selection. Panels show fixation probability of 
cooperation in a group-structured population where initially only a 
single individual cooperates. Within groups, payoff-based learning 
favours defection, but cooperation can spread between groups by 
occasional learning outside of the local group, because individuals in 
cooperative groups have higher payoffs. The number of groups m was 
varied between 10 and 200, in steps of 5, holding the metapopulation 
size constant at m∙n=1000. The frequency of conformist updating was 
varied between 0 and 1, in steps of 0.01. In (A), βC is equal to zero, 
corresponding to random updating, while the conformism-based 
updating has a strong effect (βC=1) in (B). Hence, panel (A) should 
mainly be viewed as a reference for panel (B). We used an 
interpolation procedure (using the R-package ‘akima’) to smoothen the 
plots. Colours facilitate comparison to the fixation probability of a 
selectively neutral mutant 1/(m·n). The payoff matrix coincides with 




When the frequency of random switching within groups (as opposed to 
payoff-based switching) increases, the scope for cooperation increases 
(Figure 2.4A, going from the left to the right in the panel); within groups, 
the selection against cooperation is weakened, whereas selection between 
groups is kept constant (see Hauert and Imhof (2012) for a general 
analysis of how weakening within-group selection can affect the scope for 
cooperation in group-structured populations). Cooperation is favoured 
most, when the metapopulation is structured into many small groups 
(Figure 2.4A going from the bottom to the top of the panels). When groups 
are small, the probability that a single cooperative strategy reaches 
fixation – in spite of payoff-based learning disfavouring this strategy – is 
relatively large. Once such fixation has happened, cooperation can spread 
to other groups. 
Comparing Figures 2.4A and 2.4B allows us to evaluate the net effects of 
conformism on the cultural evolution of cooperation by group selection. It 
is obvious that conformism hinders rather than favours the evolution of 
cooperation: in the whole parameter range, cooperation spreads more 
easily to fixation when conformism-based updating is random (βC=0) than 
when it has a strong effect (βC=5). Conformism hinders the evolution of 
cooperation because cooperation cannot gain a foothold in new groups: 
whenever a cooperator is introduced in a group of defectors, both 




By means of a simple argument (where conformism was approximated by 
a coordination game), we have shown that the effect of conformism on 
cultural evolution strongly depends on the interaction context. In case of a 
coordination game, conformism merely affects the basins of attraction of 
the two pure-strategy equilibria; in case of a social dilemma, conformism 
can turn cooperation into a stable Nash equilibrium that coexists with an 
equilibrium corresponding to pure defection; and in case of an evasion 
game (such as a Hawk-Dove game or a Snowdrift game), conformism can 
destroy a polymorphic equilibrium and induce evolution to a pure-
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strategy state. These conclusions were confirmed by a more mechanistic 
model for cultural evolution in a finite population. Including cultural 
group selection in this model strongly suggests that conformism tends to 
hinder, rather than promote the cultural evolution of cooperation by 
group selection.  
Our approach using two-by-two matrix games with pure strategies is 
mathematically convenient, allowing to evaluate the success of strategies 
under a range of conditions in a fast and fairly straightforward manner. 
Also, this approach allows for deriving a diffusion approximation of the 
stochastic process, leading to a closed-form expression for fixation 
probabilities of a strategy under any mixture of payoff-based and 
conformist learning (see section 2 of the Appendix). Individual-based 
simulations in which switching between A and B is prone to errors – 
whose magnitudes are inversely related to βP and βC – lead to very similar 
outcomes in terms of fixation probabilities (not shown). This suggests 
that, despite the simplicity of our model, our findings are robust with 
respect to the way in which stochastic effects are introduced in the 
switching dynamics.  
Our analysis is, however, restricted to the situation where each individual 
can only adopt a pure strategy. It remains unclear how conformism would 
influence cultural evolution when individuals are characterised by a 
mixed strategy, which specifies a probability distribution over the pure 
strategies. If such probabilistic tendencies could be transmitted between 
individuals by social learning, the dynamics of cultural evolution could be 
rather different from the scenario considered here (see (Gargiulo and 
Ramasco 2012) for an example). For instance, in an evasion game, all 
individuals could fixate on the same mixed strategy 0 1p  , supporting 
a polymorphism where individuals make use of both pure strategies in a 
probabilistic fashion. In contrast to the findings from our analysis using 
two pure behaviours, conformism would be unlikely to destabilise such a 
behavioural polymorphism. Note, however, that the transmission of 
strategies by social learning depends on the degree to which individuals 
can evaluate the strategies of their peers. Whereas individuals might be 




them accordingly), it is not obvious that more complex (mixed) strategies 
readily transmit between individuals. 
Furthermore, we assume that individuals in the population all use the 
same social learning strategy. Decision making experiments show that 
individuals tend to vary considerably in their social learning strategies 
(e.g., in the degree in which individuals learn based on payoffs; Molleman 
et al. in press; McElreath et al. 2005). Such individual variation in social 
learning strategies can affect the course of cultural evolution. To see this, 
consider a group in which some individuals typically learn based on 
payoffs and others learn based on conformism. This group may reach a 
stable behavioural polymorphism in an evasion game: when conformists 
all perform a common strategy, payoff-based learners can anticipate to 
that by adopting the strategy that is rare. Such an emerging 
differentiation, in which conformist learners perform one behaviour and 
payoff-based learners perform another behaviour, cannot be attained by 
groups that are homogeneous with respect to their social learning 
strategies. In our model, individuals use a mixture of conformist and 
payoff-based learning. As a consequence, a behavioural polymorphism is 
destabilised by a number of consecutive conformist learning events, 
potentially reducing the average payoffs of individuals in a population.  
Human social learning comes in many different forms, and payoff-based 
and conformist learning only represent those forms that have received 
most attention in the social learning literature. Our analysis does not 
account for how other relevant forms of social learning – such as following 
a leader or a teacher – would affect the spread of behaviours within 
groups (see, e.g., Lehmann and Feldman 2008 for how leadership can 
affect the cultural evolution of cooperation). Also, the mechanism that 
spreads behaviours between groups considered our model, is only one 
way that this group-level mechanism might work (Henrich 2004). 
Alternative scenarios in which groups of cooperators grow faster and split 
up when reaching a certain size (Traulsen and Nowak 2006) are likely to 
lead to different outcomes of cultural evolution. Such alternative forms of 
group-level selection can have different consequences for evolutionary 
dynamics, and can interact with within-group social learning in different 
ways. A more specific simulation study (Molleman et al. 2013), 
considering other population structures and different forms and social 
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learning and group selection, arrives at a similar conclusion: conformism 
can promote the cultural evolution of cooperation by group selection 
when groups can replace other groups, whereas cooperation cannot 
evolve when cooperators have to spread singly from group to group by a 
process of ‘infection’.  
Our study leads to the conclusion that conformism has only a marginal 
effect in the context of coordination games, that it tends to erode the 
polymorphic equilibrium in evasion games, and that it does not favour 
cooperation in a social dilemma. In other words, our evaluation of the role 
of conformism is considerably less favourable than the opinion of other 
scholars of cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and 
Boyd 1998; Henrich and Boyd 2001; Henrich 2004; Andrés Guzmán et al. 
2007). To put our conclusion into context, we would like to stress that our 
analysis did not consider potential intrinsic benefits of conformism. Two 
such benefits may be relevant in a variety of situations. First, conformism 
could homogenise groups with respect to a diversity of norms and habits, 
potentially increasing social cohesion and facilitating the establishment of 
trust, thus making it easier to resolve internal conflicts and to get 
cooperation off the ground. Second, conformism could be a beneficial 
strategy in environments with considerable spatial variation in payoffs 
and/or behavioural norms. In a situation like that, newcomers in a local 
group or environment could profit from imitating local habits, thus 
quickly adopting locally superior strategies or adapting to local 
behavioural equilibria. More sophisticated models accounting for spatial 
variation and the mechanisms underlying decision making in groups 
might therefore arrive at a more positive judgement of the role of 






In the first part of this Appendix, we provide a graphical illustration of the 
logistic functions used in our stochastic model to translate information on 
payoff or frequency differences into the probability of switching to 
another strategy. In the second part, we derive a diffusion approximation 
of our stochastic model that yields, by good approximation, analytical 
expressions for the fixation probability of a strategy in a finite population 
as a function of the strategy’s initial frequency.  
 
S2.1. Modelling the probability of switching to another behaviour as 
a function of payoff or frequency differences 
The stochastic model presented in Section 2.4 of the main text specifies 
probabilities of switching as a logistic function of the difference in payoffs 
or frequencies of strategy A and B (equations 2.6a, b and 2.7a, b). Figure 
S2.1 below illustrates this relationship between the payoff or frequency 
differences and switching probabilities for three values of β. The function 
1[1 exp( )]x    specifies switching probabilities when two individuals 
with opposite strategies are paired, given the difference x in their payoffs 
or frequencies. Parameter β specifies the relationship between this 
difference and the probability of switching. When β is large, switching is 
strongly biased towards more frequent behaviour (or behaviours with 
higher payoffs). When β is small, switching is error-prone; a switch 
towards rare (or lower-payoff) behaviour will frequently occur by 
conformist (or payoff-based) learning.  




S2.2. Diffusion approximation of our stochastic model 
The stochastic model of the main text tracks the abundance i of behaviour 
A in a population of size n using transition probabilities between states i of 
the population. In each time step, this state i may change into i+1 or i–1, 
otherwise, the state remains unchanged. Here we use standard methods 
(Karlin and Taylor 1975; Otto and Day 2007, Chapters 14 and 15) to 
derive an analytical approximation of this discrete process by means of a 
diffusion model. The approximation transforms the discrete stochastic 
model in such a way, that the time and state space intervals become so 
small that the change of the system can be analysed as if it were 
continuous.  
For switching probabilities, we take the definition of iT
 and iT
  from the 
updating process described in section 3 of the Analysis and Results. In the 









behaviour A and the rescaled time 2/ t t n . We have to derive the drift 
coefficient ( ) p  and the diffusion coefficient 2 ( ) p  for small time steps 
(  t ), which in the chosen parameterization corresponds to large 
values of n ( n ). 
Using the method in Otto and Day (2007, Box 15.2), it is straightforward 
to derive the first three moments of the expected frequency change per 
unit rescaled time: 
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In the limit n , the third moment vanishes and the drift and diffusion 
terms are given by, respectively, 
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      (S2.5, a, b, c) 
The diffusion approximation is valid if the terms kz  remain finite for large 
values of n, i.e. when Pn  and Cn  remain bounded. In other words, P  
and C  are of order 1n : payoff-based learning and frequency-based 
learning are both weak in large populations.  
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With the help of the drift and the diffusion coefficient, we can now express 
the fixation probability of A as a function of the initial frequency of A, 
0 /p k n
 
. In general, this probability is given by the equation (Otto and 
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   (S2.6) 
Inserting ( ) p  and 2 ( ) p  calculated above reveals that k  can be 
expressed in terms of the error function (erf): 
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with  
1 2 3 2 3( / )(2 ( 2 ))k k n z z z z z            (S2.8a, b)
 
1 2 32 ( 2 )h z z z        
This approximation of fixation probabilities matches the fixation 
probabilities in the stochastic model quite well (see Figure 2.2 of the main 
text).
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The role of cultural group selection in the evolution of human cooperation 
is hotly debated. It has been argued that group selection is more effective 
in cultural evolution than in genetic evolution, because some forms of 
cultural transmission (conformism and/or the tendency to follow a 
leader) reduce intra-group variation while creating stable cultural 
variation between groups. This view is supported by some models, while 
other models lead to contrasting and sometimes opposite conclusions. A 
consensus view has not yet been achieved, partly because the modelling 
studies differ in their assumptions on the dynamics of cultural 
transmission and the mode of group selection. To clarify matters, we 
created an individual-based model allowing for a systematic comparison 
of how different social learning rules governing cultural transmission 
affect the evolution of cooperation in a group-structured population. We 
consider two modes of group selection (selection by group replacement or 
by group contagion) and systematically vary the frequency and impact of 
group-level processes. From our simulations we conclude that the 
outcome of cultural evolution strongly reflects the interplay of social 
learning rules and the mode of group selection. For example, conformism 
hampers or even prevents the evolution of cooperation if group selection 
acts via contagion; it may facilitate the evolution of cooperation if group 
selection acts via replacement. In contrast, leader-imitation promotes the 
evolution of cooperation under a broader range of conditions.  





The extension, degree and diversity of cooperation among unrelated 
individuals are key to the ecological success of humans. The term 
‘cooperation’ refers to behaviours by which benefits arise from the 
interactions between individuals. Hence cooperative behaviour provides 
benefits at the group level. From the individual perspective, however, the 
evolutionary emergence and stability of cooperation is often puzzling. In 
particular, this holds for social dilemmas where performing a cooperative 
act is costly to the actor, and free-riding individuals can reap the benefits 
of cooperation without paying the costs. 
In evolutionary biology, which is focused on genetic evolution, the 
evolutionary emergence and stability of cooperation is the subject of a 
considerable body of literature (Axelrod 1984; Lehmann and Keller 2006; 
Nowak 2006). Since the dawn of evolutionary theory, Darwin suggested 
that the evolution of cooperation might be explained by the differential 
performance of cooperative and non-cooperative groups in intergroup 
competition (Darwin 1859, 1871). Ever since then, this idea has been 
controversial (Maynard Smith 1964; Queller 1992; West et al. 2008; Leigh 
2010). Evolutionary models demonstrate that selection between groups 
can indeed favour cooperation, but only under a limited range of 
demographic conditions (Maynard Smith 1964; Leigh 1983; Lehmann and 
Keller 2006; Lehmann et al. 2006; Traulsen and Nowak 2006). The 
problem is that within-group processes are typically faster than between-
group processes. The rapid spread of individually favoured strategies (like 
refraining from cooperation) within groups erodes intergroup variation 
and, as a consequence, undermines the effectiveness of selection at the 
group level.  
It has been argued that when social strategies are transmitted culturally 
rather than genetically, group selection can favour the evolution of 
cooperation under less restrictive conditions. The transmission of cultural 
traits is mediated by various forms of social learning, some of which play a 
key role in theories of cultural group selection. In particular, conformism, 




(Boyd and Richerson 1985), can retard or prevent the spread of initially 
rare defective strategies (Henrich and Boyd 1998). By homogenizing 
behavioural strategies within groups, conformism changes the 
distribution of variation within and between groups, rendering cultural 
group selection a potentially efficient force promoting the evolution of 
cooperation (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Boyd and Richerson 2002; 
Bowles et al. 2003; Boyd et al. 2003; Henrich 2004; Guzmán et al. 2007; 
Scheuring 2009; Boyd et al. 2011). Recent models, however, cast doubt on 
the facilitating role of conformism in the evolution of cooperation 
(Lehmann et al. 2008; Lehmann and Feldman 2008; Peña et al. 2009). 
These models indicate that conformism can even hamper the evolution of 
cooperation because it hinders the spread of any new strategy in a group. 
Some modelling studies suggest that other mechanisms of social learning, 
such as the tendency to follow a group leader are more efficient in 
promoting cooperation via cultural group selection (Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman 1981; Lehmann et al. 2008; Lehmann and Feldman 2008). The 
contrasting conclusions of different modelling studies by different schools 
of thought have led to an on-going debate on the role of cultural group 
selection. Part of the debate centres on the range of parameter values 
considered reasonable by different authors. Perhaps more importantly, 
comparison across models is hampered by the fact that the models differ 
in their basic assumptions on social learning and group selection (Boyd et 
al. 2011). 
In the theory of genetic evolution, there has been considerable confusion 
and debate around the meaning of ‘group selection’. Some authors even 
argue that this term should be abandoned altogether (West et al. 2007), 
since group selection is a special case of a more general hierarchical 
theory of selection  (Frank, 1986). Yet the concept of group selection can 
be useful in the context of a group-structured population, since group 
traits may be an emergent property of the interaction of group members 
that cannot easily be reduced to individual-level traits (Okasha 2006; 
Simon et al. 2012). When talking about group selection, it is crucial to 
distinguish between two main modes, each representing different 
mechanisms that can have different effects on the outcome of evolution 
(West et al. 2007). First, group selection can be driven by the differential 
extinction and colonization of patches, that is, the replacement of less 
Cultural evolution of cooperation… 
55 
 
successful groups by more successful ones (Maynard Smith 1964; Leigh 
1983). This mode of group selection played a prominent role in the 
earliest discussions on group selection and is currently been referred to as 
‘old’ group selection (West et al. 2007) or multilevel selection 2 (Okasha 
2006). We prefer to use a more descriptive term and will henceforth refer 
to ‘replacement group selection’ when group selection is driven by the 
replacement of less successful groups by more successful ones. Second, 
group selection can be driven by the differential production of individuals 
migrating to and settling in other groups, that is, the ‘contagion’ of groups 
by individuals derived from other groups (Wilson 1975; Rogers 
1990).This mode of group selection has been coined ‘trait-group’ selection 
(Wilson 1975), ‘new’ group selection (West et al. 2007), or multilevel 
selection 1 (Okasha 2006).  As a more descriptive term, we propose to call 
this mode ‘contagion group selection’. In the biological literature, the 
distinction between group selection by replacement and group selection 
by contagion, or the lack of it, has produced extensive discussion(Okasha 
2004, 2006; West et al. 2007, 2008; Wilson 2008) and confusion (Wilson 
and Wilson 2007). Despite this, there have been very few attempts to 
compare the requirements for each of these processes to work (Lehmann 
et al. 2006; García and Van den Bergh 2011).  
In cultural evolution, the distinction between replacement and contagion 
group selection is as relevant as in biological evolution (Henrich 2004). 
Replacement group selection corresponds to the cultural take-over of 
whole groups by other more successful groups (Boyd et al. 2003; Traulsen 
and Nowak 2006; Guzmán et al. 2007). This may happen as a result of 
intergroup conflicts, where the winning group imposes their ‘culture’ 
upon subdued groups (Boyd et al. 2003; Traulsen and Nowak 2006; 
Guzmán et al. 2007). It may proceed in a more indirect way, if less 
successful groups tend to disband and go extinct, while well-performing 
groups bud off subgroups recolonising empty patches (Soltis et al. 1995). 
Contagion group selection is mediated by the more gradual migration of 
cultural traits from one group to another. This may, for example, happen if 
the cultural traits observed in well-performing groups are preferentially 
imitated by the individuals of other groups, leading to the gradual 
introgression of group-beneficial strategies into less successful groups 




2008). It is to be expected that, as in genetic evolution, the two modes of 
group selection have contrasting effects on the course and outcome of 
cultural evolution. Yet, systematic studies on these effects are currently 
lacking. 
Before continuing it is important to clarify the meaning of the term 
‘selection’ in the context of cultural evolution. We use a definition that is 
analogous to the usage of natural selection in genetic evolution, but 
somewhat more restricted than the definitions often given in the 
literature on cultural evolution (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; 
Boyd and Richerson 1985). In genetic evolution, natural selection refers to 
the preferential transmission of alleles that enhance the ‘fitness’ of 
individuals, groups or other entities, that is, the ability of these entities to 
survive and reproduce. Darwinian fitness is often measured in payoffs that 
are acquired in interactions with others. Natural selection is an important 
driver of evolutionary change, but there are many other processes 
(including genetic drift and mutation pressure) leading to a change in 
allele frequencies. These processes differ from natural selection in that the 
evolutionary success of an allele is not related to the effect this allele has 
on the performance of the individuals, groups or other entities harbouring 
this gene. Similarly, in cultural evolution, various processes lead to 
changes in frequencies of cultural variants. In some of these processes, the 
evolutionary success of a cultural variant is related to the ‘performance’ of 
individuals, groups or other entities harbouring this variant. Examples 
include the preferential imitation of high-payoff individuals or the higher 
rate of cultural take-over from groups with superior organisation or 
technology. However, as in genetic evolution, the cultural transmission of 
a trait is not necessarily linked to the ‘performance’ of this trait, or to any 
of its inherent properties. Examples of forms of social learning that lead to 
cultural changes independent of payoffs include conformism-based 
learning (imitating traits that are locally most frequent), and status- or 
reputation-based learning (e.g., following a leader irrespective of intrinsic 
qualities of his/her cultural traits). To maintain consistency with genetic 
evolution, we interpret cultural change that is driven by performance- or 
payoff-based social learning as analogous to natural selection, while 
cultural change driven by other forms of transmission (such as 
conformism) does not fall into this category.  
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In this paper, we study three forms of social learning: payoff-based 
learning, conformism and leader imitation. Firstly, humans preferentially 
copy strategies from successful individuals (Henrich and Gil-White 2001; 
Lehmann et al. 2008; Kendal et al. 2009). In the context of a social 
dilemma, this social learning rule is expected to decrease rates of 
cooperation within groups since free-riding leads to higher payoffs. 
Secondly, under conformist learning individuals tend to adopt locally 
common strategies, thereby further increasing the frequency of those 
strategies in their groups. Thirdly, individuals may be inclined to follow a 
leader or a teacher in their group, so that the strategy of one influential 
individual tends to spread locally (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). 
Experimental results suggest that more than one of the abovementioned 
social learning rules can apply at the same time (Efferson et al. 2008; 
McElreath et al. 2008). 
To clarify matters and to help resolving the disagreements in the 
literature on the role of cultural group selection, we developed an 
individual-based model of cultural evolution in a group structured 
population. The model allows to consider various mixtures of social 
learning rules (payoff-based learning, conformism, leader imitation) in the 
context of two contrasting modes of cultural group selection (contagion 
versus replacement). For all combinations of settings, we systematically 
varied the strength of individual and group selection with the aim of 
elucidating whether, and under which conditions, cultural group selection 




We simulate a metapopulation structured in m groups of n individuals 
each. Individuals face a social dilemma, modelled here as a public goods 
game. At each point in time, each has a pure strategy, ‘cooperate’ or 
‘defect’. Cooperators contribute to the public good of their group at a cost. 
Defectors contribute nothing. All contributions to the public good yield a 
benefit that is distributed equally among all group members, irrespective 




simulations of cultural evolution, payoffs acquired in the public goods 
game influence the probability that a strategy spreads due to payoff-based 
learning. In each time step of the simulation, one individual (‘focal’) is 
randomly sampled from the metapopulation to change its strategy by 
imitating one or more other individuals. Imitation can be based on payoffs, 
conformism to the majority, or following a leader. After each iteration, the 
payoff that individuals obtain from the game is updated. This stepwise 
procedure leads to an evolutionary dynamics in which the population can 
lose or gain one cooperator per iteration. We iterate this event-based 
process until cooperation has either been lost in the metapopulation or 
spread to fixation. Imitation of strategies can either occur within the focal 
individual’s group or in the context of a different group. The probability of 
occurrence of within and between group imitation events is given by the 
parameter γ that corresponds to the probability of a group level event. 
Within-group imitation occurs either based on individual payoffs from the 
public goods game (with probability α) or based on another imitation rule 
(probability 1 – α). As alternatives to payoff-based learning, we consider 
conformism, leader-following and – as a standard of comparison – the 
imitation of a randomly chosen group member. As motivated in the 
introduction, we interpret changes in the frequency of strategies due to 
payoff differences as ‘selection’. Therefore, the parameter α that  specifies 
the frequency of payoff-based imitation within groups represents the 
strength of individual selection. Between-group imitation occurs either 
randomly (with probability 1 – β), or based on benefits of the public goods 
in the respective groups (probability β). The parameter β specifies the 
frequency of payoff-based imitation at the group level, and therefore the 
strength of group selection. Events involving different groups are 
implemented in two ways, reflecting two modes of group selection 
(contagion versus replacement). Figure 3.1 gives a graphical 
representation of the possible events that occur in a single iteration of the 
simulation. Details of the implementation of the imitation rules and modes 
of group selection are given below. First we examine scenarios where the 
metapopulation initially consists of one fully cooperative group and 
defectors in all the other groups. This is an assumption that has been 
adopted in several models of cultural group selection (Henrich and Boyd 
2001; Boyd et al. 2003; Guzmán et al. 2007) and is based on the idea that 
cooperation gained a foothold and has spread to fixation in one group due 
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to stochastic processes. Second, we contrast these scenarios with 
simulations that start with a whole metapopulation of defectors, allowing 
cooperation to arise spontaneously with a fixed probability 
(corresponding to a mutation in genetic evolution). 
 
Figure 3.1. Structure of the event based-model. When an event 
occurs, a randomly chosen focal individual may change its strategy as a 
result of either between-group imitation (probability ) or within-
group imitation (probability 1-). In case of a within-group event, 
imitation is either based on the payoffs in the local public goods game 
achieved by a randomly chosen group member (probability α) or based 
on another form of social learning like conformism or leader-following 
(probability 1–α). Accordingly, α reflects the strength of individual 
selection against cooperation. In case of a between-group event, 
imitation is either based on the comparison of the public-good benefits 
achieved in the focal individual’s group with those of another group 
(probability β) or by the random imitation of an individual from a 
foreign group (probability 1-β). Accordingly, β reflects the strength of 




3.2. The public goods game 
The social dilemma is modelled as a public goods game with discrete 
strategies. Cooperators contribute c units of their resources to a public 
good. Defector do not contribute, avoiding the cost of cooperation. The 
total of investments is multiplied by 1a  , yielding the overall benefit 
cb n a c    to a group containing cn  co-operators. This benefit is 
distributed equally among the n members of the group, irrespective of 
their contribution. Accordingly, payoffs acquired by cooperators and 
defectors are cP b n c   and dP b n , respectively. Since the payoff of a 
defector is always higher than that of a co-operator, within-group 
selection favours defection over cooperation. 
 
3.3. Within-group events 
The focal individual can imitate a member of its own group with 
probability 1 – γ. We consider four social learning rules determining this 
within-group imitation. With probability α, social learning is based on the 
payoffs acquired in the public goods game. With probability 1–α, payoff-
based imitation is complemented by either random imitation, conformism 
or leader-imitation. These four learning rules were implemented as 
follows: 
 Payoff-based imitation: the payoff of the focal individual Pf is 
compared with the payoff Pm of a randomly chosen group member 
(the ‘cultural model’). The focal individual switches its strategy to that 
of the cultural model when the perceived payoff difference 
m fP P    is positive, where the ‘noise’ term ε is drawn from a 
standard normal distribution.  
 Random imitation: the focal individual switches its strategy to that of 
a randomly chosen group member. Random imitation corresponds to 
genetic drift in genetic models of evolution. It is included in our model 
as a benchmark to assess the effects of a decrease in the strength of 
individual selection α on the evolution of cooperation in the absence 
of conformism and leader-imitation.  
Cultural evolution of cooperation… 
61 
 
 Conformism: the focal individual samples three randomly chosen 
models from its group and imitates the majority in that sample (Boyd 
and Richerson 1985). With only two strategies in our model, taking 
three models guarantees a majority in a sample of minimal size. This 
small sample size reflects limited availability of information (e.g., due 
to constrains on the time that individuals can spend sampling the 
behaviour of other group members), or limited cognitive capacities. 
Alternative implementations of conformism, including larger sample 
sizes, are discussed below.  
 Leader-imitation: the focal individual imitates the ‘leader’ of its group. 
Each group has a leader, who is randomly chosen at the beginning of 
the simulation. The identity of the leader remains unchanged 
throughout a simulation run. Leaders may change their strategy by 
imitation, like any other member of their group by payoff-based 
imitation or between-group events. Leader-imitation homogenises 
strategies within groups, irrespective of their payoff or frequency. 
 
3.4. Between-group events 
Imitation based on between-group comparisons occurs with frequency γ. 
With probability 1 – β, the focal individual imitates a randomly chosen 
individual from any group in the population. This process mimics the 
random migration of strategies or mixing of ideas between groups. With 
probability β, imitation is based on a measure of group performance, 
reflected in the acquired payoffs. In this case, the focal individual 
compares the per-capita benefit fb n  from the public goods in its own 
group to the per-capita benefits mb n  in a randomly chosen ‘model 
group’. The perceived benefit difference is ( )m fb b n   , where the 
‘noise’ term ε is again drawn from a standard normal distribution. We 
consider the following modes of group selection: 
 Contagion-based group selection: if the perceived benefit difference is 
positive, the focal individual imitates a randomly chosen individual 
from the model group. The group of the focal individual is ‘infected’ 




 Replacement-based group selection: if the perceived benefit 
difference is positive, with probability 1/n the strategies of all n 
members of the group of the focal individual is changed to the 
strategies in the model group. The group of the focal individual is 
replaced by the model group, so that the group of the focal is an exact 
copy of the model group. With probability 1 – 1/n, no change does 
occur. We introduced the probability 1/n to compensate for the fact n 
group members change their strategies in case of group replacement. 
This allows a more direct comparison of contagion-based and 
replacement-based group selection, as the same number of 
individuals is expected to change in every time step.  
 
3.5. Initial conditions 
In the first set of simulations, we initialise our population with one group 
composed of only cooperators and the other m–1 groups composed of 
only defectors. This choice of the initial state rests on the assumption that 
one group has shifted to a cooperative state due to stochastic effects 
(Boyd et al., 2003, 2011). The initial presence of strategic variation allows 
us to study the effect of transmission and selection without ‘mutation’. In 
the second set of simulations, we start with m groups of defectors (and no 
cooperators) to see if a stochastic group shift is likely to occur. To this end, 
we allow individuals to spontaneously change their strategy with 
probability μ. While we consider this second set of simulations - including 
spontaneous changes - more realistic, we include both sets to compare the 
effects of common settings used in the literature.  
In all simulations, we track the evolution of cooperation by iterating the 
model for a maximum of 500 000 time steps (events). Simulation runs 
finished when either cooperation or defection had reached fixation in the 
population. Parameters (α, β, γ) were varied between 0 and 1 with steps of 
0.1, and with steps of 0.01 for values under 0.1. Based on preliminary 
simulations runs, we chose to run 30 replicates for each parameter 
combination to assure that the results were robust to stochastic 
processes. In the results reported in the main text, we consider a 
metapopulation of m=50 groups consisting of n=20 individuals, yielding a 
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total population size of 1000 individuals. All figures shown below are 
based on the payoff parameters a=3 and c=1.  
Results 
For each parameter combination, we calculated the frequency of 
cooperation in the metapopulation at the final time step averaged across 
the 30 replicate simulations. Figure 3.2 gives an overview of the 
simulations that were initialised with one cooperative group. Each panel 
summarizes the outcome of cultural evolution as a function of the 
parameters α (strength of individual selection) and β (strength of group 
selection). The 24 small panels to the right correspond to the scenarios 
obtained by combining two modes of group selection (contagion-based 
versus replacement-based) with three alternatives to payoff-based 
imitation (random imitation R, leader-imitation L, conformism C) and four 
levels of  (corresponding to the relative frequency of between-group 
events).  
Selection strengths 
As exemplified by the enlarged panel in Figure 3.2, the evolved frequency 
of cooperation decreased with the strength of individual selection (from 
left to right), while it increased with the strength of group selection (from 
bottom to top). In all scenarios considered, cooperation disappeared in 
case of weak group selection (β0) while it spread to fixation in case of 
strong group and weak individual selection (β1, α0). This makes sense, 
since payoff-based imitation disfavours cooperation in case of within-
group events, while it favours cooperation in case of between-group 
events. Strong individual selection (α≈1; right-hand side of each panel) 
almost invariably lead to the disappearance of cooperation; only in case of 
strong (β1) replacement-based group selection it remained in the 







The scenarios where payoff-based imitation is combined with random 
imitation (panel rows R) exemplify how a decrease in the strength of 
individual selection on its own may lead to the establishment of 
cooperation. The corresponding panels serve as a benchmark for the cases 
where payoff-based imitation is combined with leader-imitation (panel 
rows L) or with conformism (panel rows C). A comparison across panel 
 
Figure 3.2. Evolution of cooperation under cultural group 
selection under various assumptions on social learning and the 
mode of group selection. Each panel depicts the evolved frequency of 
cooperation as a function of the rate α of payoff-based imitation within 
groups (a measure of the strength of individual selection) and the rate 
β of payoff-based imitation between groups (a measure of the strength 
of group selection). The six rows of panels present outcomes when 
within-group payoff-based learning is complemented (at rate 1–α) by 
either random imitation (R), leader-imitation (L), or conformism (C), 
under group selection by either contagion or replacement. The four 
columns of panels present varying frequencies of between-group 
events (γ) as opposed to within-group events. Values obtained from the 
simulations were interpolated to smoothen the plots. 
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rows reveals that the effects of leader-imitation and conformism, while 
clearly present, only marginally expand the parameter range for the 
establishment of cooperation. In case of contagion-based group selection, 
conformism even leads to a reduction in the parameter range allowing for 
the evolution of cooperation. In that sense, conformism can hamper the 
evolution of cooperation by cultural group selection.  
Group selection by contagion 
When group selection is based on contagion, only leader-imitation favours 
the evolution of cooperation, whereas conformism has a detrimental 
effect. It is easy to understand why conformism hampers the spread of 
cooperation: even if some individuals get ‘infected’ by a cooperative 
strategy (by imitating an individual from a group with high public-goods 
benefits), this strategy cannot get a foothold in the local group since 
within-group payoff comparisons act against cooperation while within-
group conformism tends to weed out cooperation as long as it is rare. In 
contrast, leader-imitation can promote the evolution of cooperation 
provided that group selection is strong enough to overcome the effects of 
individual selection.  
Group selection by replacement 
Under group selection by replacement, both conformism and leader-
imitation widen the scope for cooperation (Figure 3.2). In contrast to the 
contagion scenario, conformism can promote cooperation here. This is 
even the case when group selection is relatively weak (low values of β), 
particularly when within-group events are based on considerable 
frequencies of conformism (say, α < 0.4). Note that conformism favours 
cooperation most when rates of between-group events (γ) are relatively 
low. This effect is also exemplified by Figure 3.3. When between-group 
events are rare, conformism can prevent defectors from invading in 
cooperative groups and facilitate the evolution of cooperation under 
group replacement (Figure 3.3, right panel). This effect breaks down if 
between-group events are too frequent. All else being equal, the impact of 
group selection increases with γ. However, beyond a certain level of γ, 
within-group dynamics is too slow for conformism to prevent the spread 




conformism is infrequent, variation between groups breaks down, 
weakening the potential of group selection to promote cooperation. While 
the effect of conformism on the evolution of cooperation is strongly 
dependent on the mode of group selection, leader-imitation has similar 
effects under contagion- and replacement-based group selection (Figure 
3.2, panel rows L; Figure 3.3). In contrast to conformism, leader-imitation 
promotes cooperation more strongly under increasing rates of between-
group events (Figure 3.2, panel rows L; Figure 3.3). The arrival of 





Figure 3.3. Increasing the frequency  of between-group events 
hinders cooperation under conformism and promotes 
cooperation under leader-imitation. Both graphs are based on α=0.2 
and β=0.5. For low rates of between-group events, simulations with 
conformism do not always reach fixation within 5∙105 time steps. 
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Spontaneous emergence of cooperation 
All results reported so far were obtained from simulations initialised with 
one group of cooperators. We relaxed this assumption by initialising the 
population with only defectors and allowed individuals to spontaneously 
switch their strategy by innovation. In this scenario, conformism does not 
promote the evolution of cooperation. Even under group selection by 
replacement, conformism impedes the evolution of cooperation, 
preventing the spread of any new strategy that arises by innovation 
(Figure 3.4). For leader-imitation, the initial conditions do not influence 
the outcome of cultural evolution qualitatively.  
Robustness of results 
In addition to the simulations reported above, we ran numerous other 
simulations. Changing the payoff parameters in the public goods game, the 
distribution of individuals over groups (e.g., m=10, n=100; m=40, n=25) 
and the total population size (with n=20 and m=500) only had a small 
quantitative effect but did not change our conclusions. In contrast to the 
findings reported by Boyd and colleagues (2011), the outcome of cultural 
group selection was also not affected when we considered a spatially 
explicit model with stepping-stone migration on a torus (Boyd and 
Richerson 2002). More localized migration only slows down the speed of 
evolution, but does not change the outcome in a qualitative way.  
In our implementation of conformist learning, an individual samples only 
three models in its group (Boyd and Richerson 1985). Increasing the size 
of this sample strengthens conformist effects, leading to more efficient 
within-group homogenization of behaviour (simulation data not shown). 
Moreover, alternative approaches to modelling the effects conformism on 
the cultural evolution of social behaviour yield results in line with the 
findings reported here (Molleman et al. 2013), suggesting that our 








The last years have seen a debate about the role of social learning in the 
evolution of cooperation by cultural group selection. On the one hand, it 
has been argued that a social learning rule like conformism favours the 
evolution of cooperation (Boyd and Richerson 2002; Boyd et al. 2003; 
Choi and Bowles 2007; Boyd et al. 2011). This argument is based on the 
idea that conformism reduces behavioural variation within groups, 
thereby increasing the effects of variation between groups (Henrich and 
Boyd 1998). As a result, cultural group selection could potentially be an 
 
Figure 3.4. Outcome of cultural group selection when cooperation 
was initially absent and could only arise by spontaneous 
‘mutation’ (innovation). Panels as in Figure 3.2. Per event, the focal 
individual spontaneously changes its strategy with probability µ=0.01. 
Values obtained from the simulations were interpolated to smoothen 
the plots. 
Cultural evolution of cooperation… 
69 
 
important factor facilitating the evolution of cooperation. On the other 
hand, recent theoretical work has challenged this argument, showing by 
means of example models that conformism does often not favour the 
evolution of cooperation (Lehmann et al. 2008; Lehmann and Feldman 
2008). Our systematic comparison indicates that the contrasting 
conclusions reflect the specific combination of social learning rules and 
mode of group selection assumed in the models underlying these 
conclusions. Under group selection by contagion, individuals from 
cooperative groups are imitated more and defector groups get ‘infected’ 
by cooperative strategies. Conformism hinders the evolution of 
cooperation in this scenario: uncommon behaviours are strongly selected 
against and rare cooperators infecting defector groups are disfavoured by 
both payoff-based imitation and conformism. When cooperative groups 
can replace less cooperative groups, conformism can promote the 
evolution of cooperation, provided that initially one group in the 
population consists of cooperators (Boyd et al. 2003). 
Our results contrast with previous models in terms of the facilitating 
effects of conformism on the evolution of human cooperation (Boyd and 
Richerson 1985; Henrich and Boyd 1998; Henrich and Boyd 2001; Boyd et 
al. 2011). However, one could think of scenarios in which conformism 
could have a positive influence on cooperation in a more indirect way. For 
instance, conformism might homogenize groups with respect to various 
norms and habits and thereby increase social cohesion. As a consequence, 
trust may build up among group members more easily, potentially 
facilitating cooperation. Secondly, conformism may have positive effects 
on cooperation when payoffs of behaviour vary spatially. Conformist 
learning can help newcomers to adopt locally beneficial strategies, 
allowing them to coordinate with resident individuals, and adapt to local 
equilibria (Boyd and Richerson 1985). Therefore, it is possible that under 
these different conditions conformism plays a more prominent role in the 
evolution of social behaviours. Further theoretical work is needed to 
clarify these issues. 
Earlier studies (Lehmann and Feldman 2008; Lehmann et al. 2008) 
arrived at the conclusion that leader-imitation is more efficient than 
conformism in establishing cooperation through cultural group selection. 




leader can promote the evolution of cooperation irrespective of the mode 
of group selection. However, the way that leadership is implemented in 
these models as well as ours, is a simplification that is certainly quite 
unrealistic. Leaders are most likely not chosen at random, but they 
emerge in the interaction between individuals (e.g., Johnstone and Manica 
2011; Weissing 2011). Becoming a leader or a follower and accepting the 
leadership of somebody else will often be the outcome of a game with 
strategies and payoffs that are quite unrelated to the public goods game 
considered here. Leadership and followership can also be 
institutionalized, again associated with costs and benefits that are not 
necessarily congruent with those of the underlying public goods game. 
Accordingly, leaders and followers will often be motivated by incentives 
that are not conceptualized in our simple model. It is easy to imagine 
situations where leader-imitation is an even more potent force in bringing 
about cooperation than in our model (e.g., if institutions reward leaders 
on the basis of group benefits). However, in other situations leader-
imitation might actually hamper the evolution of cooperation (e.g., if the 
leader has to be paid from public-good benefits). Clearly more refined 
models of leadership are required to really judge the role of leader-
imitation for the evolution of cooperation.  
In total, we conducted more than 4·109 simulations, each simulation 
running for up to 5·105 time steps. Yet, even an extensive study like this 
can only address few potential interactions between social learning rules 
and modes of cultural group selection. For example, we assessed the 
effects of only two imitation rules (conformism and leader-imitation).  
There may be many other rules potentially reducing variation within 
groups (Laland 2004; Rendell et al. 2011), and the way this reduction 
comes about could interact with the mode of group selection in 
unexpected ways (witnessed by the effects of conformism reported here). 
Also, different modes of group selection are by no means mutually 
exclusive, and may act simultaneously and interactively (Okasha 2006). In 
our model, payoff-based imitation is error prone, but we did not 
systematically investigate the implications of various error rates and 
degrees of noise. For simplicity, we assumed that the errors associated 
with the measurement of payoff differences are equally large when 
imitation occurs within or between groups. In many situations it is more 
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plausible to assume that the success of individuals from other groups is 
harder to assess than the payoffs of group members. 
Models studying the evolution of social learning mainly focus on contexts 
in which outcomes of behaviour are independent of the behaviour of 
others (Boyd and Richerson 1985). The same is true for most (McElreath 
et al. 2005; Efferson et al. 2007; McElreath et al. 2008; Efferson et al. 
2008) but not all (Traulsen et al. 2010) experimental work investigating 
how humans use social information to determine their behavioural 
strategies. Our understanding of the cultural evolution of cooperation 
would benefit from theory that predicts which forms of social learning are 
adaptive in contexts where outcomes of behaviour also depend on the 
strategic choices of others. Confronting humans with such contexts under 
controlled laboratory conditions could then test if humans indeed use 
these social learning rules in decision making in cooperative interactions. 
Also, studying cooperation should not restrict itself to social dilemmas. 
Human cooperation comes in many different forms and flavours; the 
public goods game modelled here represents only one specific context in 
which humans cooperate. Exploring the effects of various social learning 
rules on the cultural evolution of social behaviour in other games, such as 
coordination games and evasion games, presents an interesting venue of 
research for the future. 
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Social learning has been key to human evolutionary success. The cultural 
transmission of information between individuals has enabled human 
groups to adapt to a vast array of habitats. Using the ability to learn from 
their peers, humans have built up extensive cultural repertoires tailored 
to the environmental and social conditions that they faced. However, it is 
unclear which social learning strategies people use, especially in social 
contexts where their payoffs depend on the behaviour of others. Here we 
show experimentally that individuals differ in their social learning 
strategies and that they tend to employ the same learning strategy 
irrespective of the interaction context. Payoff-based learners focus on 
their peers’ success, while decision-based learners disregard payoffs and 
exclusively focus on their peers’ past behaviour. These individual 
differences may be of considerable importance for cultural evolution. By 
means of a simple model we demonstrate that groups harbouring 
individuals with different learning strategies may be faster in adopting 
technological innovations, and can be more efficient through successful 
role differentiation. Our study highlights the importance of individual 
variation for human interactions and sheds new light on the dynamics of 
cultural evolution. 





Human success in colonising nearly all terrestrial habitats of our planet 
was facilitated by our social nature (Boyd et al. 2011; Whiten and Erdal 
2012). Humans excel in collective action, are able to cooperate in social 
dilemmas and to employ high degrees of group coordination and 
cooperation to solve adaptive problems. The transmission of information 
between individuals through social learning was a key factor for the 
spread of humans across the whole planet (Boyd et al. 2011). Such 
cultural transmission has led to the accumulation of huge amounts of 
adaptive information in very little time. It has been argued that social 
learning leads to a parallel inheritance system giving rise to a process that 
is in many ways analogous to genetic evolution (Dawkins 1976; Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985). The dynamics and 
outcome of this process of cultural evolution is to a large extent 
determined by the rules that govern the transmission of cultural 
information between individuals; i.e., the social learning mechanisms that 
people use. Several social learning strategies have been described that 
may each be adaptive under particular circumstances (Laland 2004; Galef 
Jr and Laland 2005; Valone 2007; Kendal et al. 2009; Rendell et al. 2010; 
Rendell et al. 2011). A social learning strategy can specify under which 
circumstances to pay attention to social information; which individuals to 
choose as target for collecting information; which type of information to 
gather from these individuals; and how to use this information as 
guidance for future behaviour (Laland 2004; Hoppitt and Laland 2013). 
Prominent examples of social learning strategies are ‘conformist learning’ 
(to imitate a local majority; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Rogers 1988; 
Henrich and Boyd 1998; Richerson and Boyd 2004; Kendal et al. 2009), 
‘payoff-based learning’ (to imitate the behaviour of peers who achieved 
high payoffs in the recent past;  Boyd and Richerson 1985; Schlag 1998; 
Henrich and Gil-White 2001; Lehmann et al. 2008; Lehmann and Feldman 
2008), or ‘prestige-based learning’ (to imitate or follow the advice of high-
status individuals such as leaders or teachers; Henrich and Gil-White 




Empirical evidence from the field suggests that these learning strategies 
do indeed affect the spread of behaviour in human groups (Henrich and 
Henrich 2010; Henrich and Broesch 2011). The results of such 
investigations are corroborated by evidence from controlled laboratory 
studies, indicating that people attend to both the frequencies of their 
peers’ behaviour, as well as to the payoffs associated with it (McElreath et 
al. 2005; Efferson et al. 2007; McElreath et al. 2008; Efferson et al. 2008; 
Mesoudi 2008; Traulsen et al. 2010; Mesoudi 2011). In addition, there are 
indications that the extent to which people resort to social information 
depends on factors like task difficulty, confidence in their own behaviour 
(Morgan et al. 2012) and environmental variability (Toelch et al. 2009). 
Remarkably, experimental results suggest that individuals differ in the 
extent to which they rely on social information when making decisions 
under uncertainty (McElreath et al. 2005; Mesoudi 2011), and vary in 
their tendency to conform to behaviour of the majority (Efferson et al. 
2008).  
As yet, there is no strong evidence that individuals differ with respect to 
the type of social information that they rely on in making decisions. This is 
not surprising, since experimental studies of human social information 
use have predominantly focused on the spread of technological 
innovations that are mainly relevant in non-social contexts. For instance, 
when attempting to acquire technological know-how, individuals almost 
exclusively use payoff-based learning (by copying behaviour of successful 
individuals) when explicitly presented with a choice between multiple 
social learning strategies (Mesoudi 2011). Here we focus on a different 
type of problem: finding the adequate behaviour in a social setting. Such 
social ‘know-how’ differs from technological know-how in that the payoffs 
of the various alternatives do not only depend on the external 
environment, but also on the behaviour of others in the population. When 
having to choose among alternatives in a non-social setting, the 
information obtained from others is mainly useful for obtaining a more 
accurate estimate of the payoffs of these alternatives in a noisy world. In a 
social setting, these payoffs reflect the behaviour of others. As a 
consequence, social learning gets a new dimension, namely acquiring 
information on the distribution of behavioural tendencies in the 
population. The importance of such frequency information strongly 
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depends on the type of social interaction. For this reason, we here study 
social learning in social interactions with a different signature. This way 
we get a more general impression of whether and how social learning 
differs between technological and social contexts. Moreover, the inclusion 
of different types of social context allows us to investigate whether 
individuals are consistent across those contexts. Do social learning 
strategies reflect general behavioural tendencies, or do individuals flexibly 
adjust their use of social information to the type of social interaction at 
hand?   
To obtain a better understanding of human social learning in both social 
and non-social settings, we designed two experiments. Subjects were 
grouped and repeatedly made decisions that determined the amount of 
money earned during the experiment. Before making a decision, they were 
allowed to request information about the behaviours and payoffs of their 
peers. We evaluate social learning strategies by tracking the types of 
information requests that subjects made. 
In eight independent sessions of our first experiment (henceforth called 
the ‘primary experiment’), we confronted sixteen subjects (n=128) with 
four settings (‘contexts’). In each context, the subjects had to make binary 
choices between options A and B, but the contexts differed in the way 
payoffs depended on the subject’s own decision and the decisions of 
others. We based our design on the experimental paradigm of McElreath 
et al (2005), and extended this setup to include interactions in the three 
strategically different classes of games with pure strategies (Molleman et 
al. 2013a), each of which has been extensively researched in the literature 
on the evolution of cooperation (Gintis 2000). Each subject sequentially 
encountered i) a best choice (BC) situation where one options (B) yields 
on average a higher payoff; ii) a social dilemma (SD) where one option (A) 
increases the payoffs of all group members but in each situation yields a 
lower payoff than the other option (B) for each individual employing it; iii) 
a coordination game (CO), where the payoff of each option (A or B) 
increases with the number of subjects employing this option; and iv) an 
evasion game (EV), where the payoff of either option (A or B) decreases 
with the number of subject choosing this option (see Appendix, sections 1 
and 2, for details). The best choice context corresponds to a non-social 




represent different types of social settings. In each context, groups of eight 
individuals were randomly formed, and subjects interacted for 20 rounds 
within the same group. All individuals were informed beforehand which 
type of context they encountered, but they did not know the payoffs 
associated with the two options. Payoffs were noisy, so that it would 
require several trials to find out which option was better (see Methods 
Summary for details). In each round, subjects had to decide 
simultaneously and anonymously for one of the two options. Before 
making their decisions, subjects could pay a small cost to collect 
information about their peers. The information available about each peer 
included a) the previous decision, b) previous payoff, and c) the total 
payoff acquired in the current context. If a subject chose to collect 
information, she could freely request up to six pieces of information. For 
example, a subject might request all three types of information of two (out 
of seven) of her peers, or she might request only the previous decision of 
six of her peers. At the end of each round, subjects were informed about 
the payoff of their decision in that round. As a benchmark, we ran four 
control sessions with sixteen subjects each (n=64) where no social 
information could be collected (see Appendix, section 2). 
To check for the replicability and robustness of the results obtained, we 
also conducted a second experiment (henceforth called the ‘follow-up 
experiment’), consisting of ten sessions with 20 subjects each (n=200). 
This experiment shared the same general set-up with the primary 
experiment but differed in various aspects (group size was five instead of 
eight, individuals were allowed to view only four pieces of information per 
round, the payoff matrices were slightly different, the stochastic 
component in the payoffs was increased; see Part B of the Appendix for 
details). We will first report on the outcome of the primary experiment 
and subsequently address questions related to robustness and 
replicability by referring to the results of the follow-up experiment.  
 
Results 
Dynamics of behaviour and social information use 
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In the course of time, the behaviour in all groups converged to a Nash 
equilibrium of the corresponding context (Figure 4.1, top row, broken 
lines), indicating that subjects adjusted their behaviour according to the 
underlying payoff structure (see Appendix, section S4.2, for details). The 
availability of social information was associated with an increased 
adoption of the superior option in the best choice context, as well as the 
adoption of the dominant strategy in the social dilemma game 
(generalised mixed models with subject nested in group as random 
factors: P<0.001 and P=0.047 for the BC and SD, respectively; see 
Appendix, section 3 for statistical analysis). Subjects frequently made use 
of costly social information (Figure 4.1; bottom row; the fraction of 
decisions preceded by costly request for information was BC: 0.23, SD: 
0.25, CO: 0.21 and EV: 0.31). Information requests decreased over time; 
presumably because there is less need for subjects to adjust their 
behaviour once a group has approached equilibrium. Furthermore, in 85% 
of the cases subjects requested two specific types of information: previous 
peer decisions only (red bars) or the combination of previous peer 
decisions and associated payoffs (light blue bars). These types of 
information requests are consistent with frequency-based learning 
strategies (such as conformism) and payoff-based learning strategies, 
respectively. On average, subjects requested social information more often 
when their own previous decision yielded low payoffs. Also, individuals 
tended to switch when social information indicated that alternative 
behaviour yielded higher payoffs (consistent with payoff-based learning). 
Reactions to information on the frequencies of peers’ behaviour depended 
on the interaction context (see Appendix, section S4.4 for a detailed 
analysis of when individuals requested social information, and how this 
information affected decision making). In the best choice context, the 
proportion of information requests including requests for payoffs (0.61) 
was significantly higher than in the social contexts (SD: 0.40, CO: 0.26, EV: 
0.33; Tukey contrasts between effect estimates of the factor ‘context’ in a 
generalised linear model: P < 0.001). Subjects requested total payoffs 
almost exclusively in the last round (dark green, light green, yellow and 
orange bars); presumably out of curiosity to compare their own 







Figure 4.1. Change in behaviour (top) and information requests 
(bottom) in the course of time. The top row of panels shows for each 
context the change in the relative frequency of cases that option A was 
chosen (sixteen replicate groups in grey, averages in colour). Over 
time, replicate groups approach a Nash equilibrium of the games 
(broken lines, arrows; option B yielded a higher payoff than A in both 
the best choice and the social dilemma context). The bottom row of 
panels shows counts of combinations of information types requested in 
corresponding rounds. Before making their decision, subjects could 
collect six pieces of costly information about their peer group 
members. For each peer, available information was a) decision in the 
previous round, b) payoff in the previous round, and c) total payoff 
obtained in the present context. Requests for payoffs (and associated 
decisions; light blue bars) prevail in the best choice context and occur 
regularly in the social contexts; requests only involving recent 
decisions (red bars) prevail in the social contexts and occur regularly 
in the best choice context. With the exception of the final round (where 
subjects often request information on total payoffs) other types of 
requests are very rare. 
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Individual variation in social learning strategies 
Subjects strongly varied in their reliance on social learning. In each 
context, about 20% of all subjects never requested information (Figure 
4.2a). In contrast, some other individuals based most of their decisions on 
information about their peers. The subjects also differed strongly in the 
degree to which they requested information on payoffs (Figure 4.2b). 
While the overall fraction of information requests that included requests 
for payoffs was intermediate in each context (see above), the underlying 
individual behaviour was surprisingly extreme. For each context 
separately, we found that most subjects can be categorized in two largely 
distinct groups with consistent behaviour: those who rarely include payoff 
information in their requests, and those who do this in the majority of 
cases (Figure 4.2b).  
Consistency of social learning strategies 
For each of the four contexts, we categorised subjects’ reliance on social 
learning as low or high, when they requested social information in less or 
more than 25% of the cases, respectively. This cut-off point divided the 
data in two roughly equal portions for each context (cf. Figure 4.2a). 
Individuals were significantly more consistent in their reliance on social 
information (i.e., either categorised as ‘high’ or as ‘low’ in all contexts) 
than expected based on independence between contexts (Figure 4.3a). 
Subjects showed a similar consistency with regard to the type of social 
information they relied on; many of them either strongly relied on payoff-
information across all contexts (Figure 4.3b, red bar), or hardly relied on 
payoff-information at all (Figure 4.3b, blue bar; an individual’s reliance on 
payoffs was categorised as ‘low’ or ‘high’, depending on whether her 
information requests included payoffs in less or more than 50% of the 
cases). The abundance of these consistent individuals was much higher 
than expected based on independence between contexts (subjects with 
consistent high and low reliance on payoffs occurring 6.13 and 2.77 times 
more than expected on the basis of independence, respectively; χ2=9.811, 






Another large fraction of subjects employed a specific flexible social 
learning strategy, with high reliance on payoffs in the (non-social) best 
choice context and low reliance on payoffs in the other (social) contexts – 
this is the social learning behaviour that one might intuitively expect (see 
introduction). However, these ‘sensible switchers’ are not more abundant 
than expected based on independence between contexts (χ2=0.319, d.f.=1, 
P=0.572). We did not observe significant differences between types of 
social learning strategies and performance in the experiment, as reflected 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Variation among subjects in their reliance on social 
information (top) and their reliance on payoff information 
(bottom) a, Distribution of individuals’ reliance on social learning in 
decision making, measured as the fraction of decisions in which 
subjects chose to collect peer information. b, Distribution of 
individuals’ reliance on payoffs in social learning, measured as the 
fraction of requests for peer information that included previous 
payoffs. All distributions are broad and strongly overdispersed when 
compared to binomial expectations: individuals strongly vary in their 
reliance on social learning, but even more strongly so with respect to 
their reliance on payoff information. 
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in total earnings (Tukey contrasts on a linear model: P>0.121 for 




Figure 4.3. Individual consistency over contexts in reliance on 
social information (top) and reliance on payoff-based information 
(bottom). a, For each of the four contexts, we categorized subjects 
according to their reliance on social learning as low (<0.25) or high 
(>0.25), resulting in a quadruple of low-high values. The observed 
fraction of individuals with consistent (‘always high’ or ‘always low’) 
reliance on social learning is significantly larger than expected on the 
basis of independence across contexts (χ2 = 24.725, d.f.=1, P < 0.001). b, 
Similarly, subjects were categorized for each context according to their 
reliance on payoffs in social learning (low < 0.5, and high ≥ 0.5). The 
observed fraction of individuals with consistent reliance on payoffs is 
significantly larger than expected (χ2 = 20.436, d.f. = 1, P < 0.001). The 
figure also shows the observed and expected frequency of ‘sensible 
switchers’ (individuals categorized as high in the best choice context 
and as low in the three social contexts). In both a and b, the ‘other’ 
category contains the remaining combinations of low-high values, none 




Robustness and replicability 
Our follow-up experiment confirmed all main results of the primary 
experiment (Part B of the Appendix; compare Figures S4.7.1, S4.7.2 and 
S4.7.3 with Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 of the main text). On average, the 
increased magnitude of the stochastic component on payoffs increased 
subjects’ reliance on social information in each of the interaction contexts 
(ANOVAs; BC: P=0.035; SD: P<0.001; CO: P=0.071; EV: P<0.001), which is 
in line with results reported elsewhere (e.g., Toelch et al. 2009; Morgan et 
al. 2012). As in the primary experiment, subjects strongly varied in the 
extent to which they based their decisions on social information. In each of 
the four interaction contexts, individuals’ reliance on payoff information 
strongly varied; some always included payoff information in their 
requests, whereas others ignored payoff information altogether, and these 
differences were even more pronounced than in our primary experiment. 
Moreover, individuals that were consistent in their social learning 
strategies across contexts were observed in much higher frequencies than 
expected based on independence between contexts. In other words, as in 
our primary experiment, many individuals were consistent in either 
strongly or weakly relying on social information, and many individuals 
were consistent in the type of social information they requested.  
Implications of individual variation for cultural evolution 
Our experimental results indicate that there are strong and consistent 
individual differences in social learning strategies. But does this individual 
variation matter? To address this question, we developed a simple model 
of cultural evolution in which individuals interact in small groups and are 
allowed to update their behaviour by either payoff-based learning or 
frequency-based learning. We considered two implementations, a 
stochastic model and an individual-based simulation. Here, we report on 
the results of the individual-based simulation; for the results of the 
stochastic model, see Appendix (section S4.9). We imposed two 
conditions: a homogeneous population, in which all individuals updated 
their strategy by payoff-based learning or frequency-based learning with a 
50-50 probability, and a heterogeneous population, in which half of the 
individuals in a group always updated based on payoffs, and the other half 
always updated based on frequencies. In our simulations, we documented 
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the fixation probability of behaviour A or B after the introduction of a 
single B mutant in a population of A players. Figure 4.4 shows the outcome 
of simulations after an average of 20 updates per individual (in 
correspondence to the number of rounds in the experiments). In three out 
of four contexts, the existence of individual variation in social learning 
strategies considerably affects the outcome of cultural evolution. In the 
coordination game, payoff-based and frequency-based learning both 
disfavour the spread of rare behaviours, so B will be rapidly lost both in 
homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. In the best choice context, 
a newly introduced superior technology (B) is more likely to reach fixation 
in heterogeneous populations; payoff-based learners readily adopt B, and 
the increase in frequency of B reduces the risk that the superior 
technology disappears due to frequency-based learning or stochastic 
processes (e.g., copying errors). The same logic applies to the social 
dilemma: a newly introduced ‘cheater’ mutant will obtain higher payoffs, 
and payoff-based learners in a heterogeneous population will readily 
switch to defection; once cooperators are no longer in the majority, 
conformists start defecting, and cooperation is lost. In the evasion game, 
variation in social learning strategies enhances the stability of the 
coexistence of A and B. Interestingly, in heterogeneous populations, social 
learning strategies become correlated with behaviour in this game 
(playing A or B; see Appendix, section S4.8, for model details and 
additional model analyses). The emerging role differentiation can thus 






Cross-cultural experiments have established that human social behaviour 
strongly varies between cultures (Henrich et al. 2001; Herrmann et al. 
2008). This suggests that the behaviour of typical (‘WEIRD’; Henrich et al. 
2010) participants in decision making experiments is likely to 
underestimate the variation present in the human population. Our 
experiment shows that even within such a relatively homogeneous sample 
of subjects there is strong and consistent variation in the way people 
behave. The pronounced individual differences in social learning 
strategies we report emphasize that the average behaviour in a group or 
 
Figure 4.4. Effects of diversity in social learning strategies on the 
outcome of cultural evolution. For each of the four contexts, we 
simulated groups of eight individuals that were allowed to update their 
behaviour using payoff-based or conformist learning (tendencies to 
copy either successful or popular behaviour, respectively). Pairs of bars 
present the state of the groups after 160 iterations (corresponding to 
the 20 rounds of our experiments) when initialised with one B player 
in a group of A players (105 replicates each). The top row of bars shows 
the outcome in homogeneous groups, where each individual uses 
either form of learning with equal probability. The bottom row of bars 
shows the outcome in case of heterogeneous groups, where four 
individuals always use payoff-based learning, while the four others 
always use conformist learning. Individual variation can cause groups 
to adopt superior technologies (option B) more readily in a best choice 
context, but cooperation (option A) tends to be less stable in a social 
dilemma. Moreover, in heterogeneous groups, A and B coexist more 
stably in an evasion game. 
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population is far from representative for the behaviour of its constituent 
individuals. Furthermore, our simulation model suggests that individual 
variation can affect the dynamics and outcome of social interactions. 
Although individual differences have been at the heart of personality 
research in psychology, they are often disregarded in many other areas of 
the social sciences. Our results strongly suggest that individual differences 
need to be taken seriously, both in theoretical models and in the analysis 
of empirical data. More specifically, we advocate that models of cultural 
evolution take individual differences in social learning strategies into 
account. 
In the best choice context, the availability of social information was 
associated with an increase in the adoption of the optimal behaviour. This 
is in line with earlier findings in the experimental and theoretical 
literature that social learning can increase an individual’s performance in 
non-social contexts (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Efferson et al. 2008; 
Rendell et al. 2010). In agreement with earlier experimental evidence 
(McElreath et al. 2005; Efferson et al. 2008), also in a non-social context 
subjects differed substantially in the way they used social information. 
These differences were even more pronounced in the social contexts. 
Recent experimental results suggest that variation in social learning 
strategies might be associated with variation in behaviour in a given 
context (manuscript in preparation). For example, it is plausible that 
payoff-based learning in a social dilemma will be associated with a higher 
tendency to defect (since this is the payoff-dominant strategy), while 
frequency-based learning (conformism) might stabilize cooperative 
behaviour (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Molleman et al. 2013a; Molleman et 
al. 2013b).  
Of course, the results of highly stylized experimental study like ours 
should not be over-interpreted. Decision making experiments in a lab 
setting allow for a high degree of control, but inevitably abstract from 
potentially important aspects of reality. Even though our experimental 
design imposed relatively few restrictions on how individuals could track 
their social environment, our study does not account for a variety of 
factors that play a role in real-life cultural transmission. For instance, it 
was impossible for subjects to bias their attention towards older, more 




al. 2009; Henrich and Broesch 2011), and active teaching (Hoppitt et al. 
2008) was excluded by design. Also, subjects in our experiment were 
informed about the general structure of the interaction contexts in which 
they were interacting. In reality, this structure is typically unclear and 
people have to base their decisions on their best guess of how their 
behaviours and the behaviour of others affect their payoffs. More specific 
to our design including different contexts, subjects in a session always 
encountered the simplest (non-social) best choice situation first and 
subsequently interacted in the other (social) contexts in random order. 
Some of these concerns can be addressed by additional experiments. For 
example, a recent experiment revealed that the above-mentioned order of 
contexts encountered did not affect the results; presenting the 
coordination game first yielded almost identical results concerning social 
information use (in preparation). Still, lab experiments should best be 
viewed as unravelling interesting features of human behaviour that 
should subsequently be scrutinized under more realistic conditions. 
Assuming that the individual variation found in our study is ‘real’, why 
should individuals differ in their learning strategies, and why should they 
be consistent in their use of social information across different contexts? 
Possible explanations can be found in the literature on ‘animal 
personalities’. In recent years, evidence has accumulated that consistent 
individual differences in behaviour (‘behavioural syndromes’ or 
‘personalities’) are not only prevalent in humans, but also exist 
throughout the animal kingdom (Gosling 2001; Sih et al. 2004). In the 
past, it has often been assumed that selection on behaviour should result 
in a single, optimally adapted phenotype. By studying animal personalities 
it has become apparent that a variety of mechanisms (reviewed in Wolf 
and Weissing 2010) can lead to the evolutionary emergence of consistent 
individual variation in behaviour. More specific models based on this 
theoretical framework predict the coexistence of alternative life history 
strategies (Wolf et al. 2007; Réale et al. 2010); the coexistence of 
individuals differing strongly in responsiveness and social sensitivity 
(Wolf et al. 2008; Wolf et al. 2011); and the coexistence of communication 
strategies that differ in the way that signals are sent and how information 
is processed and interpreted (Botero et al. 2010).  These results may serve 
as a useful starting point for understanding the consistent individual 
Consistent individual differences in human social learning strategies 
89 
 
differences in social learning strategies observed in this study. For 
example, Botero and colleagues (2010) have shown that a ‘general-
purpose’ mechanism is often not able to produce optimal behaviour in 
specific situations; this leaves opportunities that can be exploited by other 
strategies, allowing for coexistence. These insights were obtained in the 
context of communication, but they might apply to learning as well: 
learning strategies are also applied in a multitude of contexts, and are 
unlikely to be optimally tailored to every particular learning situation. 
Cognitive constraints and incomplete information on the learning context 
will often prevent the evolution of learning strategies that are optimal in 
every possible circumstance. Instead, evolution may result in the 
coexistence of locally suboptimal but cognitively ‘cheap’ strategies using 
rules-of-thumb (cf. Gigerenzer et al. 1999) such as payoff-based learning 
or frequency-based learning. Other mechanisms facilitating the 
coexistence of behavioural strategies may apply to social learning as well. 
For example, the benefits of information are often negatively frequency-
dependent: the value of information decreases when more individuals also 
have this information. This immediately explains why individuals relying 
heavily on information coexist with others that are seemingly not 
interested in gathering information at all (Wolf et al. 2008). Last, but not 
least, the coexistence of learning strategies could be explained by ‘synergy’ 
between different forms of learning. As suggested by our simulation 
model, group heterogeneity with respect to learning strategies may under 
some circumstances lead to more efficient outcomes. Such synergetic 
effects might again induce negative frequency-dependent selection and 
result in the coexistence of alternative learning strategies. 
Even if different learning strategies do coexist, one might expect that 
individuals are flexible and employ different strategies in different 
contexts. Again, the literature on animal personalities has revealed 
various mechanisms explaining a more rigid behaviour, corresponding to 
the consistent use of the same type of behaviour in different contexts. 
Behavioural consistency can be favoured when strategic conventions are 
establishing (McNamara and Weissing 2010) or when behaviour serves as 
a signal to others. For example, already a small fraction of ‘socially 
responsive’ individuals in a population may exert a strong selection 




be supported by all kinds of positive feedbacks: individuals can increase 
their performance with the consistent use of a certain social learning 
strategy, due to an increased efficiency in the collection, interpretation 
and application of the kind of information as they get more experienced in 
using this strategy.  
Rather than explaining individual variation from an evolutionary 
perspective, scholars of human personality have focused on characterising 
the structure of individual differences. This has resulted in a number of 
models that aim to describe human personality along a few dimensions 
(the ‘Five Factor Model’ (Digman 1990) being best-known example). It is 
not unlikely that that the observed variation in social learning strategies is 
associated with these dimensions or factors, and this possibility presents 
an interesting objective for further research. For instance, one might 
predict that reliance on social information is associated with openness, or 
with an orientation towards collectivism (as opposed to individualism 
(Oyserman et al. 2002); in fact, this latter association has just recently 
been observed by Toelch and colleagues (personal communication). 
Similarly, one might expect that individuals that focus on payoff-
information are inclined to behave more competitively (rather than 
cooperatively) in social interactions.   
Another interesting future direction would be to address whether the 
presence of individual differences in social learning strategies affect the 
dynamics of behaviour (as predicted by our simulation model). One could 
experimentally test this by creating groups of individuals assorted 
according to their social learning strategies, and comparing these 
homogeneous groups to unassorted (heterogeneous) groups. Another 
interesting question that could be tested in such a setup is whether the 
behavioural dynamics are different between groups that are 
homogeneous for different social learning strategies (such as payoff-based 
learning and frequency-based learning).  For example, one might expect 
that a group of payoff-based learners may more readily adopt new 
superior technologies, whereas groups of frequency-based learners may 
be faster in reaching equilibrium in a coordination context.  
 




Experimental sessions were run at the Sociology department of the 
University of Groningen. Subjects (mainly students, aged 19-25) 
participated in twenty separate sessions (primary experiment: eight 
sessions; control: four sessions; follow-up experiment: ten sessions), each 
lasting for about 90 minutes. In each session of the primary experiment, 
sixteen subjects participated. Subjects were paid according to their 
performance in the experiment, and earned €29.60 on average, excluding 
a show-up fee of €7. All subjects interacted in four blocks of 20 rounds in 
sequence, each representing a different interaction context. At the 
beginning of each block, subjects were randomly grouped, labelled with a 
number 1-8, and each received 3,000 points to play with (1,000 points = 1 
euro). These points could be used to collect social information. During the 
block of rounds subjects could make substantial profits, but subjects could 
also lose their initial endowment in case of negative outcomes. After the 
groups were formed, participants read brief instructions on their screen 
and filled out a quiz checking understanding of the upcoming block of 
rounds. In the primary experiment, sessions started with the best choice 
context; the other contexts were played in random order. 
In each of the contexts, subjects repeatedly decided between two options. 
The setting was framed as planting either of two crops on a farm. Payoffs 
for option A or B were    (1 )p a p b  and    (1 )p c p d , respectively, 
where p denotes the fraction of A players in the group. We chose the 
following parameter settings: best choice {a=50, b=50, c=300, d=300}, 
social dilemma {a=300, b=-250, c=600, d=0}, coordination game {a=175, 
b=-75, c=-75, d=675} and the evasion game {a=-75; b=175; c=675; d=-75}. 
A stochastic component was added to each of the subjects’ payoffs 
independently, by adding a number taken from a standard normal 
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 175. Sessions ended with 
a questionnaire including items on game play and game understanding. 
The experiment was conducted using Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007); code is 
available upon request. See Appendix, section 6, for experimental 
instructions and screenshots. 
Simulations were programmed in C++ (code available on request). We 




player in a group of A players. Each time step of the simulation, a random 
individual (‘focal’) is drawn from a group of eight to update its behaviour 
by either payoff-based or frequency-based learning. This process is 
iterated for 160 time steps, so that each individual has on average been 
drawn 20 times. Social learning strategies correspond to strategies 
feasible in our experiment: in frequency-based learning the focal switches 
if the other behaviour is more abundant in a sample of six others. In 
payoff-based learning, the focal switches to the behaviour of the individual 
with the highest payoff in a sample of three others. 





Part A. Primary experiment: additional information and 
analyses 
In this Part we give an overview of the experimental setup of our primary 
experiment, and provide additional data analyses. First, we delineate the 
general setup and describe the four contexts in which the subjects 
interacted. Second, we present the results of control sessions of our 
primary experiment, in which no peer information was available to the 
subjects, so that social learning was impossible. Third, we present 
additional analyses of the data from the primary experiment. We focus on 
the question under which conditions individuals used social information, 
and how this information affected decision making. Fourth, we present 
regression models fit to the distributions of the social learning strategies 
presented in Figure 4.2 of the main text. 
S4.1. General setup 
We confronted subjects with four different interaction contexts in 
sequence. Decision making was formulated as planting crops on the land 
of an imaginary farm. Each interaction context consisted of a block of 
twenty rounds, in which subjects could decide which of two crops they 
would plant on their farm (we used actual crop names, but for simplicity 
we will refer to the options as A and B). At the beginning of each block, 
subjects were randomly divided in two groups of eight and informed 
about how the payoffs in the current context depended on their own 
decisions, and the decisions of their group members. Before a block of 
rounds started, subjects filled out a brief quiz to check their 
understanding of the structure of the coming interaction context.  
In each round, all subjects made their decisions simultaneously. After 
making their decision, subjects were each informed about the payoff they 
obtained in that round. Before making their decisions, subjects could 
choose whether or not to collect information about the members of their 
group (they had to pay a small cost for this). If they did so, they could view 




the information available included a) the previous decision, b) the 
previous payoff and c) the total payoff accumulated in the current context. 
After a block of twenty rounds ended, new groups were formed, and 
subjects were informed about the payoff structure of the new context 
(again followed by a short quiz).  






. Let p denote the fraction of subjects in a group that chose option 
A. The deterministic component of the payoff of a subject that chose A was 
given by (1 )p a p b    . Similarly, for a subject that chose B this was 
given by (1 )p c p d    . Payoffs were noisy, reflecting the fact that the 
outcome of behaviour is often influenced by exogenous factors. This noise 
made it harder for the subjects to find out individually which choice was 
optimal, and as a consequence, made social information more valuable. 
Noise was implemented by adding a stochastic term to the deterministic 
component of the payoffs of each subject separately. This stochastic 
component was a number drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 
and standard deviation σ.  
 
S4.2. Interaction contexts 
In this section, we describe the four interaction contexts, their associated 
payoff matrices, and the Nash equilibria of the one-shot version of each 
context, corresponding to the dotted lines of Figure 4.1 of the main text. 
Subjects were always confronted with the ‘best choice’ context first. 
Starting with this most simple interaction context facilitated the subjects’ 
understanding of the context they were in and how their decisions 
affected their payoffs. The three other interaction contexts – in which 
payoffs depended on the decisions of others – were played in randomized 
order. These other contexts correspond to the three different classes of 
games: a social dilemma, a coordination game and an evasion game. The 
payoff matrices of each of the interaction contexts were chosen such that 
at p=0.5, the payoff difference between A and B equalled 250 points (1000 
points=1 euro). We set σ=175, so that at p=0.5, choosing the option with 
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the lower expected payoff nevertheless lead to a higher payoffs in 16% of 
the cases.  
In the best choice context (BC), a subjects’ payoff did not depend on the 
decisions of the other subjects in their group (a=b and c=d); the payoff 






. Irrespective of the behaviour of the 
other players, option B yielded higher payoffs on average. In game 
theoretical terms, B dominates A and therefore * 0p   is the Nash 
equilibrium of the one-shot version of the ‘game’ (technically, it is not a 
game, since the payoffs do not depend on the actions of others).  
In the social dilemma (SD), cooperation (A) is dominated by defection (B): 







like in the best choice context,  * 0p   was the Nash equilibrium of the 
one-shot version of the game. However, all subjects obtain a higher payoff 
when they all cooperated ( 1p  ), compared to this equilibrium (a d ). 
This shows that in this context, collective interests and individual 
interests are opposed to each other, like in the famous (two-player) 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. 
In the coordination game (CO), the payoff of choosing one of the two 
options increased with the number of others also choosing it ( a c and 






. In this case, both 
* 0p   and * 1p  are Nash equilibria. However, the Nash equilibrium at 
* 0p   is Pareto superior; the payoff to all players was higher compared 
to the equilibrium at * 1p  . There was a (dynamically unstable) 








.   (S4.1) 
In this equilibrium (in our case, when two subjects chose A and six 




equal, but any deviation from this equilibrium leads towards either of the 
Nash equilibria. Typical examples of coordination games are the Stag-hunt 
game and the Battle of the Sexes.     
     
In the evasion game (EV), the payoff of choosing one of the two options 
decreased with the number of others also choosing it ( a c and b d ). 






. In this case, there was a 
Nash equilibrium given by equation S1 (when two subjects choose A and 
six subjects choose B). Typical examples of evasion games are the Hawk-
Dove game and the Snowdrift game. 
 
S4.3. Control sessions 
To investigate how the presence of social information affected behaviour, 
we ran control sessions in which subjects could not collect information 
from their peers before making their decisions. Otherwise, the setup was 
identical to the setup of our primary experiment. We ran four independent 
sessions with sixteen subjects each (n=64), for a total of eight replicate 
groups of eight participants each. Figure S4.3.1 summarises the 
development of the decisions in the twenty-round blocks of the four 
interaction contexts, and allows for comparison to the results presented in 
the main text. Comparing the dynamics over time to the dynamics in our 
primary experiment (where social information was available; cf. Figure 
4.1 of the main text), we observe differences in the best choice context and 
the social dilemma. In both of these contexts, groups tended to approach 
the Nash equilibria of the one-shot versions of the game (in both games 
characterised by p*=0) more slowly in the control sessions, compared to 
the primary experiment (two separate binomial generalized linear mixed 
models (GLMM) with subject nested in group as random factor, and with 
‘information present/absent x round’, ‘previous decision x previous 
payoff’ and ‘difference between payoffs in round t–1 and t–2’ as fixed 
factors, detected significant effects of the presence of information on the 
probability that an individual chooses option B; P<0.001 and P=0.047 for 
BC and SD, respectively). This suggests that the availability of social 
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information allowed for a faster adoption of individually optimal 
behaviours. The presence of social information led to a more rapid 
convergence on the superior option in the best choice context, but it 
reduced cooperative behaviour in the social dilemma. In the coordination 
and evasion game, fitting such a statistical model to data is not as 
straightforward, since the ranking of payoffs (A<B, or A>B) of decisions 





Figure S4.3.1. Decisions in the absence (top) and presence 
(bottom) of social information. The top row of panels shows 
frequencies of choices for option A over twenty rounds of the four 
interaction in four control sessions, where social information was not 
available (eight replicate groups in grey, averages in colour). As a 
reference, the bottom row of panels shows the decision data from our 
primary experiment (where social information was available), also 
presented in Figure 1 of the main text. Over time, groups tended to 
approach the Nash equilibria of the one-shot versions of the games 




S4.4. The effects of social information on decision making 
In the main text, our analysis of social learning strategies focuses on the 
frequency and the types of social information that individuals requested 
before making a decision. However, these factors constitute only one 
aspect of an individual’s social learning strategy; a more complete account 
would include how this information affected decision making. This section 
aims to look deeper into how social information affected decision making 
in our primary experiment. First, we analyse how subjects’ decisions to 
collect social information depended on the payoffs they received in the 
previous round (Figure SI4.1). In line with earlier findings (Morgan et al. 
2012), we find a strong negative relationship between the previous payoff 
and the request rates for social information. Second, we consider how 
social information affected decision making in each of the interaction 
contexts. To this end, we separately consider decisions that were 
preceded by requests for others’ previous decisions and previous payoffs 
(cf. payoff-based learning; Figure S4.4.2), and decisions that were 
preceded by requests for (only) others’ previous decisions (cf. frequency-
based learning; Figure S4.4.3). We find strong indications for payoff-based 
learning in each of the four interaction contexts. We also find indications 
of frequency-based learning in each of the contexts, but the effects of 
observing only the decisions of group members are less pronounced. 
 













Figure S4.4.1. Information request rates as a function of individual 
payoff in the previous round. Data on previous payoffs were pooled 
in cohorts of 100 points to obtain the symbols reflecting request rates. 
Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean (SEM). Total 
number of observations per context was 2432. Cohorts with fewer than 
five observations are not shown as a data point. We fitted a binomial 
GLMM to decisions to request information, using ‘subject’ as random 
effect, and ‘round’ and ‘interaction context’ as fixed factors. This 
analysis detects a negative effect of previous payoffs (P < 0.001) on the 
probability to request information, indicating that subjects tended to 
request social information when their current behaviour had 
unfavourable returns. This GLMM also detects that rates of requests for 
social information decrease over time (P < 0.001), confirming the 






Figure S4.4.2. Effects of payoff information on switching 
behaviour. Panels show proportions of decisions to switch behaviour 
as a function of the difference in own previous payoff and the observed 
average payoff of the alternative option. Open and solid symbols 
represent rates of switching (±1SEM) from B to A and from A to B, 
respectively. Payoff differences were pooled in cohorts of 200 points to 
obtain the data points shown (cohorts with fewer than five 
observations were omitted). We fitted a binomial GLMM to decisions to 
switch to each context separately, with subject nested in group as 
random factors, and ‘round’ and ‘previous decision x previous payoff x 
observed payoff difference’ as fixed factors. Each of these models 
detected significant effects for the observed payoff difference on the 
probability of switching (P<0.001 in BC, CO and EV, and P=0.023 in SD). 
Also, an overarching GLMM with the same error structure fitted to 
decisions to switch for of all contexts, in which ‘interaction context’ 
were added to the interaction terms, detected an overall significant 
effect (P<0.001) for the observed payoff difference. These findings are 
strong indications for payoff-based learning.  




Figure S4.4.3. Effects of observing behaviour of group members on 
own behaviour. Panels show proportions of decisions (± 1SEM) for 
option A as a function of the observed frequency of A. Data points were 
pooled in cohorts of 1/6; cohorts with fewer than five observations are 
not shown. The solid symbols show the information requests where 
information about at least one decision of a group member was requested 
(so information about payoffs may have also been requested within the 
same information request). The open symbols show decisions that were 
preceded by requests purely for the decisions of fellow group members 
(so, no payoff information was requested). For each interaction context 
separately, we fitted binomial GLMMs to all decisions for option A in 
which any decision information was requested (data corresponding to the 
solid symbols). In these regression models, we used ‘subject nested in 
group’ as random factors, and ‘round’, ‘previous payoff’ and ‘previous 
decision x observed frequency of A’ as fixed factors. In BC, SD and CO we 
find positive effects of the observed frequency of A on the probability of 
also choosing that option (P=0.002, P=0.039, P<0.001, for BC, SD and CO, 
respectively). The GLMM fitted to the SD data detected a strong negative 
effect of ‘round’, which may explain why the slightly positive influence of 
observing A (cooperation) on the probability of also choosing A is not 
visible from the solid dots. In the evasion game, we find negative effects of 
the observed frequency of A on the probability to choose it (P=0.009), 
suggesting that subjects reacted to the underlying structure of the game. 
For SD, CO and EV, the findings of the models were confirmed by a GLMM 
fitted to data in which only decision information was requested (data 
corresponding to the open symbols). In these cases, we observe in the SD 
a stronger positive influence of the observed frequency of cooperation on 





S4.5. Regression fit to social learning strategy distributions 
Figure 4.2 of the main text shows the distribution of social learning 
strategies observed in our experiment. Here, we further analyse those 
distributions by fitting regression models to this data in order to 
characterize patterns of variation. For each of the interaction contexts 
separately, we fitted beta-binomial models to i) individual rates of 
information requests (cf. reliance on social learning) and ii) proportion of 
information requests which included previous payoffs (cf. reliance on 
payoffs). These measures are analysed as the probability of success in 
Bernoulli trials, where a ‘success’ refers to a decision to request 
information, and a request including payoff information, respectively. The 
beta-binomial distribution has two positive parameters (α, β), which can 
produce a wide range of distributional forms. For instance, α=β=1 results 
in a discrete uniform distribution (where each number of successes out of 
n trials is equally likely), and for large α and β, the binomial distribution is 
approached. When α<1 and β<1, the distribution is U-shaped.  
Model selection was conducted by maximum likelihood estimation of our 
observed data for alternative beta-binomial distributions (defined by 
parameters α and β) using the ‘optim’ function in R. The models with the 
lowest log-likelihood values are shown in the dotted lines of Figure S4.5.1. 
For each game, the parameters (α, β) of the best-fitting distributions are 
shown in Table S4.5.1. Rates of informed decisions show a broad, hump-
shaped distribution, highlighting individual diversity in reliance on social 
learning. Individuals differ even more strongly in their reliance on payoffs, 
with an even broader, U-shaped distribution with peaks at the extremes. 
Fitting mixtures of beta-binomial distributions yielded better fits (based 
on their AICs) to the distributions in reliance on payoffs in three out of 
four interaction contexts. This more complicated analysis lead to the same 
conclusions. For clarity of presentation, we chose to show the results of 
the current simpler analysis; details of the more detailed analysis are 
available on request. 






Reliance on  
social information 
Reliance on  
payoffs 
  α β α β 
Best choice 1.631 5.431 0.786 0.429 
Social dilemma 1.283 3.745 0.317 0.320 
Coordination 1.492 5.505 0.279 0.510 
Evasion 0.864 1.844 0.408 0.620 
 
Table S4.5.1. Parameters of the selected beta-binomial 
distributions fit to data. Table entries correspond to the dashed lines 
shown in Figure S4.5.1.  
 
 
Figure S4.5.1. Regression models fit to distributions of individual 
information request rates and reliance on payoffs. Bars reflect 
observed distributions in our primary experiment (also presented in 
Figure 4.2 of the main text), dashed lines represent beta-binomial 




Part B. Follow-up experiment 
This Part presents the setup and results from the follow-up experiment. 
We highlight how decisions and requests for social information developed 
over time, and how social information use varied between individuals. 
 
S4.6. Setup 
To test the robustness of the findings of our primary experiment, we 
conducted a follow-up experiment consisting of ten independent sessions, 
each with 20 subjects (n=200). The basic setup of this follow-up 
experiment was the same as the primary experiment reported in the main 
text: we confronted participants with four interaction contexts in 
sequence, each consisting of a block of 20 rounds. In each round subjects 
made a decision between two options, and before making their decision, 
subjects could collect social information about their peers. However, there 
were a few differences with the primary experiment: i) subjects interacted 
in groups of five instead of eight; ii) because the group size was not the 
same, the payoff matrices were changed (see below); iii) the stochastic 
component of the payoffs was relatively larger (see below) iv) the 
maximum number of pieces of information subjects could collect in a 
round was limited to four, instead of six; v) subjects could no longer 
request information about the total payoffs of their group members (this 
type of information was requested at a low frequency in our primary 
experiment), but only about their previous decisions and previous payoffs. 
 
The interaction contexts of the follow-up experiment were characterised 


























. As in the primary experiment, we chose the 
parameters such, that at p=0.5, the payoff differences between A and B are 
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equal (i.e., 200) in each of the interaction contexts. In the coordination 
game, the unstable equilibrium was situated where three players choose A 
and two players choose B. The Nash equilibrium of the one-shot version of 
the evasion game was situated where two players chose A and three chose 
B. All other equilibria were the same as in the primary experiment. The 
stochastic component on the subjects’ payoffs was relatively larger than in 
our primary experiment (σ=200). This implies that at p=0.5, choosing the 
inferior option nevertheless lead to higher payoffs in 24% of the cases. 
 
S4.7. Main results  
To allow for comparison with the primary experiment, we present the 
results along the same lines as in the main text (cf. Figure 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). 
Figure S4.7.1 presents the average behaviour in the 20 replicate groups 
over time (top row of panels), and gives an overview of the types of 
information requests (bottom row). As in the primary experiment, we find 
that groups approach the Nash equilibria of the one-shot versions of the 
games over time in each of the contexts (on which we based the coloured 
dashed lines and arrows; see section 2 of this Appendix). Comparing these 
results with Figure 4.1 of the main text, we observe that in the best choice 
context, dynamics were similar to the primary experiment. In the social 
dilemma, levels of cooperation tended to be higher than in the primary 
experiment, possibly due to the smaller group size. In the coordination 
game, a higher proportion of groups ended up at the equilibrium where all 
group members choose A, which is Pareto inferior to the equilibrium 
where all group members play B (i.e., all players would obtain higher 
payoffs in the latter equilibrium). This may be explained by the fact that 
the Pareto inferior equilibrium had a relatively larger basin of attraction 
in the follow-up experiment than in the primary experiment; the unstable 
internal equilibrium is closer to 0.5. In the evasion game, groups were 
attracted to the internal equilibrium (as occurred in the primary 
experiment).  
 
Information requests tended to decrease over time in each of the contexts 
(Figure S4.7.1, bottom row of panels). We observe that fewer decisions 




the other interaction contexts. Also, we find that most requests were for 
either a combination of previous decision and associated payoffs (blue 
bars), or for previous decisions only (red bars). In the best choice context, 
requests for both decision and payoffs are the dominant type of 
information request. In the other contexts, most requests were for 
previous decisions only. These observations are in line with those from 
the primary experiment. 
As in the primary experiment, subjects in the follow-up experiment 
strongly varied in both the amount and the type of information they 
requested. Figure S4.7.2 shows the distributions of information request 
rates (reliance on social information, Figure S4.7.2a) and the fraction of 
information requests that included a request for payoff information 
(reliance on payoffs, Figure S4.7.2b). The strong overrepresentation of 
extreme strategies – some individuals always requested payoff 
information, and others disregard it altogether – confirms the findings 
presented in Figure 4.2 of the main text.  
To assess the individual consistency in social information use across 
contexts, we analysed the requests for information in the same way as in 
the primary experiment. For each of the four contexts, we categorized 
subjects’ reliance on social learning as ‘low’ or ‘high’ (requesting 
information in <25%, or >25% of the rounds, respectively). Similarly, 
subjects’ reliance on payoffs in social learning was categorized as ‘low’ or 
‘high’ (with <50%, or >50% of the requests including payoff information, 
respectively) for each of the contexts separately. Next, we calculated the 
expected percentage of consistent individuals, assuming independence of 
behaviour in the different contexts.  Figure S4.7.3 compares those 
expected fractions of individuals with consistent (high or low) reliance on 
social information with the observed values (top), and makes the same 
comparison for reliance on payoff information (bottom). As in our primary 
experiment, we find that the fraction of individuals that was consistent in 
their social information use is significantly larger than expected (χ2 = 
29.551, d.f.=1, P < 0.001). This is also the case for individuals’ consistency 
in reliance on payoffs (χ2 = 13.673, d.f. = 1, P < 0.001). ‘Sensible switchers’ 
(that tended to rely on payoff information in the best choice context only) 
occur at a high frequency, but not more than expected (χ2 = 2.801, d.f. = 1, 
P < 0.094).  






Figure S4.7.1. Decisions and information requests in four 
interaction contexts. The top row of panels shows the fraction of 
subjects that chose A over twenty rounds of four contexts (40 replicate 
groups of five subjects in grey, averages in colour). The bottom row of 
panels shows counts of combinations of information types requested in 
corresponding rounds. Colours indicate specific (combinations of) 
information requested: only the payoff (green), only the decision (red), 







Figure S4.7.2. Social learning strategies vary between individuals. 
a, Distribution of subjects’ reliance on social learning in decision 
making, measured as the fraction of decisions in which subjects chose 
to collect peer information.  
b, Distribution of subjects’ reliance on payoffs in social learning, 
measured as the fraction of requests for group member information 
that included at least one request for previous payoffs. 




Figure S4.7.3. Social learning strategies tend to be consistent 
across contexts. a, The observed fraction of individuals with 
consistent (high or low) reliance on social learning is significantly 
larger than expected. b, The observed fraction of individuals with 





Part C. Implications of individual variation in social learning 
strategies for cultural evolution 
In this Part we offer more detailed information about the simulation 
model presented in the main text. To check the robustness of our findings, 
we also present an alternative analytical model focusing on cultural 
evolution of social behaviour in an evasion game. Both models are 
conceptual ‘toy models’, providing a first theoretical investigation on 
whether individual variation in social learning strategies influences the 
dynamics and outcome of cultural evolution. With these models, we do not 
intend to make any testable predictions or accurately mimic reality. 
Rather, we aim to provide a proof of principle that individual differences 
in social learning strategies potentially have a strong effect on the 
outcome of cultural evolution. 
For simplicity, we focus on two different kinds of learning: payoff-based 
learning (in which individuals tend to imitate individuals with higher 
payoffs) and frequency-based learning (in which individuals tend to 
imitate the majority of the group).In our models, we compare groups that 
are homogeneous with respect to social learning strategy (i.e., all 
individuals employ the same mixed learning strategy that consists of both 
payoff-based learning and frequency-based learning) with groups that are 
heterogeneous in this respect (i.e., each individual uses either only payoff-
based learning or only frequency-based learning, but individuals differ 
with respect to which type of learning they use).   
Both models have the same basic structure, closely following the setup of 
our primary experiment. We consider groups in which individuals are 
involved in social interactions. Individuals have a trait (A or B) that 
determines their behaviour in these interactions. Payoffs of A and B 
are (1 )pa p b  and (1 )pc p d  , respectively, where p denotes the 
fraction of the group playing A. Individuals have pure strategies (either 
playing A or B), but their strategy can change over the course of time due 
to social learning.   
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S4.8. Details of the simulation model presented in the main text 
For each of the four interaction contexts presented in Figure 4.4 of the 
main text, we simulated a process of cultural evolution in 105 replicate 
groups. In each of these replicates, individuals interacted in groups of 
eight and obtained payoffs according to the same payoff matrices as were 
used in the primary experiment (see section 2 of this Appendix). After 
each interaction, one individual was randomly drawn to update its 
strategy (see below). This cycle was repeated for 160 iterations (loosely 
according to the number of potential strategy updating events in the 
experiment, in which eight individuals could update their strategy in each 
of 20 rounds). At the beginning of each simulation, seven individuals 
played A and one played B. This setup of our simulation mimics the 
introduction of a deviant behaviour in a resident group of which all 
individuals have adopted the same behaviour. In the best choice context, 
this scenario mimics the introduction of a superior technology to a group. 
In the social dilemma, this scenario mimics the invasion of a defector in a 
group of cooperators. In a coordination and evasion games, this mimics 
the introduction of a deviant behaviour that, when rare, leads to lower and 
higher payoffs, respectively.  
We implemented updating of traits through social learning is such a way 
that individuals used the same amount of information as was allowed in 
the primary experiment. In the event of frequency-based learning, 
behavioural updating was based on the previous decisions of a sample of 
six group members. The behaviour was updated to the behaviour 
exhibited by the majority of the sampled group members (if both 
behaviours were observed in equal proportions, the behaviour was not 
changed). For payoff-based learning, behavioural updating was based on 
both the previous decision and the previous payoff of a sample of three 
group members. The behaviour was updated to the behaviour that was 
associated with the highest payoff in this sample (but only if this payoff 
exceeded own payoff). In the simulation model, we do not allow for 
spontaneous switching between A and B (cf. mutation or innovation; see 
the alternative model in section S4.9 of this Appendix for a scenario in 
which we relax this assumption), neither do we add a stochastic 
component to the payoffs. These assumptions are made for simplicity. We 




(recall that there is no spontaneous strategy switching in our model, so a 
fixated group cannot change anymore).  
In Figure S4.8.1, we illustrate how frequency- and payoff-based learning 
affect the expected change in the abundance of A and B in each of the four 
interaction contexts, in groups that are homogeneous and heterogeneous 
with respect to their social learning strategies. This graph aims to give 
insight into the dynamics that lead to the outcomes of cultural evolution 
presented in the panels in Figure 4.4 of the main text. In the best choice 
context and the social dilemma, the individually inferior behaviour A is 
more likely to fixate in a group in the absence of individual variation. The 
arrows in Figure S4.8.1 offer an intuition for this result: if a payoff-learner 
in the heterogeneous group has adopted the individually superior 
behaviour B, this individual will never switch back to A. This guarantees 
the eventual fixation of B. However, in heterogeneous groups, fixation in A 
always remains possible, particularly when B is initially rare and is 
disfavoured by frequency-based learning. In the coordination game, there 
are no differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups in 
terms of the outcome of cultural evolution. This is because any learning 
event (payoff-based learning or frequency-based learning) will lead to 
choosing A, so the fixation of A is the only possible outcome.  
The most striking effects of individual variation in social learning 
strategies occur in the evasion game. The probability of fixation of either A 
or B is much higher in groups that are homogeneous. Note that in the 
evasion game, average payoffs are higher when A and B coexist (see 
section 2 of this Appendix). As illustrated by the bottom right panel of 
Figure S4.8.1, the dynamics of cultural evolution in the heterogeneous 
group will lead a the group composition where all frequency-based 
learners play B, whereas the payoff-based learners play A and B in equal 
proportions. When at this equilibrium, frequency-based learning events 
can no longer lead to the fixation of the most common strategy (B), 
because the only individuals that are playing A are payoff-based learners. 
In contrast, in a homogeneous group in which two players are playing A 
and six are playing B, fixation of B (through two consecutive frequency-
based learning events) is still possible, and even likely to occur at some 
point. The emerging role differentiation in the heterogeneous group, in 
which all frequency-based learners play A and the payoff-based learners 
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play A or B with equal probability, ensures that the group retains 
behavioural polymorphism. In this particular interaction context, 
individual variation in social learning strategies increases average payoffs 




Figure S4.8.1. Effects of individual variation in social learning 
strategies on dynamics of cultural evolution in four interaction 
contexts. Arrows indicate the expected direction of change due to 
social learning in a group of eight individuals. Individuals learn based 
on frequencies (white arrows) or based on payoffs (blue arrows). The 
top row of panels represents the possible dynamics in a group that is 
homogeneous with respect to social learning strategies: each individual 
updates its behaviour based on either frequency- or payoff-based 
learning with a 50-50 probability. The bottom row of panels represents 
the possible dynamics in a group that is heterogeneous with respect to 
individual social learning strategies: four individuals always learn 
based on frequencies, and the other four always learn based on payoffs. 
Closed and open circles indicate dynamically stable and unstable 




S4.9. Details and results of an alternative analytical model 
Here we present the details and results of an alternative model, in which 
we use an analytical approach to the same question: to what extent do 
individual differences in social learning strategies affect the outcome of 
cultural evolution? In this case, we focus only on the evasion game (for 
which we obtained the most interesting results in the simulation model). 
As in our simulation model, we compare groups that are homogeneous 
with respect to social learning strategy (all individuals use both 
frequency-based learning and payoff-based learning with equal 
probability) with groups that are heterogeneous in this respect (half of the 
group always uses payoff-based learning, the other half always uses 
frequency-based learning). Again, individuals exhibit either of two 
behaviours (A or B), and one randomly selected individual per time step 
can update this behaviour through social learning.  
Let i denote the number of individuals that play A, with 0 i n  , where n 
denotes group size. For each state i we specify the probabilities of 
transition to states i–1 and i+1. These probabilities are entered in a 
transition matrix, the dominant right eigenvector of which gives its 
stationary distribution (Karlin and Taylor 1975; Otto and Day 2011), 
describing the long-run proportion of time that the group spends in each 
state. 
In a homogeneous group, in which all individuals use the same mixture of 
frequency- and payoff-based learning, the probability that an individual 
that plays A switches to B is given by 
1 1








      
  









 denote the probabilities in state i of switching from 
A to B by frequency-based learning and payoff-based learning, 
respectively. In contrast to our simulation model, we allow for 
spontaneous strategy switching; the rate at which this occurs is given by ε. 
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Social learning occurs with the complementary probability 1 – ε. Similarly, 
the probability that a B player switches to A is given by 
1 1




B A C P
n
  
   
      
  
.  (S4.9.1b) 
Social learning rules are deterministic: frequency-based learners always 
adopt the behaviour of the majority (when both types of behaviour are 
equally abundant, individuals stick with their original behaviour), payoff-
based learners always adopt the behaviour that is associated with the 
highest payoff in the sample.  
In a group that is heterogeneous with respect to the social learning 
strategies of its members, we cannot simply keep track of the number of A 
players in the group, since there are two distinct types of them 
(frequency-based learning A players and payoff-based learning A players). 
Therefore, we have to take four possible transitions from each state of the 
group into account: i) loss of a payoff-based learning A player, ii) loss of a 
frequency-based learning A player, iii) gain of a payoff-based learning A 
player, or iv) gain of a frequency-based learning A player.   
Let iC and iP denote the number of frequency-based learning and payoff-
based learners playing A, respectively. The total number of A players i in 
the group equals iC + iP . The probabilities of switching from A to B by 
either frequency- or payoff-based learning are given by  




           (S4.9.2a) 




           (S4.9.2b) 
respectively.  
Similarly, the probabilities of switching from B to A by either frequency- 
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        (S4.9.3b) 
respectively.  
Again, we enter those probabilities into a transition matrix, and calculate 
the dominant right eigenvector to obtain the stationary state of the group 
(Karlin and Taylor 1975).  
We consider an evasion game with the same payoff matrix as the evasion 
game of our primary experiment in a group of eight players (see section 2 
of this Appendix for details). The coexistence equilibrium of this game is 
located at p*=0.25(where two individuals play A and the other six play B). 
This means that payoff-learners that update their behaviour will adopt 
playing A or B if fewer or more than 2 individuals play A, respectively. 
They will stick to their previous behaviour if exactly 2 individuals play A. 
Frequency-based learners that update their behaviour will adopt playing 
A or B if the majority (more than four players) play A or B, respectively. 
They will stick to their previous behaviour if A and B are both played by 
four players.  
Figure S4.9.1 shows the stationary states of the homogeneous and the 
heterogeneous groups. When there is no individual variation in social 
learning strategies, payoff-based learning will drive the group towards the 
coexistence equilibrium. However, frequency-based learning tends to 
drive the group towards the extreme state where all individuals play B. 
The net effect is that most of the time, all individuals play B. In contrast, as 
in the simulation model, a group with individual variation in social 
learning strategies allows a coexistence of A and B in the evasion game. At 
equilibrium, all frequency-based learners and two payoff-based learners 
play B, and the other two payoff-based learners play A. This confirms the 
findings of our simulation model, and supports the conclusion that 
individual variation in social learning strategies can affect the outcome of 
cultural evolution.  
 




Part D. Experimental details 
In this Part we describe the experimental procedures. It contains written 
instructions to the subjects, as well as instructions given on the computer 
screen during the experimental session. We conclude with screenshots of 
the decision making environment presented to the subjects.   
S4.10. General experimental procedure 
We ran 22 independent experimental sessions with n=396 subjects in 
total (primary experiment: eight sessions with sixteen subjects each; 
control: four sessions with sixteen subjects each; follow-up sessions: ten 
sessions with 20 subjects each).  Experimental subjects were recruited by 
e-mail, using the subject pool of the Sociology department of the 
University of Groningen. Subjects (132 male, 264 female; aged 18 to 31, 
 
Figure S4.9.1. Individual variation in social learning strategies 
facilitates behavioural diversity in an evasion game. In groups that 
are homogeneous with respect to their social learning strategies, most 
time is spent in the state where all individuals play B (blue bars). By 
contrast, groups that are heterogeneous with respect to individual 
social learning strategies spend most of their time at or near the 
coexistence equilibrium stable. In this state, frequency-based learners 
all play B and payoff-based learners respond by half of them playing A 




mean age 22) were mostly undergraduate students from the social 
sciences, economics and biology. Experimental sessions lasted around 90 
minutes, in which subjects earned €29.60 (£ 24.90) on average according 
to their performance, excluding a show-up fee of 5 euros. 
Instructions were handed out in the reception room of the laboratory and 
read out loud by one of the experimenters. Each participant received a 
randomly chosen number corresponding to a desk in the laboratory. 
Before the experiment itself started, subjects played a test trial of five 
rounds, making them familiar with the decision making environment. 
After that, the four blocks of 20 rounds were started. At the beginning of 
each block of rounds, specific instructions for the upcoming interaction 
context were given on the computer screen, and participants had to fill out 
a brief quiz to check their understanding. Sessions finished with a 
questionnaire including items about personal demographic background. 
Participants were paid individually in the reception room.  
S4.11. Instructions on paper 
This section contains the instructions that participants received on paper. 
The on-screen instructions follow below, in section 12. 
 
Welcome!  
This session will last for approximately 2 hours. During the session it is 
not allowed to talk or communicate with the other participants. If you 
have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to you to 
answer it. During this session you will earn money. The amount you earn 
depends on your decisions and (sometimes) the decisions of others. At the 
end of the session the amount you have earned, plus a show-up fee of 5 
euros, will be paid to you in cash. These payments are anonymous; you 
will be paid individually in a separate room. Please stay seated at the end 
of the session until your desk number is called. We will not inform any of 
the other participants about your earnings. It is impossible for us to 
associate your desk number with your identity.  
 




In the coming session you own an imaginary farm. You will run this farm 
in 4 different experiments in which you can earn points. At the end of 
the session, these points will be translated into real money (1000 points = 
1 euro). At the beginning of each experiment, you will be grouped with 7 
randomly chosen other participants in the room and each is randomly 
labeled with a number 1-8. All experiments are anonymous; you cannot 
find out the real identity of the other Farmers in your group, and they 
cannot find this out about you. During each experiment, your group 
consists of the same 8 participants, but when a new experiment starts, 
new groups are formed. At the beginning of each experiment, you will 
receive 2500 points to start with. The experiments are completely 
separate – what you earn in one experiment does not influence what you 
can earn in the other experiments. Also, it is likely that your earnings will 
vary between experiments.  
Making decisions 
Each experiment lasts for 20 Seasons. In each Season, you will make a 
decision how to use the land on your farm. In each experiment, you will 
decide between two different options. All Farmers in your group will 
make this decision at the same time.  
Once all Farmers have made their decision, all Crops of all Farmers in your 
group are sold on the Market. This procedure is automated in the 
computer program. The number of points you earn (your ‘revenue’) 
depends on three things:  
1. Crop value: one of the two Crops is worth more points. This Crop 
yields higher revenues on the Market.  
2. Your land production: the number of Crops you produce in a 
Season is affected by things that you don’t control, such as crop 
diseases or pests. In each Season, Farmers that make the same 
decision, will not receive exactly the same revenues. It will 
sometimes occur that a Farmer that chose the Crop with the 
higher value, will nevertheless get less revenues than a Farmer 




Crop with the higher value will give higher revenues. The variation 
in Crop production is fully determined by chance.  
3. Decisions of other Farmers: in experiment 1, your revenues are 
independent of the decisions of the other Farmers in your group. 
In experiments 2, 3 and 4, your revenues also depend on the 
decisions of other Farmers. How your revenues depend on your 
decisions and the decisions of the other Farmers in your group, is 
given by the ‘Market Rules’. These Rules are different in each of 
the experiments. The Market Rules will always be explained by the 
computer program at the beginning of each experiment. During an 
experiment, the Market Rules remain the same. Before the Seasons 
of an experiment start, you will fill out a short Quiz to check if you 
understand the Market Rules. 
At the end of each Season, you are informed about the number of points 
you received for your Crops. It is also possible to lose points. The points 
you earn are stored in the computer memory. 
Collecting information 
Before making your decision, you can collect information about the 
decisions and revenues of the Farmers in your group. Three kinds of 
information are available about each Farmer:  
i) Decision in the previous Season 
ii) Revenue in the previous Season 
iii) Total points in the current experiment 
At the start of each Season, you can indicate whether or not you want to 
collect information. Collecting information costs 25 points. For those 25 
points, you can collect up to 6 pieces of information in total. Remember 
that your revenues only partly depend on your land production in a 
Season. Collecting information about the decisions and revenues of other 
Farmers can be useful in finding out which Crops the other Farmers are 
producing, and which Crop has the higher value.  
If you indicated not to collect information, no costs will be charged. In the 
first Season of each experiment, no information is available yet. At the 
start of the session, a test trial will make you familiar with the decision 
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making environment on the computer screen. This test trial lasts for 5 
Seasons. You cannot earn anything; the points are not worth any money. 
After the test trial, the experiments will start. 
Time limits 
In each Season (except the first of each experiment), you have 10 seconds 
to decide if you want to collect information about the Farmers in your 
group.  If you have not decided within this time period, you will not get the 
opportunity to collect information. If you indicated ‘Yes’ (and confirmed), 
you have 20 seconds to decide which pieces of information you wish to 
collect. In the Decision screen the information you collected is shown to 
you, and you can make your decision how to use your land. You have 20 
seconds to make this decision. If you have not decided (and confirmed 
your decision) within this time period, the computer program will make a 
random choice for you. When the Season has finished, a Results screen 
shows you the number of points you earned in this Season. This screen is 
shown to you for 10 seconds. After the Results screen, a new Season will 
start.  
After 20 Seasons, the experiment is over, and a new experiment will be 
started by us. At the beginning of this new experiment, you will again be 
grouped with 7 randomly chosen other participants in the room and each 
participant is randomly labeled with a number 1-8, and the new Market 
Rules are explained in the computer program. After 4 experiments, the 
session ends. 
End of the session 
At the end of the series of 4 experiments, you are asked to fill out a short 
Questionnaire. Once you have filled out this Questionnaire, you will be 
paid in a separate room. Please stay seated until we call your desk 
number.  
 
S4.12. On-screen instructions 





A new experiment starts now. 
You are grouped with 7 randomly chosen other participants. 
You receive 2500 points to start with. 
Subsequently, the ‘Market rules’ of the upcoming environment were 
displayed.  There rules were specific of each of them, followed by a quiz to 
check the subject’s understanding of the market rules. The quiz consisted 
of four statements, and subjects had to indicate if they were true or false. 
The rounds (or ‘seasons’) of the environment were started once all 




In this experiment, two Crops are available: Potatoes and Wheat.  
One of the two Crops (Potatoes or Wheat) has a higher value than the 
other Crop.  
The revenues of your Crops do not depend on the decisions of the other 
Farmers in your group.  
Before the Seasons of this experiment start,  
a short Quiz will check if you understood the Market Rules. 
Quiz 
1. In each Season of this experiment, I can decide to produce Potatoes or 
Wheat. 
2. Before I make my decision, I can collect information about the decisions 
of the other Farmers in my group. 
3. The revenues of my Crop production also depend on the decisions of 
other Farmers in my group. 
4. My group consists of the same Farmers during this experiment. When 
the experiment has finished, new groups will be formed randomly.   
 





In this experiment, Apples are the only Crop available.  
Each Season, you can decide if you want to spray Pesticides during the 
production of your Apples.  
Using Pesticides will increase your land production. 
However, the more Farmers decide to use Pesticides,  
the lower the value of all Apples on the Market  
(both Sprayed Apples and Unsprayed Apples). 
Quiz 
1. New groups have been formed randomly. 
2. In each Season of this experiment, I can decide to use Pesticides to 
produce my Apples. 
3. The value of all Apples is higher when I choose to use Pesticides. 
4. The value of all Apples is highest, if all Farmers produce their Apples 




In this experiment, two Crops are available: Melons and Pumpkins. 
In principle, one of the two Crops (Melons or Pumpkins) has a higher 
value than the other Crop. 
Yet, the Supplier of the Crop seeds will give more discount  
if more Farmers decide to produce the same Crop. 
This means that the revenues of your Crops also depend on the decisions 
of the other Farmers in your group:  







1. In this experiment, the revenues of my decision depend on the decisions 
of the other Farmers. 
2. The more Farmers decide to produce a certain Crop, the more discount 
the Supplier will give. This will increase the revenues of this Crop. 
3. The more Farmers decide to produce Melons, the higher the revenues of 
Melons will be. 
4. The more Farmers decide to produce Pumpkins, the higher the 




In this experiment, two Crops are available: Carrots and Onions. 
In principle, one of the two Crops (Carrots or Onions) has a higher value 
than the other Crop. 
Yet, if a Crop is scarce on the Market, its value increases. 
This means that the revenues of your Crops also depend on the decisions 
of the other Farmers in your group:  
the more Farmers decide to produce a specific Crop, the lower its value. 
Quiz 
1. In this experiment, the revenues of my decision depend on the decisions 
of the other Farmers. 
2. The more Farmers decide to produce a certain Crop, the lower its value. 
3. The more Farmers decide to produce Carrots, the higher the revenues 
of Carrots will be. 
4. The more Farmers decide to produce Onions, the higher the revenues of 
Onions will be. 
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Collecting information and making decisions 
Before making their decisions in a Season, subjects could collect 
information from their fellow group mates. On the screen, subjects were 
asked the following: 




If a subject ticked ‘yes’, a screen appeared in which he could collect 
information about his fellow group members (see below for screenshots). 
If subjects indicated ‘no’, they immediately went on to the decision screen. 
After all subjects made their decisions, a Results screen was shown, giving 
information about the payoffs acquired in the current Season. After 20 
Seasons, subjects were also shown their total number of points collected 









Figure S4.13.1. Collecting information of fellow group 
members. Subjects could check radio buttons to collect up to six 
pieces information of each other Farmer in their group separately. 
After checking the desired information, they could click the button 
‘Update information!’. 






Figure S4.13.2.View of the collected information and decision 
making. The program shows the requested information. In the 
bottom right part of the screen, subjects could make their planting 






Figure S4.13.3. Screen showing the results of the current Season. 
After making their planting decision, subjects were informed about 
their revenues. If information was requested, the costs were 
subtracted. 
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Social learning has caused humans to build up extensive cultural 
repertoires, allowing them to adapt to a wide variety of environmental 
and social conditions. Recent experimental evidence (reported in Chapter 
4 of this thesis) shows that people differ with respect to their social 
learning strategies: some focus on the success of their peers, whereas 
others base their decisions on the behaviour of the majority. Moreover, 
this individual variation in social information use tends to be consistent 
across interaction contexts. However, the earlier findings leave open the 
question of whether these differences are stable over time. Here we 
provide experimental evidence that individual variation in social 
information use does indeed tend to persist over time, suggesting that 
social learning strategies are a structural part of individuals’ behavioural 
repertoire. In addition, we show that the assortment of individuals with 
respect to their social learning strategies can affect the outcome of social 
interactions: groups of individuals that attend to majority behaviour (cf. 
using ‘frequency-based learning’) achieve high levels of cooperation in a 
social dilemma, as compared to groups whose members focus on the 
efficiency of peers’ decisions (cf. using ‘payoff-based learning’). In sum, 
our findings suggest that human social learning strategies are relatively 
stable, and that these strategies can have marked consequences for the 
outcome of cooperative interactions. 
 





Theories of cultural evolution assess how the frequencies and 
distributions of socially learned traits change over time (Cavalli-Sforza 
and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985). The dynamics of this 
process depends on how traits transmit between individuals. Theory 
suggests that different forms of social learning at the individual level 
(often referred to as ‘social learning strategies’; Laland 2004) can lead to 
different outcomes of cultural evolution at the population level (Chapters 
2 and 3 of this thesis; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and 
Richerson 1985). For instance, it has been argued that groups whose 
members use conformist learning – preferentially copying the behaviour 
of the majority of one’s peers – are likely to sustain cooperation in a social 
dilemma, as compared to groups whose members use payoff-based 
learning (Boyd and Richerson 1985; but see Chapters 2 and 3 of this 
thesis).  
The assumptions about human social learning strategies underlying 
theories of cultural evolution are largely circumstantial in nature, based 
on theoretical considerations and experiments from social psychology 
that were designed for other purposes. Only recently, systematic empirical 
evidence has started to accumulate on how people actually learn from 
each other in making decisions under uncertainty (McElreath et al. 2005; 
McElreath et al. 2008; Efferson et al. 2008; Mesoudi 2008; Mesoudi 2011). 
The results of these experiments suggest that people use both payoff-
based and frequency-based social learning strategies in determining what 
to do. However, these studies typically focus on non-social contexts in 
which payoffs of behaviour do not depend on the behaviour of others 
(Traulsen et al. 2010 being the only exception known to us).  
The experimental work presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis was the first 
to compare social learning strategies across social and non-social 
contexts. We observed that individuals differ strongly and consistently 
with respect to their social learning strategies. Some individuals tended to 
largely ignore social information in a range of different situations, 




decisions (Chapter 4 of this thesis, Figure 4.2a). We found even more 
pronounced differences in the type of information that individuals used: 
some consistently focused on the payoffs of their peers, whereas others 
tended to consistently disregarded payoffs altogether, basing their 
behaviour on the frequencies of behaviour among their peers (Chapter 4 
of this thesis, Figure 4.2b). These pronounced differences in social 
learning strategies persisted across contexts: individuals that tended to 
use payoff-based learning in one interaction context (e.g., a social 
dilemma) were likely to use this form of learning in other interaction 
contexts (e.g., a coordination or an evasion game; Chapter 4 of this thesis, 
Figure 4.3, S4.7.3).  
The observation of distinct social learning strategies, and their 
consistency over interaction contexts raise two questions. First, do 
individual differences in social learning strategies persist through time? 
The observation of time consistent, distinct forms of social information 
use would suggest that social learning strategies can be viewed as 
‘personality traits’, reflecting differences among individuals that stably 
persist across time and contexts. Second, how does assortment of distinct 
social learning types influence the outcome of social interactions? Human 
interactions are often structured in networks, and it seems plausible that, 
as a result of this structure, social learning strategies are distributed in a 
non-uniform way, so that individuals with similar social learning 
strategies are more likely to interact. The study presented here addresses 




We measured how individuals’ social learning strategies at two points in 
time, t1 and t2, with four weeks in between. At t1, we documented each 
subject’s social information use in the four different interaction contexts 
(best choice, social dilemma, coordination game, evasion game). 
Subsequently, we categorized subjects based on reliance on payoffs in 
social learning, and assigned them to sessions for t2 according to their 
social learning strategies. At t2, we again measured the subject’s social 
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information use in the four interaction contexts, using a slightly different 
setup. This procedure allowed us to i) quantify the time consistency of 
subjects’ social learning strategies, and ii) assess the effects of assortment 
of social learning strategies on the outcome of group interactions.  
Time point 1 (t1) 
The experimental sessions whose results are presented in the Appendix of 
Chapter 4 (Part B) of this thesis provide the basis for our analysis here. In 
these sessions at t1, a total of n=200 subjects were invited into the 
laboratory. In each of the ten sessions, twenty subjects participated and 
interacted in four groups of five. Subjects were confronted with four 
interaction contexts in sequence, in each of which the payoffs of decisions 
depended on the decisions of others in a different way (see below). In 
each interaction context, subjects made decisions in a block consisting of 
20 rounds. At the beginning of each block, groups were randomly formed 
and instructions were given about the upcoming interaction context. In 
each round, subjects made a decision between two options (described as 
choosing to plant either of two crops on a virtual farm). Before making 
their decision, subjects could collect social information about their peer 
group members. From each of his or her four peers, a subject could collect 
information about a) the previous decision and b) previous payoff. The 
number of information pieces that an individual could collect before 
making a decision was limited to four. Each subject encountered, in 
random order, a sequence of i) a best choice situation, where one option 
yields on a average a higher payoff; ii) a social dilemma, where one option 
increases the payoffs of all group members but in each situation yields 
lower payoffs for the individual; iii) a coordination game, where the payoff 
of each option increases with the number of peers choosing this option, 
and iv) an evasion game, where the relative payoff of either option 
decreases with the number of peers choosing this option. The payoff 
matrices of the interaction contexts are given in the Appendix of Chapter 4 
of this thesis, section 2. 
We documented for each subject in each interaction context his or her 
reliance on payoff information in social learning. To this end, we divided 
the number of information requests including payoff information over the 




categorized each subject along the lines of the analysis used in Chapter 4 
of this thesis: we distinguished ‘payoff-based learners’ (with a high 
reliance on payoffs in each of the four contexts), ‘frequency-based 
learners’ (with a low reliance on payoffs in each of the four contexts), and 
‘sensible switchers’ (with a high reliance on payoffs in the best choice 
context, and a low reliance on payoffs in the other contexts). In case 
individuals could not be categorized according to any of the 
abovementioned types, they were labelled as ‘other’. We used this 
categorization to assign subjects to different sessions of t2, as will be 
explained below.  
Time point 2 (t2; one month later) 
Based on the above categorization, we assigned payoff-based learners, 
frequency-based learners and sensible switchers to specific sessions of t2, 
planned four weeks after t1. Subjects labelled as ‘other’ were assigned to 
control sessions (for details of the assignment procedures, see Appendix, 
section 1). The participants in the control sessions were complemented by 
subjects unavailable at the time slots of their appropriate sessions. For 
each of the four categories we organized two sessions with 20 participants 
each (n=40 subjects for each category, n=160 in total). Subjects were not 
informed about the criteria we used to assign them to specific sessions.  
The experimental setup of the sessions at t2 was almost identical to the 
sessions of t1, the only change being the description of the decision making 
environment: instead of deciding to plant either of two crops on a farm, 
subjects had to choose between two investment options on a virtual stock 
market. This change aimed to minimize potential risks that individuals 
would fall back on a routine behaviour settled on at t1. Payoff matrices and 
the level of noise on payoffs remained unchanged.  
In similarity to the sessions at t1, we sequentially confronted subjects with 
four interaction contexts in randomized order, each consisting of a block 
of 20 rounds. We again documented the types of social information that 
individuals requested before making their decisions. Comparing 
individual information use in each of the interaction contexts between t1 
and t2 allowed us to assess the time consistency of social learning 
strategies. In addition, we tracked the group dynamics in each of the 
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interaction contexts, to assess the effect of assortment of types of social 
learning strategies.  
 
Results 
Time consistency of social learning strategies 
For both t1 and t2, we categorized for each interaction context each 
subject’s reliance on social information as ‘high’ (with a request rate of 
>0.25) or ‘low’ (with a request rate of <0.25). This 25% boundary splits up 
the population in roughly equal partitions for each of the interaction 
contexts (see Chapter 4 of this thesis, Figure S4.7.2a). The top row of 
panels in Figure 5.1 shows for each interaction context the fraction of 
individuals that are consistent in time in their reliance on social 
information. For each interaction context, we observe that the majority of 
individuals tends to be consistent with respect to their reliance on social 
learning (Figure 5.1 top row of panels; compare the coloured bars 
indicating the fraction of consistent individuals with the grey bars 
indicating the inconsistent individuals). A more fine-grained analysis 
based on linear regression revealed that regarding the degree of reliance 
on social learning, behaviour at t1 is a fairly good predictor for behaviour 
at t2 (with R2 values for best choice: 0.39; social dilemma: 0.38; 
coordination game: 0.19; and evasion game: 0.42; see Appendix, section 2 
for details). These results support the conclusion that individuals’ reliance 
on social information tends to be stable over time.  
The extent to which individuals relied on payoffs in social learning was 
analysed in a similar way: for each interaction context, each subject’s rate 
of requests for payoffs was labelled as ‘high’ (when social information 
requests included payoff information at a rate >=0.5) or ‘low’ (with 
requests including payoffs at a rate <0.5). This 50%-boundary forms an 
obvious threshold to distinguish individuals that predominantly focus on 
payoffs from others who ignore payoffs in more than half of their requests 
for social information, and it also splits up the population in roughly equal 
partitions in three out of four interaction contexts (see Chapter 4 of this 
thesis, Figure S4.7.2b). The bottom row of panels in Figure 5.1 shows for 




or low) reliance on payoffs at t1 and t2. Again, for each interaction context, 
we observe that the lion’s share of individuals tends to be consistent with 
respect to their reliance on payoffs. In addition, we ran a separate analysis 
based on linear regression on the individual degrees of reliance on payoffs 
at t1 and t2. This analysis revealed that for each context separately, a 
positive relationship exists between individual reliance on payoffs at t1 
and t2 (with R2 values for best choice: 0.13; social dilemma: 0.26; 
coordination game: 0.12; and evasion game: 0.19; see Appendix, section 1 
for details). The results of both analyses suggest that individuals are also 
time consistent with respect to their reliance on payoff information.  




Information use differed between interaction contexts. For instance, 
reliance on social information tended to be high in the evasion game, as 
compared to the coordination game (Figure 5.1, top row; compare the 
relative sizes of the red and blue stacked bars in both games). This can be 
explained by the fact that in the coordination game, most replicate groups 
rapidly reached an equilibrium in which all members performed the same 
behaviour (see below decision dynamics). At this equilibrium, subjects 
had no incentive to switch behaviour, making (costly) social information 
less valuable. By contrast, in the evasion game, social information retained 
 
Figure 5.1. Time consistency in social learning strategies. For each 
interaction context, we categorized subjects according to their reliance 
on social learning as ‘low’ (<0.25) or ‘high’ (>=0.25) at t1 and t2 (see 
main text for details). The top row of panels shows for each of the four 
interaction contexts the fractions of individuals with a consistent 
reliance on social information at both time points. Similarly, we 
categorized subjects according to their reliance on payoffs in social 
learning as ‘low’ (<0.5) or ‘high’ (>=0.5). The bottom row of panels 
shows for each of the four interaction contexts the fractions of 
individuals with a consistent reliance on payoffs. In each of the 
contexts, we observed a high fraction of individuals using a consistent 
strategy with respect to reliance on social information and reliance on 
payoffs. Note that interaction contexts differ in the degree of 





its value as the frequencies of behaviour tended to fluctuate (see below, 
Figure 5.2, and Chapter 4, Figure S4.7.1). The extent to which individuals 
used payoff information in social learning also varied between interaction 
contexts: in the best choice situation, a majority of individuals consistently 
used payoff-based learning (bottom left panel of Figure 5.1; compare the 
relative sizes of the red and blue stacked bars); and this overall bias 
towards payoff information was more pronounced than we observed 
before (Chapter 4 of this thesis; Figure 4.2b, left panel). In the other three 
interaction contexts – where payoffs of decisions depended on the 
decisions of others – reliance on payoffs was lower considerably lower. 
This is in line with the findings reported in Chapter 4.  
Effects of assortment of social learning strategies on the outcome of group 
interactions 
Next, we turn to the effects of assortment of individuals with respect to 
these strategies on the outcome of social interactions within groups. We 
will focus on group dynamics in the sessions at t2 only; for game dynamics 
in the sessions at t1, see Part B of the Appendix of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
Figure 5.2 presents the average behaviour in each of the replicate groups. 
The rows of panels in this Figure show for each interaction context, for 








Within each of the interaction contexts, groups tended to approach a Nash 
equilibrium of the one-shot versions of the game (Figure 5.2). For the best 
choice situation, the coordination game and the evasion game, we do not 
observe strong differences between assorted groups in terms of group 








Figure 5.2. Group dynamics in behaviour over the course of time. The 
rows of panels represent frequencies of choices for option A in the 
best-choice, social dilemma, coordination and evasion context, 
respectively. Columns of panels represent the categorized types of 
social learning used by the members of the replicate groups. Over time, 
replicate groups (in grey) approach a Nash equilibrium of the games 
(dotted lines). In both the best choice and the social dilemma context, 
option B yielded a higher payoff than A. In the coordination game, the 
horizontal line separates the basins of attraction of the pure A- and B-




difference in cooperation levels (highlighted in Figure 5.3). Groups whose 
members predominantly learn based on frequencies (in case of the social 
dilemma these are both the ‘frequency-based learners’ and the ‘sensible 
switchers’) achieved significantly higher levels of cooperation than groups 
of  payoff-based learners (Tukey’s test: P=0.010 and P=0.022 for 
comparisons of payoff-based learners with frequency-based learners and 
sensible switchers, respectively; logistic generalized linear mixed model 
fit to individual decisions, using ‘learning type’ and ‘period’ as fixed 
factors, and ‘replicate group’ as random factor). As an alternative 
approach to analyze the differences in cooperation levels in the social 
dilemma, we pooled together frequency-based learners and sensible 
switchers into one cohort of ‘frequency-based learners’. Subsequently, we 
compared average cooperation rates in control sessions (8 observations), 
frequency-based learners (16 observations) and payoff-based learners (8 
observations). This analysis confirms that mean cooperation levels in 
groups of frequency-based learners are significantly higher than those in 
groups of payoff-based learners (Tukey’s test: P=0.0125). This result is in 
line with the earlier findings, and supports our conclusion that frequency-
based learning can lead to high levels of cooperation, as compared to 
payoff-based learning.  
 





Intriguingly, recent research has provided experimental evidence that 
subjects from different cultural backgrounds behave very differently when 
confronted with problems of cooperation (Henrich et al. 2001; Herrmann 
et al. 2008; Gächter and Herrmann 2009; Gächter et al. 2010). It is 
possible that distribution of other behaviours involving social interaction, 
such as social learning strategies, varies from culture to culture. For 
instance, it seems plausible that reliance on social learning may correlate 
with culture-level characteristics (Inglehart and Baker 2000). For 
instance, the degree of collectivism in a society may affect the degree to 
which individuals learn socially as opposed to non-socially, and may also 
influence conformist tendencies in deciding how to behave. Alternatively, 
 
Figure 5.3. Mean cooperation rates in the social dilemma in each 
of the four treatments. Based on their information requests at t1, 
subjects were classified as ‘frequency-learners’ (largely ignoring payoff 
information of peers), ‘sensible switchers’ (only regarding payoffs in a 
best choice situation) or ‘payoff-learners’ (regarding payoff 
information in any context). Each bar shows averages of aggregated 
cooperation rates in the eight groups (± 1 SE; n=8 for each bar) in the 
experiment at t2. Groups that consisted of frequency-based learners or 
sensible switchers (orange and blue bars) achieved higher levels of 
cooperation than groups consisting of payoff-based learners (green 
bar). Asterisks refer to P-values of comparisons between groups 




social learning strategies may depend on the degree to which people tend 
to generally trust others. Trust may affect the availability and reliability of 
useful social information: in low-trust societies, social information may be 
likely to be concealed or manipulated in a strategic way (e.g., in attempts 
to gain competitive advantage), whereas in high-trust societies it might be 
easier to obtain reliable social information, allowing individuals to copy 
useful behaviours and to estimate the payoffs of one’s peers. It is an 
empirical question whether social learning strategies indeed differ 
between societies, and correlate with one of the culture-level 
characteristics above. In case such society-level characteristics 
systematically influence social learning strategies of their members, 
societies likely differ with respect to the dynamics of cultural evolution 
(e.g., how new technologies, beliefs, social norms, etc. spread).  
Our experiments show that differences in social learning strategies occur 
on a smaller scale, within a single population. Our subject pool mainly 
consists of subjects from the University of Groningen, The Netherlands, 
aged 18-25. The coexistence of stable, distinct types within one 
demographically homogeneous subject pool is a phenomenon that calls 
for further theoretical and experimental investigation of the causes and 
consequences of this variation. 
As a first step, we might ask how stable individual variation in social 
learning strategies within a population can emerge and be sustained in the 
face of natural selection. Models studying the evolutionary emergence and 
persistence of consistent variation in behavioural types could help explain 
the observed differences in social learning strategies (Wolf et al. 2007; 
Wolf et al. 2008; McNamara and Leimar 2010; Wolf et al. 2011; Wolf and 
Weissing 2012). Efficient behaviour in different interaction contexts may 
call for different forms of social learning. For instance, whereas focusing 
on payoffs seems useful in a best choice situation, it might be better to 
base decisions on the frequency of behaviours among your peers when the 
outcome of decisions depend on what others do. Adjusting their learning 
strategy from environment to environment could allow individuals to 
readily adopt optimal behaviour. However, there might be costs involved 
for being flexible (e.g., in terms of the formation and maintenance of 
cognitive machinery, or time and deliberation costs of enhanced 
processing of (social) information). As a result, one might expect that 
Time consistency in human social learning strategies...  
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individuals are inclined to use some mixture of frequency-based and 
payoff-based learning. In our experiment, however, we observe 
pronounced differences between individuals with respect to the type of 
social information they use. It seems plausible that a consistent focus on 
one type of information (i.e., payoffs or frequencies) could stem from a 
positive feedback mechanism reinforcing an individual’s learning strategy. 
Over time, individuals may become more proficient in exploring their 
social environment and respond to specific types of social information in 
an adequate way. For instance, once individuals have gained experience in 
estimating the success of the behaviour of their peers, they may be 
inclined to exploit this potential advantage.  
Time consistency in behaviour in cooperative contexts is an issue that 
only recently started to attract attention in the experimental social 
sciences. Evidence for individual stability of cooperative tendencies over 
time is mixed (Brosig et al. 2007; Volk et al. 2012). Our results provide 
empirical evidence for time consistency of individual social learning 
strategies. The fact that we did not find even greater degrees of 
consistency over time may be partially explained by the fact that our 
subjects were relatively young. Empirical studies have shown that in 
humans, consistency in personality traits increases as people grow older 
(Roberts and DelVecchio 2000). This suggests that we may find even 
higher levels of time consistency in social learning strategies in 
individuals from older age classes. Another factor that may influence 
degrees of consistency in social learning strategies is the time interval 
between observations (Roberts and DelVecchio 2000). The interval 
between t1 and t2 in our study was four weeks. This is relatively short 
compared with the total life span of an individual, but relatively long 
compared with more transient individual states that may affect behaviour 
in experiments, such as mood or fatigue. It remains an interesting 
question how stable social learning strategies – and traits affecting social 
behaviour in general – are over longer time spans, and which factors may 
cause them to change over an individual’s life time.  
Finally, assorting individuals with respect to their social learning 
strategies led to high cooperation rates in groups of frequency-based 
learners, as compared to groups of individuals who learn based on 




payoffs in social learning may reflect an individual’s ‘competitiveness’; i.e., 
a subject’s desire to perform better than others. Such a motivation is likely 
to be detrimental to cooperation in a social dilemma. Namely, whereas in 
repeated interactions cooperation may be beneficial when trust builds up 
and cooperation is reciprocated, defection is a way to secure the highest 
payoff relative to interaction partners. Results from a questionnaire 
associated with another cooperation experiment (Junikka et al., in 
preparation) support the suggestion that behaviour in social dilemmas 
may be in part motivated by competitive considerations. When asked to 
rate the importance of absolute versus relative performance in decision 
making, a substantial fraction of individuals rates relative performance as 
more important (see Box 5.1). Individuals that indicated that relative 
performance was an important factor in their decision making tended to 
contribute less to public goods. Together, these results suggest that at the 
individual level, links exist between human social learning strategies, 
strategic behaviour in social dilemmas and motivations in social 
interactions. Studies explicitly assessing these links seem a promising 
avenue of future investigation, which could add a new dimension to 
research on human personalities. 




This Appendix consists of 2 sections. In section 1, we give details of the 
procedure on which we based the group compositions in the sessions at t2. 
In section 2, we present additional analyses and measurements of 
individual time consistency in social learning strategies.  
S5.1. Procedural details of assigning subjects to sessions of t2 
From the sessions of t1, we calculated for each subject his or her reliance 
on payoffs in each of the four interaction contexts. Subsequently, we 
assigned all individual to specific sessions of t2 of the experiment, 
grouping together subjects with similar social learning strategies. The 
process of assigning categorized subjects to sessions was limited by two 
factors. First, at recruitment for the first phase, subjects were informed 
that they were expected to indicate their availability for sessions of t2 for 
at least four – out of eight – predefined time slots (one month after t1). To 
minimize constraints on assigning subjects to sessions, we rewarded each 
extra slot for which a participant indicated his or her availability with 1 
euro. Second, despite the fact that social learning strategies were 
relatively extreme within each context, our measure of an individual’s 
reliance on payoffs could take values anywhere between 0 (where a 
subject only requested information on behaviour, and ignored payoffs 
altogether) and 1 (where a subject always included payoffs in information 
requests). This lead to the some degree of heterogeneity within categories. 
For instance, an individual categorized as a ‘frequency-based learner’ may 
have requested information about payoffs several times across the four 
interaction contexts. Despite this heterogeneity, the current procedure 
was strong enough to observe group-level effects of assortment in the 
social dilemma (Figure 5.3 of the main text).  
S5.2. A more fine-grained comparison of social learning strategies at 
Time point 1 and Time point 2 
In Figure 5.1 of the main text, we show that individual social learning 
strategies tend to be consistent over time: the fraction of consistent 
individuals is substantially higher compared to inconsistent individuals, 
for both reliance on social learning and reliance on payoffs. This analysis 
was based on a categorization of individuals’ reliance on social learning 




aspects). Below we present an analysis on the uncategorized data, by and 
large confirming the findings presented in Figure 5.1. We find strong 
correlations in behaviour between t1 and t2 (Figure S5.2.1). This is the case 
for individuals’ reliance on social learning, and, to a slightly lesser extent, 
for individuals’ reliance on payoffs. This analysis supports our claim that 




Figure S5.2.1. Time consistency of social learning strategies. Dots 
represent measures of individual use of information at t1 (horizontal 
axes) and t2 (vertical axes). The top row of panels shows, for each 
interaction context, the relationship between individuals’ reliance on 
social learning at t1 and t2 (one month later). Reliance on social 
learning was measured as the fraction of decisions preceded by a 
request for social information. The bottom row of panels shows, for 
each interaction context, the relationship between individuals’ reliance 
on payoffs at the two time points. Reliance on payoffs was measured as 
the fraction of information requests that included payoff information. 
The dotted lines represent linear regressions, whose associated R2 
values are printed above each panel. For each of the interaction 
contexts, and for both aspects of social learning, we observe 
considerable degrees of consistency over time. 





Box 5.1. Competitive motivations in a cooperation experiment. We 
conducted a decision making experiment on cooperation and conflict in 
which, in one of the treatments, subjects were confronted with ten rounds 
of a public goods game (Junikka et al. in preparation). In each round, 
groups of four were randomly formed, and subjects could choose to 
contribute some amount (0-20 monetary units) to a ‘group project’. Points 
not contributed subjects kept for themselves. Summed contributions were 
doubled, and group members received an equal share of this doubled 
amount, irrespective of their contribution. This setup opposes individual 
and group interests: whereas the collective outcome is optimal when all 
group members contribute all their points, it is individually optimal to 
contribute nothing – thereby reaping the benefits of the contributions of 
others without paying the costs. 
 
After the experiment, subjects filled out a questionnaire including the 
following two questions: 
 
A. On a scale (1 – 10), how important was it for you to score a lot of points in 
this experiment? 
and 
B. On a scale (1 – 10) how important was it for you to score more points 





Questions A and B aim to gauge the importance of, respectively, absolute 
and relative performance in decision making in a social dilemma. The plot 
shows the distribution of ratings of n=240 subjects. The size of the dots 
reflects the number of individuals with a specific combination of ratings 
on the two questions. The majority of individuals rates its absolute score 
higher than its performance relative to others (green dots). A vast 
majority fraction of subjects indicates that their relative performance was 
of some importance to them; only very few subjects answered question B 
with a ‘1’. Strikingly, a substantial fraction (>25%) indicated that their 
relative performance was at least as important as their absolute 
performance (the black and red dots; see the pie-diagram indicating the 
distributions of individuals over the respective categories). Moreover, 
some 10% of individuals indicated that their relative score was more 
important to them, as compared to their absolute score.  A linear 
regression (taking the mean contributions in 10 rounds of a public goods 
game with random group formation as dependent variable, and 
questionnaire answers to Question B as the independent variable) reveals 
a strong negative relationship between the degree to which an individual 
was motivated by relative performance and its cooperation level in the 
public goods game (β=-0.468; adj. R-square = 0.104; P<0.001). This 
questionnaire result suggests that individuals are not exclusively driven 
by material self-interest; on the contrary, for a substantial fraction of 
individuals relative performance prevails over absolute performance. 
 



















There is ample evidence that human cooperative behaviour towards other 
individuals is often conditioned on information about previous 
interactions. This information derives both from personal experience (cf. 
direct reciprocity) and from experience of others, i.e. reputation (cf. 
indirect reciprocity). Direct and indirect reciprocity have been studied 
separately, but humans often have access to both types of information. 
Here we experimentally investigate information use in a repeated helping 
game. When acting as donor, subjects can condition their decisions to help 
recipients on both types of information at a small cost to access such 
information. We find that information from direct interactions weighs 
more heavily in decisions to help and participants tend to react less 
forgivingly to negative personal experience than to negative reputation. 
Moreover, effects of personal experience and reputation interact in 
decisions to help. If a recipient’s reputation is positive, the personal 
experience of the donor has a weak effect on the decision to help, and vice 
versa. Yet, if the two types of information indicate conflicting signatures of 
helpfulness, most decisions to help follow personal experience. To 
understand the roles of direct and indirect reciprocity in human 
cooperation, they should be studied in concert, not in isolation. 




A key mechanism proposed to explain the evolution of cooperation is 
reciprocity (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Nowak 2006). When individuals 
interact repeatedly with the same partner, reciprocal donation can lead to 
mutual cooperation if the probability of future interaction is large enough 
(direct reciprocity; Trivers 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) . This 
mechanism becomes less relevant as group size increases and thus the 
probability of two members meeting again decreases. In such situations, 
indirect reciprocity can favour cooperation if individuals can base the 
decision to help others on reputation, i.e. information about helping 
behaviour of individuals in previous interactions with others (Nowak and 
Sigmund 2005).  
In humans, experimental work on helping behaviour confirms that both 
direct and indirect reciprocity can promote cooperation (e.g.,  Wedekind 
and Milinski 1996; Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Seinen and Schram 
2006). Such controlled experiments have focused on one of the two 
mechanisms in isolation, by employing designs that ensure the 
participant’s information is either based on earlier interactions with the 
same individual (personal experience) or based on interactions of the 
recipient with other individuals (reputation). Other studies have 
compared effects of each of the two mechanisms, but in separate 
treatments. Some find higher helping rates towards recipients when 
information is available from personal experience rather than by 
reputation (Bolton et al. 2005). Others report the reverse (Dufwenberg et 
al. 2001). Simulations suggest that helping strategies based on reputation 
can survive in a population with other strategies based on personal 
experience (Roberts 2008). However, to the best of our knowledge, 
strategies based on both types of information were not yet taken into 
account. When making real-life decisions, humans typically use their own 
experience with another person and the experiences of others with this 
person. This raises the question how both types of information affect each 
other in the decision to help. 
Here we report on an experiment in which subjects are allowed to 
condition helping behaviour on both personal experience and reputation. 




Milinski 2000; Seinen and Schram 2006; Engelmann and Fischbacher 
2009) participants are randomly paired, and within pairs one participant 
is randomly assigned the role of donor and the other the role of recipient. 
In each game, the donor must decide to i) give a benefit to the recipient at 
a cost to himself or ii) to pass, resulting in no change in payoff for either of 
them. This helping game is iterated at least 100 times in groups of 12 
subjects. To investigate the effects of personal experience and reputation, 
the game itself is preceded by an information stage in which donors can 
request costly information about their partner’s past behaviour towards 
the donor (when roles were reversed) and/or towards others. Below, we 
refer to past behaviour towards the donor or others as ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect information’, respectively. Donors choose to request either direct 
and/or indirect information at the same time, but may also decide not to 
request any information. A request for direct information provides the 
donor with the recipient’s most recent decisions towards the donor, but 
not the order of decisions. For our baseline experiment, we impose 6 as a 
maximum to the number of decisions so that behaviour in the more 
distant past is ignored (cf. Seinen and Schram 2006; see Methods for 
details). Donors have no other way to retrieve this information, since 
subjects cannot be identified. A request for indirect information gives 
donors insight in the recipient’s interaction history by presenting up to 
the last six decisions of this recipient when paired as a donor with other 
participants. Hence, indirect information excludes previous direct 
interactions with the donor. Additionally, we test for two factors that may 
affect the role of information in our baseline experiment. First, in reality, 
information on interaction histories with third parties is likely to be noisy 
due to mistakes in information transfer (e.g., in gossip). To mimic this, we 
superimpose noise to the indirect information (‘noise’ treatment). Second, 
under random matching, indirect interactions are more frequent than 
direct interactions. To mimic this, we changed the available information 
on a recipient’s history from six each to two direct decisions and twenty 
indirect decisions (‘asymmetric’ treatment).  
To address the question of how personal experience and reputation affect 
helping behaviour we focus on the following three issues: Do humans base 
their decisions to help on personal experience as well as on reputations? 
How do personal experience and reputation affect helping behaviour? Are 
Personal experience and reputation interact… 
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We conducted a computerized experiment (programmed in Z-Tree; 
Fischbacher 2007) in laboratories at the CREED laboratory of the 
University of Amsterdam and the Sociology laboratory of the University of 
Groningen, the Netherlands. A total of 180 students were recruited to take 
part in 15 independent sessions with 12 participants each. In each session 
subjects were randomly assigned to cubicles. No communication was 
allowed. Written instructions for the experiment (in Dutch; see Appendix 
for an English translation) were provided and a quiz was used to ensure 
the subjects understood the instructions. Subjects knew that after 100 
periods, a next period started with a probability of 0.9 (this was done to 
minimize end game effects). Each session lasted for approximately 90 
minutes. In addition to a show-up fee of €7, subjects received an initial 
endowment of 3000 points (300 points = €1). Parameters were chosen 
such that requesting any type of information had a cost of five points, 
whereas helping had a cost of 150 to the donor, and a benefit of 250 to the 
recipient. To avoid income effects as much as possible, no information was 
given about the subjects’ current earnings during the experiment. In 
principle, however, subjects could calculate their own earnings with pen 
and paper.  
Whenever a participant was assigned the role of donor, two information 
request boxes were displayed. Choices to help or pass were shown as 
yellow and blue choices, respectively. When a donor requested 
information on previous decisions of the recipient, only the number of 
blue and yellow choices in the most recent decisions was given, not the 
order. In the baseline and the noise treatment, both direct and indirect 
information was limited to the six most recent decisions, giving subjects 
an opportunity to “clean their record” (cf. Seinen and Schram 2006). In 
our treatments we use random matching which implies for the baseline 
and the noise treatment that direct information is on average less recent 




larger number of rounds for an individual to clean its record compared to 
indirect information. The asymmetric treatment takes into account these 
arguments by limiting direct information to 2 decisions, and indirect 
information to 20 decisions, making both kinds of information equally 
recent.   
We impose a cost of five points for each information request, to ensure 
that subjects deliberately click on the information they are interested in. 
In the early phase of the experiment, the total number of decisions 
presented to the donor may be smaller than the maximum,(6 and 6 in the 
baseline and noise treatment; or 2 and 20 in the asymmetric treatment) or 
even zero. After decisions have been made, the donors and recipients are 
informed about their earnings in that period. At the end of the experiment, 
subjects completed a short questionnaire with topics such as age, gender 
and educational background. On average subjects earned €36.75.  
Requested information of direct interactions was fully accurate. We added 
some noise to the indirect information in 5 of the 15 sessions to mimic 
distorting effects of gossip. One out of six pieces of information was 
randomly chosen and its content was flipped, i.e. from yellow to blue or 
vice versa. This implementation is slightly biased against extreme scores, 
since a 5:1 score is more likely to stem from 6:0 than from 4:2.  
Statistical analyses were conducted in R (Venables and Smith 2005). We 
used a mixed-effects logit regression models to analyze how decisions to 
help or requests for direct and/or indirect information depended on 
various factors. We analysed these generalised linear mixed models 
(glmm) using R-package ‘lme4’ (Bates et al. 2012). All glmm analyses 
included controls for period/100, and period2/1002, correcting the model 
for temporal patterns in the experiment (e.g., decreasing helping rates in 
the ending phase of the experiment). Unless stated otherwise, subject was 
included as random factor, nested in session replicate. As a check of the 
robustness of the effects obtained, we fitted another mixed-effects logit 
model to all data, including those decisions preceded by no information. In 
order to test for the robustness of the statistical findings, we verified that 
found effects are insensitive to the assumed cumulative probability 
distributions to help (i.e. probit vs logit).  




Subjects displayed a high degree of helpful behaviour in all treatments of 
our experiments (Figure 6.1). Helping rates did not differ between 
treatments (Table S6.1a), and in all replicate sessions of the three 
treatments helping rates declined towards the end of the experiment 
(Table S6.1a). 
 
Subjects use information on both direct and indirect interactions 
Averaged over all sessions, donors based 49.3% of their decisions on past 
decisions of the recipient. In an early phase, information on interaction 
histories is likely to be scarce and is therefore less frequently requested 
(Figure 6.2; Table S6.1b,c). This is particularly true for direct information. 
Initially, under random matching, subjects are unlikely to have interacted 
with each other before; as the session progresses, direct information 
becomes relatively more useful and is therefore requested more often 
(Table S6.1). The overall proportion of requests for indirect information 
 
Figure 6.1. Direct and indirect reciprocity combined lead to high levels 
of cooperation. Panels show helping rates in the absence (a) and 
presence (b) of noise in indirect information, and (c) when indirect 
information was 10 times as abundant as direct information. Symbols 
represent ten-period averages of helping rates throughout the 
experimental sessions. Each line represents one replicate session; n=60 




tends to decrease over time (Table S6.1d). Overall, adding noise to indirect 
information decreases its relative proportion of requests compared to 
direct information (Figure 6.2b, Table 6.2d). When indirect information is 
available in higher amounts, it is requested relatively more often (Figure 
6.2c; Table S6.1d). When we control for variation at the individual level, 
treatments do not significantly differ in request rates for direct 
information (Table S6.1b). However, subjects do tend to increase requests 
for indirect information in the asymmetric treatment (Figure 6.2c, Table 
S6.1c). In the Appendix we describe patterns of variation at the individual 
level in the use of information, helping rates and performance in the 




Figure 6.2. People condition their decision to help on both direct and 
indirect information. Panels show aggregate rates of information 
requests in the absence (a) and presence (b) of noise in indirect 
information, and (c) when indirect information was more abundant 
than direct information (ratio 20:2). Solid lines and symbols reflect 
requests for direct information, dashed lines and open symbols reflect 
requests for indirect information. Symbols represent 10-period 
averages of the frequency of information requests; n=300 per data 
point. 




Direct and indirect information affect helping differently  
For both direct and indirect information, we find a strong positive 
correlation between the recipient’s helping rate and the rate of being 
helped (Figure 6.3, Table S6.2). The two types of information differ, 
however, in their effect on helping behaviour. We illustrate this with an 
analysis that contrasts the decisions preceded by requests for direct 
information only with the decisions preceded by requests for indirect 
information only. A GLMM fit to data detects a significant interaction effect 
between the observed helping rate of the recipient and the type of 
requested information (direct or indirect), indicating that direct and 
indirect information affect decisions to help differently (Table S6.2a). 
When we consider the difference between the number of helping and 
passing decisions (instead of helping rates), we find the same effects 
(Table S6.2b). On the same range of ‘image scores’, direct information has 
a steeper slope in all treatments (Figure S6.6), suggesting that subjects 
react to direct information in a more extreme way. No relationship was 
found between individual’s reliance on reputation and overall helping rate 
(Figure S6.4).  
Direct and indirect information are not independent 
When we consider decisions preceded by requests for both direct and 
indirect information, we find that reciprocity effects are significant: 
positive information (helping the donor in the past, helping others in the 
past) has positive effects on helping rates (Table 6.1). The estimated effect 
of direct information (‘help donor’) is larger than the estimated effect of 
indirect information (‘help others’), confirming the findings in section 2. 
Also, whenever a recipient’s helping rate from direct and indirect 
information show values on opposing extremes, subjects follow direct 
information more often (number of helping versus passing decisions 
equals 41:18 when direct information is positive (>0.5) and indirect 
information is negative (<0.5). In the reverse case, helping versus passing 






The statistical model shows a significant interaction effect between direct 
and indirect information. The estimate of the interaction effect is negative, 
i.e., higher observed helping rates in either type of information are 
associated with a lower impact of the other type on helping behaviour. 
The effect of indirect information becomes weaker as direct information is 
more positive (and vice versa; Table 6.1). When direct information about 
the recipient indicates this subject often helped the donor, indirect 
information has a smaller effect on the decision of the donor to help than 
when the recipient hardly helped the donor. Similarly, when indirect 
information reveals the recipient often helped others, the effect of direct 




Figure 6.3. Reciprocal motives prevail in decisions to help. Panels 
show helping rates preceded by requests for either direct (solid 
symbols) or indirect (open symbols) information in the absence (a) 
and presence (b) of noise in indirect information, and (c) when indirect 
information was more abundant than direct information (ratio 20:2). 
For each data point, the number of observations is shown above (top 
row: direct information; bottom row: indirect information). Lines 
represent logistic regressions fitted to decision data when only direct 
information was requested (solid lines) or only indirect information 
was requested (dashed lines). 








Intercept 1.130 0.266 
Period 3.842 0.223 
Period2 -5.561 0.033 
Help donor 4.620 <0.001 
Help others  3.838 <0.001 
Help donor x help others -3.883 0.006 
Noise in indirect information -0.193 0.793 
Asymmetric information -0.605 0.401 
 
Table 6.1. Direct and indirect information are not independent. Values 
represent regression model estimates of factors affecting decisions to 
help. The analysis only considers decisions preceded by requests for 
both direct and indirect information. Significant effects include the 
recipients’ fraction of helpful decisions towards the donor and others, 
as well as their interaction. Treatments do not affect helping rates 
significantly. Subject nested in session was included as random effect. 
Helping rates are centred before entering analysis. Period (squared) 








Figure 6.4. Personal experience and reputations interact in decisions 
to help. Data points correspond to rates of receiving help when both 
direct and indirect information were requested, for various categories 
of recipients’ helping rate. The recipients’ helping rate towards the 
donor (Help Donor) and towards third parties (Help others) are both 
categorized as ‘Low’ (<=0.3), ‘Medium’, (0.3-0.7), or ‘High’ (>=0.7). The 
sizes of the plotted dots indicate the natural log of the number of 
constituent data points. These numbers are also given above the graph. 
Receiving rates are plotted as a function of helping rates towards 
others, for the three categories of Help Donor. Effects of indirect 
information are largest for low values of Help Donor (orange line). 
When direct information provides a high signature of helpfulness 
(purple line), indirect information has weaker effects (compare the 
slopes of purple and orange lines). Thus, the effect or reputation is 
weak when personal experience is good. A similar pattern emerges in 
the reverse case: when helping rates towards others are low, the effect 
of direct information is stronger (data points on the left hand side, 
where ‘help others’ is low, are closer to each other than the data points 
on the right hand side, where ‘help others’ is high). 




Our results show how people integrate direct and indirect information 
about past social interactions (Figure 6.2), confirming the commonly held 
belief that people use both personal experience and reputations to decide 
whether or not to help others. Even though information is costly, subjects 
often condition their decisions whether or not to help a recipient on the 
decisions that this person made previously. Cooperation levels are far 
above zero in all sessions (Figure 6.1), which is in agreement with a 
comparable experiment in which subjects always received information 
but could not distinguish direct from indirect information (Seinen and 
Schram 2006). The past behaviour of recipients, reflected in direct and 
indirect information, has strong effects on decisions of donors to help 
(Figure 6.3, S6.6, Table 6.1, S6.1a, S6.2, S6.3), marking direct and indirect 
reciprocal motives. It has been argued that indirect reciprocity is likely to 
wane in large groups because of the noisy nature of information, e.g., due 
to gossip (Engelmann and Fischbacher 2009, but see Sommerfeld et al. 
2007, 2008). By contrast, we find that people show sensitivity to noise not 
by a lower propensity to help but, at the aggregate level, people react to 
noise by higher proportions of requests for direct information (Figure 6.2, 
Table S6.1d). In the asymmetric treatment subjects rely more on indirect 
information (Table S6.1d). Despite the fact that under these conditions 
direct information was less information-rich (ratio 2:20) but equally 
costly, subjects frequently rely on direct information in making their 
decisions to help. This suggests that people have a preference to rely on 
personal experience, even when it gives a limited picture of a recipient’s 
helpfulness.  
Subjects react more strongly to information from personal experience 
than to reputational information (Figure 6.3a, b, S6.6, Table 6.1, Table 
S6.2, S6.4). This effect does not appear to be due to differences in 
individual strategies; individuals relying to different degrees on direct 
and/or indirect information did not show differences in helping rates 
(Figure S6.4). The inherent contrast between the direct and concrete 
effects of first-person experience and the indirect and abstract notion of 
reputation, however, may partly explain the observed pattern. Refusing to 
help may infuriate a direct partner, whereas the same thing happening to 




impact of direct and indirect information could depend on the type of 
interactions that subjects encounter in their everyday life. For example, 
public information may guide behaviour of individuals from a small 
village. In a large city, however, interaction partners are mostly 
reputation-free strangers to each other. Hence, our results may be 
influenced by the fact that most participants were students from large 
cities.  
Our results show that reputation has the potential to substantially 
increase helping rates when personal experience is negative (Figure 6.4). 
Conversely, however, when personal experience is positive, a bad 
reputation does not lead to severe decreases in helping. These results are 
robust to changes in assumptions on the evaluation of (in)direct 
information in the regression models (see Appendix). When personal 
experience is positive, helping rates are generally high, and a good 
reputation has little scope to increase helping rates even more. Such 
‘ceiling effects’ may partly explain the detected interaction between 
personal experience and reputations. We believe that these effects are not 
particular to our experiment. In real life personal experience and 
reputations may compensate for each other: people might help others 
with a bad reputation if personal experience is good. Conversely, people 
may be more helpful to others after a bad personal experience, if these 
others have a good reputation (cf Figure 6.4).  
In our experiment, as in previous experiments on reciprocity (e.g., 
Wedekind and Milinski 1996; Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Seinen and 
Schram 2006), the aim is to measure effects of first-order information. 
Hence, subjects do not know whether previous decisions of their 
interaction partners are based on any information, and it is impossible to 
examine if a donor reciprocated the earlier decisions of the recipient. In 
our experiment it was thereby impossible to employ (theoretically 
superior) strategies that make use of second-order information, such as 
the reputations of subjects that were refused help by a recipient (e.g., the 
‘standing’ strategy; Leimar and Hammerstein 2001; Ohtsuki and Iwasa 
2004; Ule et al. 2009). It seems plausible that insight in second-order 
information will influence helping behaviour: subjects might forgive a 
refusal to help more easily when they themselves refused help to a 
recipient before (but see Milinski et al. 2001). In addition, second-order 
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information is likely to affect the frequency and distribution of 
information requests, as well as the payoffs of reciprocal strategies. Our 
experimental design can be readily extended to address such scenarios. 
Previous theoretical and experimental work on mechanisms driving 
human cooperative behaviour has focused on direct and indirect 
reciprocity in isolation. Building theory on the basis of these two 
mechanisms would require assumptions on how the two types of 
information, direct experience and reputation, are integrated in social 
decision making. However, how humans integrate these pieces of 
information is unknown, as yet. Our experiment shows that the effects of 
information on personal experience and reputations are interdependent 
in determining whether or not to help others: cooperation prevails when 
either personal experience or reputation is positive. This suggests that a 
higher level of cooperation can be attained, relative to a situation where 
only one of the two types of information is available. To understand the 
roles of direct and indirect reciprocity in human cooperation, these 





Regression models fit to data underpinning claims in the main text 
Table S6.1. Results of four regression models fit to all data, supporting 
the claims in the results section of the main text. Columns a-c show 
effect estimates of generalised linear mixed logit models (with 
associated p-values in brackets) using subject nested in session as 
random effect. The factors including ‘period’ account for temporal 
patterns in the data. The factors ‘noise’  and ‘asymmetric’  refer to the 
two treatments that were run in addition to the baseline treatment. All 
models detect strong temporal patterns. Furthermore, the asymmetric 
treatment shows significantly higher levels of requests for indirect 
information.  Column d shows effect estimates of a generalised linear 
logit model that tests the relative use of direct and indirect information 
between treatments (cf. Figure 6.2 of the main text). The model is fit to 
the overall per-round number of requests for indirect information 
divided by the total number of requests for information, aggregated 
over all sessions per treatment. As suggested by Figure 6.2 of the main 
text, at the aggregate level, adding noise to indirect information leads 
to lower overall request rates for this information. The asymmetric 
treatment shows a higher overall rate of requests for indirect 
information.   
  
(a) Decision to 
help 
(b) Request for 
direct 
information 




of requests for 
indirect 
information 
intercept 0.215 (0.598) -6.118 (<0.001) -2.362 (<0.001) 1.205 (<0.001) 
period / 100 2.439 (<0.001) 14.607 (<0.001) 4.105 (<0.001) -4.060 (<0.001) 
period^2 / 100^2 -4.760 (<0.001) -11.912 (<0.001) -5.014 (<0.001) 2.574 (<0.001) 
noise -0.223 (0.693) 0.736 (0.280) -0.505 (0.322) -0.395 (<0.001) 
asymmetric 0.898 (0.112) -0.508 (0.460) 1.016 (0.043) 0.555 (<0.001) 
  
    n = 9180 9180 9180 1496 
 
 




Table S6.2. Direct and indirect information affect decisions help 
differently. Columns present effect estimates of generalised linear 
mixed logit models fit to decisions that were preceded by requests for 
either direct or indirect information. Subject nested in session was 
included as random effect. Positive information on the recipient’s 
helpfulness leads to higher levels of helping (cf a strong positive 
estimate for ‘help donor or help others’) . We observe a significant 
interaction effect between the observed helping rate of the recipient 
and the type of information, indicating that subjects react differently to 
personal experience than to reputations. The same effects are obtained 
when we consider not the fraction of helping (as opposed to passing) 
decisions, but the difference between the two (the number of helping 
minus passing decisions ‘image scoring’, column b). 
  
(a) Decision to 
help (fractions) 
(b) Decision to 
help (image 
scoring) 
Intercept -3.540 (<0.001) 0.697 (0.010) 
Period / 100 3.213 (0.021) 0.915 (0.248) 
Period2 / 1002 -4.414 (<0.001) -2.913 (<0.001) 
Noise -0.177 (0.597) 0.012 (0.962) 
Asymmetric -0.584 (0.089) -0.265 (0.307) 
  
  Help donor or help others 7.238 (<0.001) 5.809 (<0.001) 
Info type (direct or indirect) -0.577 (0.132) 0.039 (0.811) 
fraction help x info type 1.175 (0.030) -1.811 (<0.001) 
  





Individual level statistics 
The results reported in the paper concern mainly group level and 






Figure S6.1. Individual variation in helping behaviour.  Panels show 
frequency distributions of helping rates in the baseline (a), the noise 
(b) and the asymmetric (c) treatment. Rates were calculated over the 
entire sessions (on average 51 decisions). The broad distributions 
indicate that individuals vary a lot in their helpfulness. In each of the 
three cases a bimodal distribution appears, with modi at 0 (individuals 
that never helped) and around 0.6-0.8. 





Figure S6.2. Most individuals rely on either direct or indirect 
information. Panels show individual request rates for direct and 
indirect information the baseline (a), the noise (b) and the asymmetric 
(c) treatment. The horizontal and vertical axes represent request rates 
for direct and indirect information, respectively. Dots represent values 
of individual subjects. Individuals vary considerably in how they 
condition their decisions to help. Concentrations are higher close to the 
axes, indicating that most individuals request either direct or indirect 
information throughout the experiment. At the diagonal direct and 
indirect information was requested equally often, suggesting an equal 
importance of personal experience and reputations. Below, the data 
from this scatter plot is split out in total reliance on historical 
information (Figure S6.3) and relative importance of direct and 







Figure S6.3. Individual variation in reliance on historical information 
in helping behaviour. Panels show frequency distributions of fractions 
of decisions that were based on any information in the baseline (a), the 
noise (b) and the asymmetric (c) treatment. Rates were calculated over 
the entire sessions (on average 51 decisions).We observe considerable 
variation between individuals in their choice to access costly 
information. 





Figure S6.4. Individual variation in use of direct experience and 
reputations. Panels show frequency distributions of relative 
importance of reputations in the baseline (a), the noise (b) and the 
asymmetric (c) treatment. Values were calculated as an individual’s 
requests for indirect information, as a fraction of his total number of 
requests. We observe considerable variation in information use 
strategies. A large fraction of the population (about 50%) relies on 
either personal experience or reputations exclusively. In the presence 
of noise in indirect information, individuals tend to rely more on direct 
information (i.e. personal experience; b). When direct and indirect 
information are presented in unequal amounts (c), more people 
exclusively rely on reputations (c; Kruskal-Wallis multiple comparison 
P<0.05). A GLMM with session replicate as random factor does not 
detect significant effect of individual reliance on reputations and 








Figure S6.5. Total payoffs vary between individuals. In the experiment, 
individuals collected 5921 points on average (corresponding to €19.75, 
excluding the show-up fee). A linear mixed regression model with 
session as random factor reveals significant (negative) associations 
between helping rates and the total number of points collected. 
Information use (either direct or indirect, or both) has no significant 
effects. 
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Table S6.3. Correlations between individual characteristics (n=60 
individuals per treatment). Requests for direct and indirect 
information are negatively correlated in each of the three treatments: 
when individuals request direct information, they are less likely to also 
request indirect information. Individuals that request more 
information tend to be more helpful. No relationships are observed 
between information use and payoffs. 
Baseline treatment (a) 
      direct 
    indirect -0.224 (0.085) indirect 
   both -0.204 (0.118) -0.016 (0.906) both 
  helping rate 0.334 (0.009) 0.253 (0.051) 0.112 (0.394) helping rate 
 payoff -0.168 (0.201) 0.013 (0.921) -0.048 (0.714) -0.167 (0.202) payoff 
informed 
   
0.488 (<0.001) -0.146 (0.265) 
Noise treatment (b) 
      direct 
    indirect -0.322 (0.012) indirect 
   both -0.028 (0.832) -0.107 (0.415) both 
  helping rate 0.277 (0.032) 0.196 (0.134) 0.281 (0.03) helping rate 
 payoff -0.026 (0.844) 0.048 (0.713) -0.067 (0.613) 0.124 (0.346) payoff 
informed 
   
0.515 (<0.001) -0.018 (0.893) 
Asymmetric treatment (c) 
      direct 
    indirect -0.256 (0.048) indirect 
   both -0.042 (0.749) -0.245 (0.059) both 
  helping rate 0.092 (0.486) 0.228 (0.08) 0.056 (0.672) helping rate 
 payoff 0.044 (0.738) 0.083 (0.527) -0.095 (0.471) -0.075 (0.571) payoff 
informed 
   









Figure S6.6. Fraction of helpful decisions preceded by requests for 
either direct (solid symbols) or indirect information (open symbols), in 
the baseline (a), the noise (b) and the asymmetric (c) treatment. Lines 
represent best least-square fits to the experimental data using logistic 
regressions  (solid lines: behaviour towards the donor; dashed lines: 
behaviour towards others). The recipient’s interaction history is 
calculated as the difference in the number of helpful decisions, i.e. as 
‘image score’ (12). In (a) and (b), shown points are rounded towards 
the nearest modulus of 3. In (c) indirect information was rounded 
towards the nearest modulus of 10. The steeper slopes associated with 
direct information indicate that subjects react in a more extreme way 
to information coming from personal experience than to reputational 
information. 
Personal experience and reputation interact… 
173 
 
Robustness of the statistical findings 
Table S6.4. To examine the robustness of the effects found in the 
regression model (Table 6.1 of the main text), we fitted another 
regression model where information on interaction histories was 
represented as the ‘image score’ (cf. Nowak and Sigmund 1998) rather 
than the fraction helpful decisions. Before entering the analysis, image 
scores for direct and indirect interactions were normalised as follows. 
In the baseline and noise treatment all image scores are divided by 6. 
In the asymmetric treatment direct and indirect image scores are 
divided by 2 and 20, respectively. Results of this generalised linear 
mixed model were in full agreement with the findings presented in the 
main text (including significant interaction between direct and indirect 
information). Another regression model fitted to the complete data set 
with all decisions – including those decisions not preceded by 
information requests – still detects significant effects of direct and 
indirect information, as well as the interaction between these types of 
information. Regression models based on alternative assumptions 
about the cumulative distribution function on the probability of 
helping (i.e. probit instead of a logit model) yield very similar patterns 
(not shown).   
Glmm regression results 
   
 
Estimate p 
Intercept 1.230 0.126 
Period 5.276   0.049 
Period2 -7.391 0.002 
Help donor 3.407 <0.001 
Help others 2.067 <0.001 
Help donor x help others -1.838 0.001 
Noise -0.204 0.731 





Instructions for the experiment 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. The experiment will last 
for approximately 90 minutes. During the session it is not allowed to talk 
or communicate with the other participants. If you have a question, please 
raise your hand and one of us will come to you to answer it. During this 
experiment you will make money. The amount you earn is dependent of 
your decisions and the decisions of others. At the end of the experiment 
the amount you have earned, plus a show up fee of 7 euros, will be paid to 
you in cash. These payments are anonymous; you will be paid individually 
in the reception room. Please remain seated at the end of the experiment 
until your desk number is called. We will not inform any of the other 
participants about your earnings. It is impossible for us to associate your 
desk number with your identity. You start out with an amount of 3000 
points; 300 points are worth 1 euro. 
Experimental procedure 
1. Instructions 
2. Quiz to verify if you understand the experiment 
3. The experiment 
4. Questionnaire 
5. Payment 
The experiment consists of at least 100 rounds. From round 100 upon, 
there is a chance of 90% that a new round starts. Every round, you will be 
paired with another participant in the room. Everybody stays anonymous; 
you will not be informed about the identity of the participant you are 
paired with.  
The chance to be paired with a particular participant is for all participants 
the same in every round. Hence, the chance to be paired with the same 
participant twice in a row is very small.  
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Every round you will be assigned a role (A or B). You only have to make a 
decision when you are assigned role A. If you are assigned role B, you do 
not have to do anything.  
Choice options 
If you are assigned role A, you can choose between two alternatives. If you 
choose ‘yellow’, participant B, who is paired with you, receives 250 points. 
You lose 150 points. If you choose ‘blue’, the participant paired with you 
receives nothing, and you do not lose any points.  
In summary: 
Yellow has cost 150 for participant A. Participant B receives 250 points. 
Blue yields 0 for both participants. 
--- the following was specific to the three different treatments --- 
a) Baseline treatment 
Information  
Before you make your decision, you have the opportunity to request 
information on the decisions of participant B in earlier rounds. By clicking 
the boxes you obtain a summary of the actions of participant B in up to 6 
previous decisions in the role of A. You can request two kinds of 
information. 
1. Information about what participant B decided, in the role of A, 
when he was paired with you 
2. Information about what participant B decided, in the role of A, 
when he was paired with others 
This information is obtained by clicking the boxes. The information will be 
displayed on the screen like this: 
1. Participant B decided in earlier rounds, when he was paired 




2. Participant B decided in earlier rounds, when he was paired 
with others in role A: … times yellow and … times blue 
Requesting information about participant B comes at a cost. This amounts 
to 5 points per requested information item. If you request both kinds of 
information, it costs 10 points. Only the participant clicking on the buttons 
obtains this information. The number of decisions of B you can see is 6 at 
maximum. If participant B has not been in the role of A yet, you will see a 
0. 
 
b) For noise treatment, this paragraph was added to the instructions of the 
baseline treatment 
The information about what player B decided when he was paired with 
you is perfectly reliable. Information about what participant B decided 
when he was paired with others is not perfectly reliable. In one out of 
six cases, a ‘blue’ choice is displayed as ‘yellow’, or a ‘yellow’ choice is 
displayed as ‘blue’. Thus, the information on what participant B did, when 
he was paired with others, is not completely reliable.  
 
c) For the asymmetric information treatment, the next paragraph replaced 
the ‘Information’ paragraph in sessions where indirect information was 
more abundant than direct information *** 
 
Information  
Before you make your decision, you have the opportunity to request 
information on the decisions of participant B in earlier rounds. By clicking 
the boxes you obtain a summary of the most recent actions of participant 
B. You can request two kinds of information. 
3. Information about what participant B decided, in the role of A, 
when he was paired with you (maximally 2) 
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4. Information about what participant B decided, in the role of A, 
when he was paired with others (maximally 20) 
This information is obtained by clicking the boxes. The information will be 
displayed on the screen like this: 
3. Participant B decided in earlier rounds, when he was paired 
with you in role A: … times yellow and … times blue 
4. Participant B decided in earlier rounds, when he was paired 
with others in role A: … times yellow and … times blue 
Requesting information about participant B comes at a cost. This amounts 
to 5 points per requested information item. If you request both kinds of 
information, it costs 10 points. Only the participant clicking on the buttons 
obtains this information. If participant B has not been in the role of A yet, 
you will see a 0. 
--- the final paragraphs were shown in all treatments --- 
When participant A has made his decision, both participants will be 
informed about their payoffs in this round. This is the end of the round. In 
the next round you will be paired with another randomly drawn 
participant. The roles of A and B are randomly assigned. 
Please remain seated at the end of the experiment, until we call your desk 
number. You will be paid in the reception room individually. 
--- end of instructions --- 
*** We ran two pilot session for the asymmetric treatment with 
instructions stating that with a request for direct or indirect information, a 
donor would obtain the recipient’s decisions in the past 44 rounds of the 
experiment. In these two sessions cooperation levels were slightly higher, 
perhaps because subjects were to more primed to be the fact that cleaning 
their record would take a long time. Patterns of requests for direct and 



























Human cooperation can be sustained when help is channelled towards 
those with a good reputation. Evolutionary models of ‘indirect reciprocity’ 
show that conditioning help on recipients’ recent behaviour alone cannot 
stably support cooperation. Stable reputation-based cooperation requires 
that individuals consider the motivation behind the past behaviour of 
their interaction partners, and distinguish justified from unjustified 
decisions to help. Empirical evidence that people actually use such 
strategies is weak. Here we show experimentally that people do consider 
their peers’ motivations, and reward those individuals who refuse to help 
defectors. Moreover, we report pronounced differences in individual 
strategies: a majority bases their decisions to help merely on the past 
actions of their interaction partners, but a substantial proportion of 
individuals additionally considers the  motivation behind these actions.  
 
 




Cooperation is a puzzle to scientists in many domains of science. Why 
would an individual provide costly help to a potential competitor? For 
cooperation to thrive, specific mechanisms are needed to prevent 
defectors reaping the benefits from cooperation without paying the costs. 
Such mechanisms either enforce cooperation through punishment 
(Yamagishi 1986; Ostrom et al. 1992), or channel help towards 
cooperators through a form of assortment (e.g, kin selection (Hamilton 
1964), group selection (Maynard Smith 1964) or partner choice (Noë and 
Hammerstein 1994)). When individuals interact repeatedly, scratching 
someone’s back can pay off when he can scratch yours at a later point in 
time (Trivers 1971). Such ‘direct reciprocity’ is widespread among 
humans and is believed to be present in some animal species as well 
(Dugatkin and Reeve 1997; Clutton-Brock 2009). 
Human cooperation can also be supported by indirect reciprocity (Darwin 
1871; Alexander 1987). Frequently, interactions between individuals are 
observed by others, and the outcome is often communicated through 
gossip. Over time, people can build up a good reputation when they tend 
to be nice and helpful towards others, or a bad reputation when they tend 
to be nasty and self-centred. It can pay off to provide costly help to 
someone, when a good reputation is more likely to attract help from 
others.  
The dynamics of reputation-based strategies has been modelled using 
‘image scores’ that reflect the helpfulness of an individual in recent 
interactions (Nowak and Sigmund 1998). Theoretical analyses suggest 
that in a randomly interacting population, cooperation can be promoted 
by strategies that condition their decisions to help on the image scores of 
their recipients (Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Nowak and Sigmund 2005). 
However, a population of individuals using such strategies can be invaded 
by mutants that do not reciprocate but merely uphold their own 
reputation in order to keep receiving help. In turn, the resulting loss of 
reciprocation paves the way for defectors to take over (Leimar and 
Hammerstein 2001). More sophisticated strategies examine the previous 
actions of their interaction partners more deeply, in which one’s good 




refusing to help defectors does not affect one’s good ‘standing’ (Sugden 
1986). These strategies ensure that individuals attain a good reputation 
by channelling help towards cooperators and away from defectors, 
thereby stabilizing cooperation (Panchanathan and Boyd 2003; Brandt 
and Sigmund 2004; Ohtsuki and Iwasa 2004; Ohtsuki and Iwasa 2006).  
Employing such sophisticated strategies requires, on top of the (first-
order) information about a recipient R’s helpfulness, also (second-order) 
information about R’s recipients at the time he made his decisions to help. 
Experiments on indirect reciprocity indicate that in human groups, the 
availability of first-order information can lead to considerable levels 
cooperation (Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Wedekind and Braithwaite 
2002; Seinen and Schram 2006), but that the presence of second-order 
information increases levels of cooperation even more (Bolton et al. 
2005). It has been argued that in real-life interactions, people unlikely 
take into account both first- and second-order information since it is 
cognitively too taxing (Panchanathan and Boyd 2003). This view is 
supported by experimental studies on indirect reciprocity failing to find 
clear indications for strategies that follow second-order information in 
decision making (Milinski et al. 2001; Ule et al. 2009). 
However, these experiments were not primarily designed to directly 
assess the use of second-order information, and the rich sets of historical 
information available to participants likely disfavoured the use of more 
sophisticated strategies. This leaves us with a situation in which on the 
one hand theory predicts that strategies accounting for second-order 
information can more stably support cooperation through indirect 
reciprocity, whereas on the other hand no experimental evidence decides 
whether such information plays a role in human interactions.   
To shed light on this issue, we conducted an experiment assessing the use 
of first- and second-order information in indirect reciprocity. A total of 
140 subjects were invited in the computer laboratory, and in groups of ten 
these subjects played 100 rounds of an ‘indirect helping game’ (Seinen 
and Schram 2006). In each round, pairs were randomly formed, and one of 
the two (the ‘donor’) could decide to either help the other (the ‘recipient’), 
or to pass. Helping incurred a cost of 200 points to the donor, increasing 
the recipient’s payoff with 250 points (where 300 points = 1 euro); 
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passing did not lead to any change in payoffs. Before making their decision 
to help, donors always received information about the three most recent 
actions of their current recipient. This (first-order) information was given 
in random order. Donors could choose to request second-order 
information about one of these three decisions by clicking on a button; 
this (second-order) information consisted of the information the recipient 
had when he or she made this decision. We imposed three experimental 
conditions: second-order information was either i) unavailable 
(CONTROL; four replicate groups); ii) available at a cost of five points 
(COSTLY; six replicate groups); or iii) available for free (FREE; four 
replicate groups, making a total of 14 independent observations). For 
details of the experimental design, including paper instructions and 
screenshots, see section 3 of the Appendix. 
 
Results 
The overall helping rate was 55%, which is comparable to helping rates in 
other experiments on indirect reciprocity (Wedekind and Milinski 2000; 
Bolton et al. 2005; Seinen and Schram 2006; Ule et al. 2009), and did not 
differ significantly between treatments. The dynamics of cooperation 
levels over time and detailed statistics are presented in sections 1.1 and 
1.2 of the Appendix. Subjects requested second-order information more 
frequently when this information was free, and when first-order 
information showed intermediate levels of helpfulness (Figure 7.1; logistic 
generalized linear mixed model: P<0.001 for both effects; see Appendix, 
section 1.3, for details). Overall, requests were strongly biased towards 
recipients’ refusals to help others (i.e., decisions to pass; 2 test: P<0.001; 
compare the dark and light grey bars in Figure 7.1). Below we focus our 
analysis of the use of second-order information on these decisions to pass 
only. In section 1.4 of the Appendix, we analyse the use of second-order 







On average, subjects reacted to first-order information by rewarding 
helpful individuals and refusing to help defectors (Figure 7.2, dotted 
horizontal lines). When requested, second-order information had a strong 
effect on helping behaviour: helping rates are substantially higher when a 
decision to pass was targeted at an unhelpful individual (Figure 7.2E-G 
and I-K, connected dots tend to decrease; logistic generalized linear mixed 
model: P<0.001, see Appendix, section S7.1.2, for details). This result 
indicates that people care whether or not the defections of their 
interaction partners in the past were justified.  
 
Figure 7.1. The use of second-order information when requests were 
(A) costly or (B) free. Before a donor D made his decision to help his 
recipient R, D observed R’s three most recent actions (reflecting R’s 
helpfulness). Second-order information could be requested about one 
of these actions. This request gave insight in the information on which 
R based this action (i.e. the three decisions shown to R). Light and dark 
grey bars indicate average individual request rates (± 1 SE) for 
decisions to help and pass, respectively. 




Recent experimental evidence suggests that even within demographically 
homogeneous populations, humans differ amongst each other in terms of 
strategic decision making (Kurzban and Houser 2005; Engelmann and 
Fischbacher 2009, Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis). Moreover, such 
diversity can have a strong impact on group dynamics and the outcome of 
social interactions (Fischbacher and Gachter 2008; Wolf et al. 2008; 
McNamara and Leimar 2010, Chapter 5 of this thesis). To gain insight in 
the individual variation underlying the results presented in Figure 7.2, we 
analyzed individual reactions to first- and second-order information by 
fitting statistical models to the decisions of each of our 140 subjects 
separately. We labelled as ‘reciprocators’ those subjects for which positive 
 
Figure 7.2. Helping rates based on first- and second-order 
information; A-D: CONTROL; E-H: COSTLY; I-L: FREE. Dotted 
horizontal lines show mean helping rates of donors (± 1 SE in grey) 
when no second-order information was requested, for each degree of 
helpfulness of their recipients. Connected dots reflect helping rates (± 1 
SE) when second-order information was requested for a refusal to help 
(for reactions to requests for helping decisions, see Appendix). On this 





first-order information on recipients’ helpfulness had a significantly 
positive effect on helping rates. When a reciprocator requested second-
order information on at least five occasions, we fitted a separate model to 
these decisions to test for sensitivity to motivations behind refusals to 
help (see Appendix, section S7.2.2, for details). When subjects’ helping 
rates significantly decreased as their recipients failed to help more 
cooperative individuals, they were labelled as a ‘deep reciprocator’. When 
no such effect was detected or second-order information was requested 
fewer than five times, a subject was labelled as a ‘shallow reciprocator’. 
Subjects not labelled as reciprocators were categorised as unconditional 
cooperators or defectors, in case they helped in more than 90% or less 
than 10% of the cases, respectively. This procedure classified 73% of the 
participants, leaving 27% unclassified. A similar statistical procedure 
revealed that about 5% of the unclassified subjects strategically 
maintained their reputations, basing their decisions on their own previous 
actions exclusively (see Appendix, section S7.2.3, for details). Figure 7.3 
shows of the classified types the average response to first- and second-
order information. 




 The prevalence of each of these distinct types is shown in Figure 7.4. Deep 
reciprocators, who evaluate the justifiability refusals to help others, 
 
Figure 7.3. Reaction norms of common strategies resulting from our 
statistical classification procedure (see main text). For each of the 
identified strategies, squares show mean helping rates of individuals (± 
1 SE) as a function of the helpfulness of their recipients (COSTLY and 
FREE combined). Panels A and B show mean reactions of unconditional 
cooperators and unconditional defectors, respectively. Panel C shows 
the mean reaction of ‘shallow reciprocators’, who solely react to the 
first-order information they receive and disregard the justifiability of 
their recipients’ actions. Panel D shows the mean reaction norm of 
‘deep reciprocators’, who take second-order information into account 
by rewarding those who refuse to help defectors. In this panel, 
connected dots indicate mean helping rates (± 1 SE) when second-
order information was requested on a refusal to help, as a function of 




present a substantial fraction of the total population when second-order 
information was available. Whereas costs of second-order information 
decreased overall information request rates (see Figure 7.1), it does not 
lead to significant differences in the prevalence of deep reciprocators 
(Fisher-exact test: P=0.11). Shallow reciprocators, who more readily help 
cooperators based on first-order information only, are the most common 
types. Other types are relatively rare. Identified strategies do not strongly 
differ in their performance. The only significant differences in 
performance was found between the two unconditional strategies: 
defectors achieve higher payoffs than cooperators (Tukey’s test on linear 




In summary, our experiment provides evidence that cooperative decisions 
are affected by the motivations of interaction partners: refusals to help 
defectors are likely to be rewarded.  However, this (potentially costly) 
 
Figure 7.4. Diversity of morals in reciprocal helping. Bars show the 
prevalence of the distinct strategies. Our statistical procedure (see 
main text) classified 73% of the subjects from the conditions CONTROL 
(n=40), COSTLY (n=60) and FREE (n=40). 
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virtuous behaviour is unevenly distributed in the population, as 
highlighted by the mixture of shallow and deep reciprocators we observe. 
These results support the emerging view that cooperative strategies do 
not only strongly differ between cultures (Henrich et al. 2001; Herrmann 
et al. 2008; Gächter et al. 2010), but also within populations of 
demographically similar individuals (Kurzban and Houser 2005; 
Engelmann and Fischbacher 2009; Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis).  
 
This variation in reciprocal strategies can have marked consequences on 
the emergence and stability of cooperation in a group. For instance, a 
small fraction of deep reciprocators might suppress free riding, thereby 
sustaining cooperation. More stable cooperation can be established when 
individuals can actively choose with whom to interact (Rand et al. 2011). 
If individuals could estimate the reciprocal strategies of others and assort 
accordingly, clusters of deep reciprocators may stably maintain 
reputation-based cooperation, whereas cooperation among shallow 
reciprocators may break down in the face of encroaching defectors.  
Evolutionary models can help understand the emergence of strategic 
polymorphisms of the kind we report here (Wolf et al. 2007; Wolf and 
Weissing 2012). In particular, the benefits of social sensitivity can depend 
on the variation in cooperative tendencies in a population (Wolf et al. 
2008; McNamara and Leimar 2010; Wolf et al. 2011): whereas deep 
reciprocators can sustain stable reputation-based cooperation in the 
presence of defectors, their costly social sensitivity is disfavoured by 
selection once cooperation has established in the population. Cooperative 
– but less sensitive – shallow reciprocators can then increase in frequency, 
making the population more vulnerable for invasion of defectors.  
Although the relatively rich information conditions of our experiment 
allow for complex and perhaps even realistic strategies, we employed a 
strong simplification of the concept of a ‘reputation’. In reality, reputations 
build up over various contexts of interaction, and factors like information 
reliability play a role. The mechanisms of information transfer are crucial: 
one may directly observe interactions between individuals and change 




gossip (Sommerfeld et al. 2007; Sommerfeld et al. 2008). Gossip is prone 
to error, lies, and strategic manipulation, and therefore second-order 
information could be less reliable than first-order information (Ohtsuki 
and Iwasa 2004; Panchanathan 2011). Such unreliable or manipulated 
information would impair the efficiency of deep reciprocity in supporting 
cooperation.  
Individuals interacting in small groups often base their decisions not only 
on reputations, but also on previous encounters with others; in this case 
cooperative behaviour may depend on the interplay between direct and 
indirect reciprocity (Roberts 2008; Molleman et al. 2013). From this 
perspective, our understanding of human cooperation through reciprocal 
helping could benefit from theoretical and empirical investigations of how 
reputational information is weighted with reliability and integrated with 
information from other sources such as direct experience. 




This Appendix comprises 3 sections. In Section 1, we show mean 
cooperation rates in each of the replicate sessions of our experiment, and 
outline the statistical comparison of cooperation levels between the three 
conditions (CONTROL, COSTLY, and FREE) we imposed (S7.1.1). Also, we 
present results of a set of statistical models assessing which factors 
influence information requests (S7.1.2), and how first- and second-order 
information affect decision making on the aggregate level (S7.1.3). We 
present analyses of reactions to second-order information about refusals 
to help (on which the main text is focused), but also show average 
reactions after requests for helping decisions. Section 2 starts with a 
comparison of the payoffs achieved by each of the four strategy types 
distinguished in the main text (S7.2.1). Further, we offer a detailed 
description of the statistical models fitted to decisions of each individual 
(S7.2.2). These models underlie the classification procedure which led to 
the strategy types presented in Figure 7.3 and 7.4 of the main text. 
Subsequently, we present a more detailed analysis of individual decisions 
by fitting a different statistical model to the data (S7.2.3). Finally, Section 
3 presents details of our experimental design and procedures (S7.3.1 and 
S7.3.2), including (translations of) the paper instructions given to the 







S7.1. Cooperation levels in the experiment and aggregate responses 
to second-order information 
This section starts by describing the dynamics of cooperation in our 
experimental sessions. We compare helping rates between treatments by 
fitting statistical models to the data. These models also assess the effects 
of reactions to first- second order information. We further assess which 
factors influence decisions to request second-order information. Finally, 
we show the aggregate reactions to second-order information on 
decisions to help.  
 
S7.1.1. Dynamics of cooperation 
 
 
Figure S7.1.1. Dynamics of helping over time. Panels show mean 
helping rates for each of the three experimental conditions for each of 
the replicate sessions. Symbols show 10-round averages of helping 
rates over the course of time. Each line represents one replicate 
session; n=50 per data point (10 rounds x 5 decisions per round). 




S7.1.2. Reactions to first- and second-order information: aggregate-
level statistics 
We fitted three different models to the data to assess the effects of our 
experimental conditions (CONTROL, COSTLY, and FREE) and the contents 
of first- and second-order information displayed to our subjects. Each of 
these models is a logistic generalized linear mixed model fitted to the 
decisions to help, and each takes as fixed factors ‘Period’ (included 
because cooperation rates tend to decrease over time, see Figure S7.1.1), 
and ‘Experimental condition’. Subject nested in replicate group was used 
as random factor. The effect estimates of these three models are presented 
in Table S7.1.2.1. Model 1 tests whether cooperation levels differed 
between the conditions CONTROL, COSTLY and FREE, and includes all 
(n=7000) decisions. This model reveals that the availability of second-
order information slightly increased cooperation levels, but this effect was 
not significant (P = 0.571 and 0.091 for COSTLY and FREE, respectively). 
Model 2 is the same as Model 1, but we added one element: the contents of 
first-order information (i.e. the number of helping decisions out of the 
recipient’s three most recent actions), to assess how such information 
affects decisions to help. The significantly positive estimate for first-order 
information suggests reciprocal motives of our subjects: help was more 
likely as first-order information showed more helping decisions of the 
recipient. Model 3 considers only those (n=924) decisions in which donors 
had requested second-order information about a recipient’s refusal to 
help (i.e., a pass decision). This model assesses the effects of second-order 
information, while controlling for the effect of first-order information. The 
significantly negative estimate for second-order information indicates that 
help was more frequent when a decision to pass was directed at an 
unhelpful individual. This suggests that people tend to take into 
consideration the motivations behind the actions of their interaction 





S7.1.3. Information requests 
Figure 7.1 of the main text shows the distribution of information requests 
in our experiment. To assess the effects of information cost and the 
content of first-order information (i.e., the helpfulness of recipients), we 
first coded the helpfulness of recipients as ‘intermediate’ (helped 1 or 2 
times out of the most recent three actions), or ‘extreme’ (helped 0 or 3 
times out of the most recent three actions). Subsequently, we fitted a 
logistic generalized linear mixed model to individual decisions to request 
information, including ‘information cost’ (COSTLY or FREE) and 
‘helpfulness of recipient’ (intermediate or extreme) as fixed factors, and 
‘subject’ as random factor. This model detects a strong negative effect of 
information cost (P<0.001), indicating that information requests are 
significantly more frequent when they were for free. We also observe a 
strong effect of the extremity of recipients’ helpfulness on information 
requests (P<0.001):  requests are significantly more frequent when first-
order information shows intermediate levels of helpfulness. A plausible 
interpretation of this finding is that people use second-order information 
at times when first-order information is inconclusive. 
  
Model 
   1 2 3 
Intercept 0.772 (0.028) 0.475 (0.174) 1.089 (<0.001) 
Period / 100 -2.002 (<0.001) -1.700 (<0.001) -0.006 (0.058) 
COSTLY 0.25 (0.571) 0.25 (0.570) 
 FREE 0.830 (0.091) 0.808 (0.095) -0.473 (0.039) 
First-order info 
 






Table S7.1.2.1. Effect sizes of three models fit to decisions to help. 
Estimated effects are shown for Model 1, 2 and 3, respectively, with P 
values in parentheses (see above text for model descriptions). 




S7.1.4. Reactions to second-order information on decisions to help 
The main text focuses on reactions to second-order information on 
recipients’ refusals to help (i.e., a decision to pass). This is motivated by 
the fact that requests were strongly biased towards these decisions to 
pass (87.5% and 63.5% of the requests, in COSTLY and FREE, 
respectively). Here, we focus on cases where subjects requested 
information on a decision to help, and analyze reactions to second-order 
information along the lines of the analysis whose results are presented in 
Figure 7.2 of the main text.  
Figure S7.1.4.1. shows that the effects of second-order information are 
much less pronounced when they are about decisions to help (as opposed 
to decisions to pass). This has two reasons. First, in the COSTLY condition, 
the analysis is based on only 36 cases in which second-order information 
on a helping decisions was requested. In the FREE condition we have 386 
of such cases, but these largely correspond to situations in which a 
recipient had chosen to help in all three of his most recent decisions (see 
Figure 7.1B of the main text, bars to the right hand side). In these cases, 
helping rates were generally very high. Since second-order information 
was available without any monetary cost, subjects might have requested 
this information not to account for it in their current decision to help, but 
rather in order to explore the general cooperativeness in their social 
environment. Such behaviour would dilute the effects of second-order 
information in this analysis. However, we do find some indications that 
people are considering the motivations of their interaction partners, also 
after a request for information on a decision to help. From panels H and K 
of Figure S7.1.4.1, we observe that helping decisions towards cooperators 
are rewarded more (the points tend to go up with more positive content 






Figure S7.1.4.1. Helping rates based on first- and second-order 
information; A-D: CONTROL; E-H: COSTLY; I-L: FREE. As in Figure 2 of 
the main text, dotted horizontal lines show mean helping rates of 
donors (± 1 SE in grey) when no second-order information was 
requested, for each degree of helpfulness of their recipients. Connected 
dots reflect helping rates (± 1 SE) when second-order information was 
requested for a helping decision. Effects of second-order information 
are less pronounced, although panels H and K suggest that more help is 
given when helping decisions are ‘justified’. 
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S7.2. Payoffs of strategies and statistical models fit to decisions of 
individuals 
Figure 7.3 and 7.4 of the main text show that the subjects in our 
experiment used distinct strategies in making their decisions. In this 
section, we analyse the performance of these strategies in our experiment. 
Further, we give a detailed description of the statistical procedure used to 
classify the subjects. We also describe an alternative classification based 
on a more complicated model. 
S7.2.1. Performance of identified strategies 
To assess the performance of the four strategy types identified in the main 
text, we calculated for each subject their average payoffs as a donor and as 
a recipient separately. By subtracting the costs in the role of donor role 
from the benefits in the role recipient, we obtain weighted average payoffs 
per round for each individual. Figure S7.2.1.1 shows for each of the 
identified strategy types these mean payoffs (±1 SE). We do not observe 
strong payoff differences between the different strategies in our 
experiment: significant differences (at the 5% level) in payoffs only occur 
between unconditional defectors and cooperators (Tukey’s test on a linear 
mixed model fit to payoffs of different types with ‘session’ nested in 






S7.2.2. Statistical classification procedure 
We analysed the use of first-and second-order information of each of our 
140 subjects separately. This analysis underlies the classification of types 
presented in the main text. First, we tested whether the cooperation rate 
of an individual was either higher than 0.9, or lower than 0.1. In these 
cases, a subject was classified as an unconditional cooperator or defector, 
respectively. When a subject’s cooperation rate was between 0.9 and 0.1, 
we tested whether the content of first-order information (i.e., the 
recipient’s helpfulness in recent interactions) had a significant effect on 
helping behaviour. To this end, we fitted a logistic generalized linear 
model to the decisions to help, while including – apart from the content of 
first-order information – ‘Period’ to control for time effects on cooperation 
rates. If this model detected a significantly positive effect of first-order 
information (with P<0.05), a subject was classified as a reciprocator. 
When reciprocators requested second-order information about their 
 
Figure S7.2.1.1. Payoffs of strategy types in our experiment. For 
each individual we calculated its weighted average payoff per round by 
subtracting its mean costs as a donor from its mean benefits as 
recipient. Bars show for each type the population average payoffs for 
each strategy type (±1 SE).  
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recipients’ refusals to help at least five times, we tested whether this 
information affected their decisions to help by fitting a Bayesian 
generalized model to these decisions, using the content of second-order 
information (i.e., the helpfulness of the recipients’ recipients) as the only 
predictor. We used Bayesian regression to avoid problems of linear 
separation in our data. When this model detected a significantly negative 
effect of second-order information (again with P<0.05) – so that refusing 
to help defectors was rewarded more, but refusing to help cooperators 
was rewarded less – a subject was classified as a ‘deep reciprocator’. 
When no such effect was found (or when second-order information was 
requested fewer than five times), a subject was classified as a ‘shallow 
reciprocator’. Fisher-exact tests comparing frequencies of help in case of 
negative (0 or 1 times help) or positive (2 or 3 times help) second-order 
information led to the exact same results in distinguishing shallow from 
deep reciprocators. Also, in a questionnaire following the experiment, the 
majority of individuals classified as ‘deep reciprocator’ indicated that they 
followed second-order information in their decisions to help. Our 
statistical procedure classified 102 out of our 140 (73%) of our 
participants.  
 
S7.2.3. Alternative classification 
In games of indirect reciprocity, it can pay off to maintain a certain level of 
cooperativeness to attract help from others. Such a strategy does not 
require paying attention to the helpfulness of your interaction partners in 
making decisions to help. Such non-reciprocal types can destabilize 
cooperation (Leimar and Hammerstein 2001; Panchanathan and Boyd 
2003). To test whether individuals in our experiment used such a strategy, 
we ran the same analysis as above, but we added one element. We added 
to the statistical model fit to the decisions of each individual his own most 
recent two decisions. ‘Hypocritical’ individuals that strategically maintain 
a level of cooperation without reciprocating, do not react to the first-order 
information about recipients’ helpfulness, but only help when they 
refrained from helping in recent interactions. Individuals with a more 
complex strategy, reacting (positively) to both their recipients’ 




assigned to a separate category. With this more advanced procedure, we 
classified 78% of our participants.  
In analogy to the main text, Figure S7.2.3.1. presents the average reactions 
of each of the classified types, and Figure S7.2.3.2. shows their relative 
frequencies in each of the three experimental conditions. First of all, we 
observe that the results are very similar to those presented in Figure 7.3 
and 7.4 of the main text. In addition, we can see that some individuals tend 
to increase their helpfulness after having recently refrained from helping. 
Types that account for their own image (‘hypocrites’ and ‘complex’ types) 
are most frequent in the CONTROL treatment, in which no second-order 
information was available. This made it impossible for others to assess the 
motivations behind the decisions of interaction partners. For the ‘complex’ 
types, despite the fact that the statistical model detected significant 
negative effects of own helpfulness, the recipients’ helpfulness seems 
more important in decision making. We do not observe significant 
differences (at the 5% level) between strategies in terms of their total 
payoffs, suggesting that these strategies perform equally well in our 
experimental setting (Tukey’s test on a linear mixed model with ‘session’ 
nested in ‘treatment’ as random factors).  
 





Figure S7.2.3.1. Reaction norms of common strategies resulting 
from the alternative classification procedure. For each of the 
identified distinct strategies, squares show mean helping rates of 
individuals (± 1 SE) as a function of the helpfulness of their recipients 
(COSTLY and FREE combined). Panels A-D as in Figure 7.3 of the main 
text. Open circles in panels E and F indicate mean helping rates of 
individuals (± 1 SE) as a function of their own recent helpfulness. Panel 
E shows the reaction norm of ‘hypocrite’ individuals that based their 
decisions on their own recent helpfulness, maintaining an appearance 
of being helpful, without reciprocating. Panel F shows the reaction for 
individuals with more complex strategy, basing decisions on both the 








Figure S7.2.3.2. Frequency of strategies from the alternative 
classification procedure. Shallow reciprocators condition their 
decisions to help on the helpfulness of their recipients. Deep 
reciprocators additionally consider the motivations behind their 
recipients’ defections. Hypocrites tend to help only when their recent 
history would paint a negative picture for potential donors. Such 
maintenance of a cooperative image also play a role for complex 
individuals, but they also consider their recipients’ helpfulness. 
Unconditional cooperators and defectors are unaffected by any such 
information. 




S7.3. Details on the experimental design 
This section describes general experimental procedures and gives more 
details on the experimental design. Also, we here present the paper 
instructions given to the subjects and show screenshots of the decision 
making environment.  
 
S7.3.1. Experimental procedures 
We ran 14 replicate sessions at the CREED laboratory at the University of 
Amsterdam and the Sociology laboratory of the University of Groningen. 
In total, n=140 subjects attended the sessions, participating in groups of 
10 (CONTROL: four replicates; COSTLY: six replicates; FREE: four 
replicates).  Subjects were mostly undergraduate students from the social 
sciences, economics and biology. Experimental sessions lasted around 90 
minutes, in which subjects earned €14.60 ($19.25) on average according 
to their performance, excluding a show-up fee of €7 (making a total of 
€21.60 = $28.50). The experiment was conducted using Z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007). Code is available upon request. 
In the reception room, participants received a randomly chosen number 
corresponding to a desk in the computer laboratory. As soon as the 
subjects entered the laboratory, they were no longer allowed to 
communicate with each other. Paper instructions (see below) were 
distributed and were read out loud by one of the experimenters. Before 
the experiment itself started, subjects had to fill out a brief quiz to check 
their understanding of the experiment. Sessions finished with a 
questionnaire including items about personal demographic background. 
Subjects were paid individually in the reception room. 
 
S7.3.2. Indirect helping game 
In groups of ten, subjects interacted in 100 rounds of an ‘indirect helping 




roles of donor and recipient were assigned (in the experiment referred to 
as role A and B). Interactions were anonymous. Donors decided between 
two options, either clicking on ‘blue’ (i.e. help; thereby increasing the 
score of his recipient with 250 points and decrease their own score with 
200 points, where 300 points correspond to 1 euro) or ‘purple’ (i.e. pass; 
not changing the payoffs of either). Recipients did not have to do anything, 
and a waiting screen was displayed requesting to wait for the decision of 
the coupled donor. 
Before making their decisions, the three most recent decisions of the 
recipient were always shown to the donors (see screenshot of Figure 
S7.3.2.1). These decisions were displayed in random order. In the 
treatments COSTLY and FREE, donors had the option to request second-
order information about one of these three decisions, by clicking the 
button ‘more information’ below one of the decisions (Figure S7.3.2.1). 
This second-order information contained the three most recent decisions 
of the player this decision was directed at (Figure S7.3.2.2). In treatment 
COSTLY the second-order information was available at a small cost (5 
points; €0.017) in the treatment FREE this information was free. After 
deciding whether or not to request second-order information, donors 
made their decision to help or pass. In the first rounds, when not all 
history information was complete, the missing data was displayed as a 
hyphen. 
At the end of each round, the donor’s decision and the payoff 
consequences were shown to both the donor and his recipient.  
 





Figure S7.3.2.1. Screenshot of the decision making environment. 
The donor decides whether or not to request second-order 
information. The boxes contain the most recent decisions of the 
recipient. The blue (Dutch: ‘blauw’) option refers a decision to help, and 
the purple (Dutch: ‘paars’) option refers to a decision to pass. Donors 
could check a box below one of these decisions and click the red button 
on the far right side of the screen, after which second-order 
information about that decision was displayed to the donor (see Figure 
S3.2.2). In the CONTROL condition subjects could not request second-





S3.3. Instructions on paper 
Subjects received instructions on paper. For each of the three 
experimental conditions, instructions were largely identical, but differed 
with respect to the availability (and costs) of second-order information. In 
the below printed text, we will indicate which parts are identical for each 
experimental condition and which parts are specific to either of them. 





Figure S3.2.2. Screenshot displaying second-order information. In 
this case, the donor has requested second-order information about a 
‘purple’ (pass) decision. The second-order information associated with 
that decision is printed below the box. On the far right of the screen, 
the donor can make his decision and confirm it by clicking the red 
button. 
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=== Instructions === 
Introduction 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. The experiment lasts for 
about 90 minutes. During the session is it not allowed to talk or 
communicate with the other participants. If you have a question, you can 
raise your hand an one of us will come to you to answer it.  
During the experiment you will make money. Your earnings depends on 
your decisions and the decisions of others. At the end of this session, the 
money you earned, plus a 7 euro show-up fee, will be paid to you in cash. 
These payments are anonymous, you will be paid individually in the 
reception room. After the experiment has ended, please remain seated 
until we call you desk number. None of the other participants will be 
informed about your earnings. We cannot connect your desk number to 
your identity. You start out with 3000 point, and 300 points are worth 1 
euro.  
Setup of this session 
1. Instructions 
2. Quiz to check if you understand the experiment 
3. The experiment itself 
4. Questionnaire 
5. Payment 
The experiment consists of 100 round and takes place in groups of 10. In 
each round, you will be paired with one of the nine other participants in 
your group. Everyone remains anonymous; you will not receive 
information about the identity of the participant you are paired with.  
In each round again, a role (A or B) is randomly assigned to you. You only 
have to make a decision when you are assigned role A. When you are 
assigned role B, you do not have to do anything.  
Making decisions 
When you are assigned role A, you can choose between two alternatives. 




points. You lose 200 points. When you choose ‘purple’ , the player that is 
paired to you receives nothing, and you do not lose any points. 
In summary: 
Blue costs participant A 200 points. Participant B receives 250 points. 
Purple yields 0 points for both.  
=== The following part was specific to the condition where second-order 
information was not available (CONTROL) === 
Information 
When you are taking your decision, the screen will show the three most 
recent decisions that the participant in role B has taken, when he was in the 
role of A.  
These three decisions of the participant in role B are displayed in three boxes 
on your screen. These boxes are given in random order. When B has not yet 
been in the role of A, you will see a “-“.  
 
=== The following part was specific to the conditions in which second-order 
information was available (COSTLY and FREE). We use square brackets to 
indicate where instructions differed between the two [with information 
specific for the COSTLY treatment in brackets] === 
Information 
When you are taking your decision, you have two sorts of information at 
your disposal. 
1. Your screen will display the three most recent decisions that the 
participant in role B has taken, when he was in the role of A. 
These three decisions of the participant in role B will always be 
displayed to you, and displayed in three boxes on your screen. 
These boxes are given in random order. When B has not yet been 
in the role of A, you will see a “-“. 
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2. About one of these three decisions of the participant with role B, 
you can request additional information. 
If you select the option ‘additional information’ under one of the 
decisions, the information that B had, when he took this decision 
will be shown to you. This information consists of the three most 
recent decisions of the participant with which B was paired at 
that time. These decisions are also given in random order. You 
can confirm your decision by clicking the button ‘Continue’. [ 
Viewing this information is costly. These costs are 5 points. ] 
 
NB: you can request additional information for only one of the 
decisions of the participant with role B. If you select ‘additional 
information’ for more than one decision, an error message will 
appear on your screen.  
In summary:  
Always available: the most recent three decisions of participant B 
Optionally available [ at a cost of 5 points ]: additional information about 
one decision of participant B, namely the three most recent decisions of the 
participant with which B was paired at that time. 
=== the rest of the instructions were identical for each of the experimental 
conditions === 
The end of a round 
When participant A has made his decision, both participants are informed 
about their score in this round, and their total amount of points at that 
moment. This is the end of the round. You will be paired to a new 
participant. Randomly, you will be assigned the role of A or B.  
The end of the session 
When the experiment has ended, a questionnaire will follow. 
Please remain seated after filling out the questionnaire, until we call your 
desk number. You will be paid individually in the reception room.
























The success of humans as a species depends to a large extent on our 
sociality. Two aspects of human nature are particularly unique: the 
unlevelled ability to cooperate in groups and the great capacity for social 
learning (Boyd et al. 2011; Whiten and Erdal 2012). By cooperating in 
groups, humans are able to surmount challenges impossible for any 
individual to deal with on its own. By learning from others, humans are 
able to rapidly adjust their behaviour to a vast array of different 
circumstances. The passing of information through social learning has 
been called ‘cultural transmission’ (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). It 
has been argued that social learning gives rise to an inheritance system 
that is in many ways analogous to genetic transmission, and can lead to a 
process of ‘cultural evolution’ in which the frequencies and distributions 
of socially learned traits changes over time (Dawkins 1976; Cavalli-Sforza 
and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985).  
The direction and outcome of cultural evolution depends on the social 
learning strategies that individuals use. Theoretical analyses suggest that 
due to the differences between cultural and genetic transmission, cultural 
evolution can more readily explain the unlevelled scale, diversity and 
degree of human cooperation (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and 
Boyd 1998; Richerson and Boyd 2004). As modelling studies on the 
cultural evolution of cooperation are accumulating, understanding of this 
process remains limited, largely because of a lack of systematic empirical 
evidence of how people actually learn from each other. In particular, 
almost nothing is known about human social learning in social contexts 
(i.e., contexts of cooperation), where the outcome of behaviour depends 
on what others do. I set out to investigate the interplay of social learning 
and human cooperation, using an approach that combines developing 




In this thesis, my investigation starts with the development of game 




direction and outcome of cultural evolution (Chapters 2 and 3). In 
particular, Chapter 2 offers a systematic analysis of how conformism and 
payoff-based learning can drive evolutionary dynamics in a range of 
different social settings. The models I present here suggest that 
conformism can change basins of attraction of equilibria in coordination 
games and destroy coexistence equilibria in evasion games. In a social 
dilemma (such as the famous Prisoner’s dilemma), conformism can 
stabilize a cooperative equilibrium. In contrast to influential views in the 
literature, this study suggests that conformism tends to hinder, rather 
than facilitate the evolution of cooperation by cultural group selection. 
Chapter 3 further discusses the potential roles of cultural group selection 
in the evolution of human cooperation. Using extensive individual-based 
simulations, I study to what extent different forms of group selection can 
promote cooperation, given that individuals use specific ways to learn 
from their peers. The analysis of this model indicates that the outcome of 
cultural evolution strongly depends on the interaction between the forms 
of social learning and group selection: although conformism can promote 
the evolution of cooperation when cooperative groups can replace non-
cooperative groups, following a leader tends to promote cooperation 
under a wider range of conditions. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, I aim to contribute to the experimental 
groundwork for an evidence-based theory of cultural evolution. By means 
of decision making experiments with human subjects, I explore what 
kinds of social information people use when confronted with a variety of 
social and non-social contexts. The experimental results presented in 
Chapter 4 show that people vary strongly in their social learning 
behaviour. Some people never consult others in deciding what to do, 
whereas others frequently rely on social learning in determining their 
behaviour. People differ even more strongly with respect to the kind of 
information they base their decisions on: some individuals mostly focus 
on payoffs of their peers, whereas others ignore these payoffs altogether 
and attend to the behaviour of the majority in their environment. 
Moreover, individual social learning strategies tend to be consistent over 
contexts: individuals who use a form of social learning in one social 
context tend to use the same form in other contexts. Further, I discuss 





In Chapter 5, I present experimental evidence for the time stability of 
individual differences in social learning strategies. In addition, this 
chapter explores the effects of assortment of social learning strategies on 
the dynamics of cooperation in a social dilemma: I find that groups of 
individuals that focus on the frequencies of behaviour in their social 
environment tend to achieve higher levels of cooperation than groups of 
individuals that focus on their peers’ payoffs.  
In Chapters 6 and 7, I consider the issue of how human cooperation can be 
supported by reciprocal helping. In many situations, people condition 
their cooperative behaviour on the past actions of their interaction 
partners. Chapter 6 presents the results of an experiment addressing how 
people use information from direct experience (“was this person nice to 
me before?”) and reputations (“was this person nice to others before?”) in 
decisions to help. These two kinds of social information are associated 
with direct and indirect reciprocity, respectively. I find that on average, 
information from direct experience tends to be more important in 
deciding to help someone. Furthermore, I observe that direct experience 
and reputations can compensate for one another; when personal 
experience with an interaction partner is bad, a good reputation can 
substantially increase helping rates. Conversely, however, when direct 
interactions are mostly positive, a bad reputation has only a minor effect. 
Chapter 7 presents the results of an experiment focusing on indirect 
reciprocity. I investigate here the extent to which people care about the 
motivations behind the actions of their interaction partners. Theory 
suggests that taking into account these motivations can efficiently stabilise 
cooperation in human groups, since ‘justified’ refusals to help defectors 
does not damage an individual’s reputation. The experimental results 
indicate that people vary in the extent to which these motivations play a 
role in their decision making: some people merely reward those that tend 
to be helpful (I call this ‘shallow reciprocity’), whereas others take into 
account the motivations behind the decisions of their interaction partners, 
and distinguish ‘justified’ from ‘unjustified’ helping behaviour (I call this 
‘deep reciprocity’). Chapter 7 ends with discussing the potential causes 





I conclude this final chapter by reflecting on the insights and limitations of 
the studies presented here. In addition, I will highlight a few issues 
concerning social learning and human cooperation, and sketch possible 
avenues for further theoretical and empirical research.  
 
Abstractions and simplifications 
Throughout this thesis I have simplified matters considerably, and 
abstracted away from various aspects of reality that likely influence social 
learning and its effects on human cooperation.  The conceptual models of 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 single out conformism, payoff-based learning, and 
leader-following, and analyse dynamics of cultural evolution using highly 
idealised versions of these specific forms of social learning in simple 
contexts of interaction. These abstractions and simplifications promote 
mathematical tractability and clarity of the analyses: they help understand 
the effects of forms of social learning on a very basic level, leaving out 
potentially confounding factors. Similarly, the decision making 
experiments presented in Chapters 4 to 7 consider relatively simple 
situations designed to reflect the essence of specific forms of human social 
interactions. Studying human behaviour in simple and stylised 
experimental situations facilitates comparisons to theoretical predictions 
(see, for instance, Figure 1 of Chapter 4, and Figure 1 of Chapter 5). Also, 
the controlled conditions of these experiments allow for exclusion of a 
range of confounding factors faced by studies that investigate human 
behaviour in a more ‘natural’ setting.  However, using ‘cartoon versions’ of 
the real world in both models and experiments limits the explanatory 
power of these studies. Below I will delineate some abstractions and 
simplifications that may weaken my ability to draw strong conclusions 
from the research presented here. 
In each of the studies presented in this thesis, individuals have only two 
behavioural options. Obviously, this is an overly simplistic representation 
of reality. In their day-to-day lives, people constantly have to choose 
courses of action from a vast array of behavioural options present. These 
options may differ in kind (“am I going for a hunt today, or am I going to 





much risk am I willing to take to protect my tribe from intruders from the 
outside”). In Chapters 2 and 3, the traits that determine behaviour are also 
binary: individuals have the tendency to choose one out of two 
behaviours, and this tendency can change over time through social 
learning. The dynamics of cultural evolution would likely be different 
when individuals would employ a mixed strategy specifying the 
probability to perform a certain behaviour, or a degree to which a 
behaviour is performed (e.g., a level of cooperation). Processes of cultural 
transmission would take different forms when traits vary on a continuous 
scale. Conformism, for instance, would need to be modelled in a different 
way, since simply following the majority behaviour in a (small) sample of 
peers would not suffice.  
Studying behaviour as making decisions between two discrete 
alternatives also limits my ability to draw strong conclusions from the 
experiments of Chapters 4 and 5. With regard to decision making itself, 
biases may arise when choice options have different degrees of 
‘prominence’. For instance, it is plausible that individuals are inclined to 
choose options that are displayed at the top of the screen. Similarly, in 
collecting social information among their peers, the subject displayed as 
‘Player 1’ may be consulted more frequently. In addition, the fact that the 
experimental design uses binary choices may affect individuals’ social 
information use in other ways. On the one hand, behaviour in the real 
world is less clear-cut and unambiguous than pulling a lever on a two-
armed bandit. For instance, when gauging your social environment, the 
cooperativeness of your peers is often far from obvious (and estimating 
your peers’ payoffs may be even harder if not impossible). When the 
behaviour of others is ambiguous and not readily imitated through 
observation, non-social learning can be a more efficient way of finding out 
what behaviour is optimal. As a consequence, social learning might be less 
important than suggested by our experimental studies. On the other hand, 
the real world is obviously much more complex than the simple situations 
I consider here. For instance, when individuals have to learn to distinguish 
edible from poisonous items from a vast array of available foods, non-
social learning is likely slow and costly and individuals may well resort to 
social learning. Because our experiments reflect more simple situations 




in our experimental setting may be much lower than can be expected in 
reality.  
One of the main artefacts of this laboratory setting is that interactions take 
place anonymously via a computer screen (see the screenshots in the 
Appendices of Chapters 4 and 7; sections 13 and 3, respectively). 
Participating subjects sit in cubicles in the laboratory and cannot look 
each other in the face while interacting. The exclusion of psychological 
effects of face-to-face encounters likely has considerable effects on the 
dynamics of social interactions. In many situations, people have to 
coordinate and cooperate in relatively small groups, and in such situations 
anonymity seems a rather strange condition. In day-to-day life, 
anonymous interactions are limited to quite specific contexts (such as e-
trading or other social interactions on the internet). To me, laboratory 
studies of the kind I present in this thesis allow for getting valuable 
insights in basic aspects of human behaviour, and help develop general 
ideas on how social learning strategies might work. However, for the 
reasons given above, a limited picture of human behaviour emerges when 
one considers such studies in isolation. From this perspective, 
complementing elementary insights from the laboratory with field 
evidence would not only yield a more complete account for human 
behaviour, but also help demarcate the external validity of claims based 
on laboratory experiments.   
The representation of social learning I employ in this thesis strongly limits 
the ways in which individuals can modify their behaviour, and 
particularly, and I omit individuals’ past experience from consideration. In 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis, cultural traits are modelled as discrete 
units of inheritance that have exactly the same effect in different 
individuals. Individuals cannot refer to any past experience beyond their 
most recent behaviour and the payoff associated with it; adjustment to 
(social) environment only occurs by occasional copying of peers based on 
observation of behaviour, payoffs, frequencies or by simply following a 
leader in a group. A more comprehensive consideration of social learning 
would take into account how socially acquired information is integrated in 
the body of information present in individual experience. This integration 
may cause socially learned information to have different effects in 





information is derived, individuals may gradually adjust their behavioural 
tendencies in the direction of the observed behaviour (for instance, 
cooperators may become slightly less cooperative by observing defectors). 
This integration may also cause changes in behavioural tendencies, or 
beliefs, values and ideas in other contexts, by generalisation and 
application of useful information in other situations (for instance, 
important insights from one domain of science can be often be fruitfully 
transported to another). Assessing the effects of such ‘spill-over’ processes 
present a perhaps difficult, but likely rewarding challenge for future 
models of cultural evolution. 
Throughout this thesis I limit myself to highly stylised interactions, 
thereby ignoring the possibility that in real life the structure of the social 
context might be unclear to interaction partners. In each of the chapters I 
use ‘games’ with specific payoff matrices, aiming to capture essential 
aspects of social situations in which human regularly interact (i.e., social 
dilemmas designed to mirror situations in which individual and group 
interests are opposed to each other; coordination games aiming to reflect 
situations in which individuals simultaneously have to settle on the same 
course of action; and evasion games in which individuals profit from 
performing behaviour that is rare). In my models, individuals can over 
time adjust their behaviour according to the payoff matrices underlying 
the games, and in each of the experiments presented here, participants are 
always informed about the general structure of the interaction contexts 
they are confronted with. In reality, however, it is typically unclear in 
what kind of social situation you find yourself – it is hard to imagine 
situations in which one can fathom the underlying payoff structure of a 
social situation, and condition behaviour on the material incentives to all 
individuals involved. In this light, it would be interesting to study social 
learning strategies in experiments in which individuals have limited 
information (or no information at all) about the underlying payoff 
structures of the contexts they interact in. Studying human behaviour in 
such ‘fuzzy’ contexts in the controlled environment of a decision making 
laboratory seems promising to get a more realistic picture of how people 
respond to the behaviour of others and may reveal interesting features of 







As argued above, one must be careful with drawing conclusions about 
human behaviour from decision making experiments of the kind 
presented in this thesis. One aspect that is widely viewed as the most 
limiting factor in such studies is the fact that the subject pool is confined 
to subjects with a cultural background that can be described as western, 
educated, industrialized, rich and democratic ('WEIRD'; Henrich et al. 
2010) – and the studies presented here are no exception. Over recent 
years, cross-cultural experiments have established that human social 
behaviour differs strongly between different cultures (Henrich et al. 2001; 
Herrmann et al. 2008; Gächter et al. 2010). From this perspective, it is 
likely that social learning strategies also vary between cultures (Efferson 
et al. 2007). As far as I know, no systematic empirical evidence exists on 
this topic as yet, but it seems plausible that the way in which social 
interactions in a population are structured influences the social learning 
strategies of its members. For instance, in societies built around 
cooperative social structures and in which people tend to generally trust 
each other, valuable information may be widely transmitted in social 
interactions. Accordingly, individuals may strongly rely on various forms 
of social learning. By contrast, in low-trust societies in which social 
information is scarce or unreliable (e.g., due to manipulation) social 
learning may take other forms, or individuals may largely resort to non-
social learning. In turn, population-level differences in social learning 
strategies likely lead to differences in the speed at which new technologies 
spread in these populations, but also the extent to which ideas, beliefs and 
social norms can gain a foothold. 
The experiments presented in this thesis revealed strong individual 
differences in human social behaviour on a smaller scale, within a 
demographically homogeneous subject pool. Firstly, the observed 
individual differences (in social learning strategies and reciprocal 
strategies) in Chapters 4 to 7 illustrate that the average behaviour is often 
not representative for any single individual in the population. 
Furthermore, the models presented in Chapter 4 reveal that accounting 





direction and outcome of cultural evolution. This reveals a potential 
weakness of all models of cultural evolution that I know of (including the 
ones presented in Chapters 2 and 3). Many of these models do assume that 
individuals use some mixture of social learning rules, such as payoff-based 
learning and conformism (e.g., Henrich and Boyd 1998; Bowles 2001; 
Henrich 2001; Bowles et al. 2003), but theory has thus far ignored the 
implications of individual differences in social learning strategies. As a 
consequence, existent models likely give a misleading picture of how 
socially learned traits spread through populations, but also of how human 
cooperation may be shaped by cultural evolution.  
The pronounced and individual differences that I find in each of the 
experimental studies presented here – and in particular, the finding that 
social learning strategies are consistent over time and contexts – makes 
one wonder whether they reflect deeper differences in how human 
behaviour is structured. The results of Chapter 5 of this thesis give 
support for the idea that the strategies measured in the laboratory reflect 
individuals’ behavioural tendencies in the real world. I observe that at two 
different time points (with one month in between), individuals by and 
large use the same social learning behaviour, even when the description of 
the circumstances was changed. This suggests that such individual 
differences are not just some artefact arising from specific experimental 
conditions, but that people differ in the way their behaviour is structured 
– and take these behavioural tendencies with them into the laboratory. 
Further investigation into the associations between social learning 
strategies and cooperative tendencies of individuals presents an 
interesting avenue of research for the future. For instance, payoff-based 
learning may be associated with selfish payoff-maximising behaviour, and 
may therefore be correlated with free-riding in social dilemmas (as 
suggested by the results presented in Chapter 5). By contrast, frequency-
based learning may be associated with forms of ‘conditional cooperation’: 
individuals might keep track of frequencies of behaviour because they are 
only willing to pay the cost of cooperation when sufficient interaction 
partners also do so. Looking into correlations across contexts and 
investigating associations of traits that are involved in behaviour in social 




structured, and to what extent individual behaviour is explained by 
distinct ‘personalities’.  
In Chapter 7 I highlighted one obvious possible consequence of such 
consistent variation for human cooperation. Variation in moral standards 
(i.e., reciprocal strategies) may well be correlated with other individual 
traits that function as signals based on which individuals select interaction 
partners. Such an assortment process may greatly affect the dynamics of 
cooperation: groups of deep reciprocators will likely maintain stable 
reputation-based cooperation, whereas cooperation is likely to break 
down among shallow reciprocators when they are confronted with 
defectors.  
 
The nature of social learning strategies 
Our understanding of cultural evolution would not only profit from having 
a solid empirical basis for social learning strategies, but also from a basic 
theory of how specific social learning strategies could have evolved in the 
first place. In Chapters 2 and 3 I simply assume that individuals use certain 
strategies of social learning, and ignore the issue of how forms of social 
learning strategies themselves evolve under the influence of selection. 
Theoretical analyses suggest that under a wide range of conditions, 
payoff-based learning and forms of conformism can be favoured by 
natural selection, in the sense that such strategies can invade a population 
of individuals that learn non-socially (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985; 
Kendal et al. 2009; Rendell et al. 2010a). These analyses, however, 
typically consider only a small number of social learning strategies, and 
limit themselves to situations in which these strategies have to compete 
with strategies deploying non-social learning. This is strange, because 
populations likely harbour a variety of social learning strategies – which is 
illustrated by the diversity in social learning strategies observed in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Individuals using different social learning strategies 
likely differ in their efficiency to acquire useful information about their 
(social) environment, so that individuals with more effective social 
learning strategies will perform better. Based on this differential 





status – processes of selection can give rise to an evolutionary dynamic in 
which frequencies of alternative social learning strategies change over 
time, and over time more effective strategies tend to prevail.  
To my knowledge, only one study explicitly pits a range of social learning 
strategies against each other (Rendell et al. 2010b). This study involved a 
tournament in which entrants (scientists as well as non-scientists) were 
invited to design a social learning strategy that would enable agents to 
survive in a simulated environment that changed over time, and over 100 
submitted strategies were systematically subjected to competition 
between each other. This study gave interesting insights in when 
individuals should effectively copy others, and how to account for 
historical information when environments change from time to time. 
Although this tournament provides a valuable first step in studying the 
efficiency of various social learning strategies, this approach does not 
consider an explicit evolutionary process in which variation emerges by 
mutation, and differential transmission leads to gradual change over time. 
Rather, the strategies considered are pre-designed, and often make use of 
complex forms of information processing requiring massive 
computational power of individuals to actually deploy.  
To gain insight in the evolution of social learning strategies, it would be 
informative to develop models in which social learning strategies emerge 
in a more gradual manner. Such an approach would not analyse 
differences in performance of a set of predefined strategies (with 
arbitrary implementations), but consider social learning strategies arising 
from scratch, whose aspects gradually change over time (e.g., due to small 
mutations). Starting out from non-social learning, strategies could evolve 
towards relying to some extent on social learning, possibly conditioned 
on, and weighted with, individual experience. At the same time, strategies 
might develop a costly capacity to estimate the performance of peers (e.g., 
reflected in their payoffs), optimise the way they react to frequencies of 
peers behaviour (e.g., in a conformist or anti-conformist manner), or 
develop the quality of actively influencing peers’ behaviour by presenting 
themselves as a leader or a teacher. Ideally, such models would also 
delineate the circumstances under which stable variation in social 
learning strategies (cf. Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis) is a likely outcome 




Models aiming to explain the evolution of social learning strategies face a 
perhaps even more fundamental issue. Namely, nothing is known about 
how social learning strategies themselves transmit between individuals. 
Twin studies have shown that various human social traits, such as 
cooperative tendencies and preferences for fairness, have a genetic basis 
(Wallace et al. 2007; Cesarini et al. 2008). It thus seems plausible that 
there is some genetic basis to social learning strategies (so that these 
strategies could be subject to genetic evolution by natural selection). An 
interesting alternative possibility is that social learning strategies 
themselves are acquired through social learning. Parents have a strong 
influence on the behaviour of their children while raising them – and 
likely shape their offspring’s social tendencies in this process. The way 
their offspring learns from others may be no exception. It may require 
clever experiments to disentangle genetic and cultural influences on the 
transmission of social learning strategies. Following the approach of the 
work mentioned above (Wallace et al. 2007; Cesarini et al. 2008),  it seems 
promising to study the basis of social learning strategies by investigating 
social learning and cooperative behaviour of heterogametic and 
homogametic twins. A subsequent comparison of twins raised together 
and twins raised apart would lead to valuable insights in the genetic and 
cultural factors that constitute social learning strategies.  
 
Concluding remarks 
After four years of studying the interplay of social learning and human 
cooperation, I have to conclude that I only scratched the surface of these 
intriguing aspects of human nature. My models and experiments 
considered very simple social situations that reflected a rather coarse-
grained picture of human interactions in the real world. A vast amount of 
work is still needed to bridge the gap between basic insights from the 
laboratory and the tremendous complexity of real-life social interactions. 
Perhaps an even bigger challenge lies in revealing the nature of social 
learning strategies, showing how such strategies are represented in 





One comforting thought is that this field of research is relatively young. 
We are just getting started with investigating the intricate ways in which 
people acquire and use social information to modify their behaviour. 
Major issues lie ahead of us in understanding the processes underlying 
social learning and how they shape human behaviour in social and non-
social situations. Despite the complexity of these matters, we have to take 
up the challenge to gain deeper insights into how social learning affects 
behaviour across the range of contexts in which humans interact with 
each other. Eventually, these insights into the interplay between social 
learning and cooperation will lead to a deeper understanding of what 
makes us humans unique: our sociality. 






Alexander R. D. (1987). The Biology of Moral Systems. Transaction Books, 
New York. 
Asch S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of 
one against a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs: 
General and Applied 70: 1-70. 
Axelrod R. (1984). The Evolution Of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York.  
Axelrod R., and W. D. Hamilton (1981). The evolution of cooperation. 
Science 211: 1390-1396. 
Barrett H. C., L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby (2007). The hominid entry into the 
cognitive niche. In: S. W. Gangestad, and J. A. Simpson (eds.). 
Evolution of Mind, Fundamental Questions and Controversies. 
Guilford Press, New York. pp. 241-248. 
Bates D., M. Maechler, and B. Bolker (2012). lme4: Linear mixed-effects 
models using S4 classes.  
Battesti M., C. Moreno, D. Joly, and F. Mery (2012). Spread of social 
information and dynamics of social transmission within Drosophila 
Groups. Current Biology 22: 309-313. 
Bolton G. E., E. Katok, and A. Ockenfels (2005). Cooperation among 
strangers with limited information about reputation. Journal of Public 
Economics 89: 1457-1468. 
Botero C. A., I. Pen, J. Komdeur, and F. J. Weissing (2010). The evolution of 
individual variation in communication strategies. Evolution 64: 3123-
3133. 
Bowles S. (2001). Individual interactions, group conflicts, and the 
evolution of preferences. In: S. N. Durlauf, and H. Peyton Young (eds.). 
Social Dynamics. MIT Press, Cambridge. pp. 155-190. 
Bowles S. (2009). Did warfare among ancestral hunter-gatherers affect the 
evolution of human social behaviors? Science 324: 1293-1298. 
Bowles S., J. Choi, and A. Hopfensitz (2003). The co-evolution of individual 
behaviors and social institutions. Journal of Theoretical Biology 
223:135-147. 
Boyd R., and P. J. Richerson (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process. 




Boyd R., and P. J. Richerson (1988). An evolutionary model of social 
learning: the effects of spatial and temporal variation. In: T. R. Zentall, 
and B. G. Galef (eds.). Social Learning: Psychological and Biological 
Perspectives. pp. 29-48. 
Boyd R., and P. J. Richerson (2002). Group beneficial norms can spread 
rapidly in a structured population. Journal of Theoretical Biology 215: 
287-296. 
Boyd R., H. Gintis, S. Bowles, and P. J. Richerson (2003). The evolution of 
altruistic punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences U. S. A. 100: 3531-3535. 
Boyd R., P. J. Richerson, and J. Henrich (2011a). The cultural niche: why 
social learning is essential for human adaptation. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences U. S. A. 108: 10918-10925. 
Boyd R., P. J. Richerson, and J. Henrich (2011b). Rapid cultural adaptation 
can facilitate the evolution of large-scale cooperation. Behavioral 
Ecology and Sociobiology 65: 431-444. 
Brandt H., and K. Sigmund (2004). The logic of reprobation: assessment 
and action rules for indirect reciprocation. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology 231: 475-486. 
Brosig J., T. Riechmann, and J. Weimann (2007). Selfish in the end?: an 
investigation of consistency and stability of individual behavior. 
FEMM Working Paper Series 5. pp. 1-33.  
Cavalli-Sforza L. L., and M. W. Feldman (1981). Cultural Transmission and 
Evolution: a Quantitative Approach. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
Cesarini D., C. T. Dawes, J. H. Fowler, M. Johannesson, P. Lichtenstein, and 
B. Wallace (2008). Heritability of cooperative behavior in the trust 
game. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U. S. A. 105: 
3721-3726. 
Choi J., and S. Bowles (2007). The coevolution of parochial altruism and 
war. Science 318:636-640. 
Clutton-Brock T. (2009). Cooperation between non-kin in animal societies. 
Nature 462: 51-57. 
Darwin C. (1859). The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection: or, 
the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. John 
Murray, London. 
Darwin C. (1871). The Descent of Man. John Murray, London. 




Digman J. M. (1990). Personality structure: emergence of the five-factor 
model. Annual Review of Psychology 41: 417-440. 
Duffy G. A., T. W. Pike, and K. N. Laland (2009). Size-dependent directed 
social learning in nine-spined sticklebacks. Animal Behavior 78: 371-
375. 
Dufwenberg M., U. Gneezy, W. Güth, and E. E. van Damme (2001). Direct 
versus indirect reciprocity: an experiment. Homo Oeconomicus 18: 
19-30. 
Dugatkin L. A., and J. J. Godin (1993). Female mate copying in the guppy 
Poecilia reticulata: age-dependent effects. Behavioral Ecology 4: 289-
292. 
Dugatkin L. A., and H. K. Reeve (1997). Cooperation Among Animals: an 
Evolutionary Perspective. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Efferson C., P. J. Richerson, R. McElreath, M. Lubell, E. Edsten, T. M. Waring, 
B. Paciotti, and W. Baum (2007). Learning, productivity, and noise: an 
experimental study of cultural transmission on the Bolivian Altiplano. 
Evolution and Human Behavior 28: 11-17. 
Efferson C., R. Lalive, P. J. Richerson, R. McElreath, and M. Lubell (2008). 
Conformists and mavericks: the empirics of frequency-dependent 
cultural transmission. Evolution and Human Behavior 29: 56-64. 
Engelmann D., and U. Fischbacher (2009). Indirect reciprocity and 
strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. Games 
and Economic Behavior 67: 399-407. 
Fehr E., and U. Fischbacher (2003). The nature of human altruism. Nature 
425: 785-791. 
Fischbacher U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic 
experiments. Experimental Economics 10: 171-178. 
Fischbacher U., and S. Gächter (2010). Social preferences, beliefs, and the 
dynamics of free riding in public good experiments. American 
Economic Review 100: 541–556. 
Gächter S., and B. Herrmann (2009). Reciprocity, culture and human 
cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 
364: 791-806. 
Gächter S., B. Herrmann, and C. Thöni (2010). Culture and cooperation. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 
365: 2651-2661. 
Galef Jr B. G. (1976). Social transmission of acquired behaviour: a 




Rosenblatt, R. A. Hinde, E. Shaw, and C. Beer (eds.). Advances in the 
Study of Behavior. Academic Press, New York. pp. 77–100.  
Galef Jr B. G., and K. N. Laland (2005). Social learning in animals: empirical 
studies and theoretical models. Bioscience 55: 489-499. 
García J., and J. C. J. M. Van den Bergh (2011). Evolution of parochial 
altruism by multilevel selection. Evolution and Human Behavior 32: 
277-287. 
Gargiulo F., and J. J. Ramasco (2012). Influence of opinion dynamics on the 
evolution of games. PloS One 7:e48916. 
Gigerenzer G., P. M. Todd, and ABC Research Group (1999). Simple 
Heuristics that Make Us Smart. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Gintis H. (2000). Game Theory Evolving: a Problem-Centered Introduction 
to Modeling Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
Godin J., and L. A. Dugatkin (1996). Female mating preference for bold 
males in the guppy, Poecilia reticulata. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences U. S. A. 93: 10262-10267. 
Gosling S. D. (2001). From mice to men: what can we learn about 
personality from animal research? Psychological Bulletin 127: 45-86. 
Griffin A. S., S. A. West, and A. Buckling (2004). Cooperation and 
competition in pathogenic bacteria. Nature 430: 1024-1027. 
Griskevicius V., N. J. Goldstein, C. R. Mortensen, R. B. Cialdini, and D. T. 
Kenrick (2006). Going along versus going alone: when fundamental 
motives facilitate strategic (non-)conformity. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 91:281-294. 
Guala F. (2012). Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment 
experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 35: 1–59. 
Guerinot M. L. (1994). Microbial iron transport. Annual Reviews in 
Microbiology 48: 743-772. 
Gummbah (2002). In: Poelmo, slaaf van het zuiden (voor meisjes die van 
dieren houden). Hummelinck Stuurman Theaterbureau. 
Guzmán A. R., C. Rodríguez-Sickert, and R. Rowthorn (2007). When in 
Rome, do as the Romans do: the coevolution of altruistic punishment, 
conformist learning, and cooperation. Evolution and Human Behavior 
28: 112-117. 
Hamilton W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour I and II. 




Henrich J. (2004). Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and 
large-scale cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 
53: 3-35. 
Henrich J., and R. Boyd (1998). The evolution of conformist transmission 
and the emergence of between-group differences. Evolution and 
Human Behavior 19: 215-241. 
Henrich J. (2001). Cultural transmission and the diffusion of innovations: 
Adoption dynamics indicate that biased cultural transmission is the 
predominate force in behavioral change. American Anthropologist 
103: 992-1013. 
Henrich J., R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, and R. 
McElreath (2001). In search of homo economicus: behavioral 
experiments in 15 small-scale societies. American Economic Review 
91: 73-78. 
Henrich J., and R. Boyd (2001). Why people punish defectors. Journal of 
Theoretical Biology 208: 79-89. 
Henrich J., and R. McElreath (2003). The evolution of cultural evolution. 
Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews 12: 123-135. 
Henrich J., and F. J. Gil-White (2001). The evolution of prestige: freely 
conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of 
cultural transmission. Evolution and Human Behavior 22: 165-196. 
Henrich J., S. J. Heine, and A. Norenzayan (2010). Beyond WEIRD: Towards 
a broad-based behavioral science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33: 
111-135. 
Henrich J., and N. Henrich (2010). The evolution of cultural adaptations: 
Fijian food taboos protect against dangerous marine toxins. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 277: 3715-
3724. 
Henrich J., and J. Broesch (2011). On the nature of cultural transmission 
networks: evidence from Fijian villages for adaptive learning biases. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 
366: 1139-1148. 
Herrmann B., C. Thöni, and S. Gächter (2008). Antisocial punishment 
across societies. Science 319: 1362-1367. 
Heyes C. M. (1994). Social learning in animals: categories and 
mechanisms. Biological Reviews 69: 207-231. 
Hoppitt W., and K. N. Laland (2013). Social Learning: An Introduction to 





Hoppitt W. J., G. R. Brown, R. Kendal, L. Rendell, A. Thornton, M. M. 
Webster, and K. N. Laland (2008). Lessons from animal teaching. 
Trends in Ecology & Evolution 23: 486-493. 
Inglehart R., and W. E. Baker (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and 
the persistence of traditional values. American Sociological Review 
65: 19-51. 
Insko C. A., R. H. Smith, M. D. Alicke, J. Wade, and S. Taylor (1985). 
Conformity and Group Size The Concern with Being Right and the 
Concern with Being Liked. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
11: 41-50. 
John O. P., R. W. Robinson, and L.A. Pervin (2010). Handbook of 
Personality: Theory and Research. Guilford Press, New York. 
Johnstone R. A., and A. Manica (2011). Evolution of personality differences 
in leadership. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U. S. A. 
108: 8373-8378. 
Junikka J., L. Molleman, P. Van den Berg, F. J. Weissing, and M. Puurtinen 
(in preparation). Effects of assortment of cooperative strategies on 
the formation and maintenance of group norms.  
Karlin S., and H. E. Taylor (1975). A First Course in Stochastic Processes. 
Academic press, Waltham. 
Kendal J., L. Giraldeau, and K. Laland (2009). The evolution of social 
learning rules: payoff-biased and frequency-dependent biased 
transmission. Journal of Theoretical Biology 260: 210-219. 
Klein R. G. (1989). The Human Career. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Feldmann, M. W., K. Aoki, and J. Kumm (1996). Individual versus social 
learning: evolutionary analyses in a fluctuating environment. 
Anthropological Sciences 104: 209-232. 
Kurzban R., and D. Houser (2005). Experiments investigating cooperative 
types in humans: A complement to evolutionary theory and 
simulations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U. S. A. 
102: 1803-1807. 
Laland K. N. (2004). Social learning strategies. Learning & Behavior 32: 4-
14. 
Lehmann L., and L. Keller (2006). The evolution of cooperation and 
altruism–a general framework and a classification of models. Journal 
of Evolutionary Biology 19: 1365-1376. 
Lehmann L., N. Perrin, and F. Rousset (2006). Population demography and 




Lehmann L., and M. W. Feldman (2008). The co-evolution of culturally 
inherited altruistic helping and cultural transmission under random 
group formation. Theoretical Population Biology 73: 506-516. 
Lehmann L., M. W. Feldman, and K. R. Foster (2008a). Cultural 
transmission can inhibit the evolution of altruistic helping. American 
Naturalist 172: 12-24. 
Lehmann L., K. R. Foster, E. Borenstein, and M. W. Feldman (2008b). Social 
and individual learning of helping in humans and other species. 
Trends in Ecology & Evolution 23: 664-671. 
Leigh E. G. (1983). When does the good of the group override the 
advantage of the individual? Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences U. S. A. 80: 2985-2989. 
Leigh J. (2010). The group selection controversy. Journal of Evolutionary 
Biology 23: 6-19. 
Leimar O., and P. Hammerstein (2001). Evolution of cooperation through 
indirect reciprocity. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: 
Biological Sciences 268: 745-753. 
Mace R., and R. Sear (2005). Are humans cooperative breeders? In: E. 
Voland, A. Chasiotis, and W. Schiefenhoevel (eds.). Grandmotherhood: 
the Evolutionary Significance of the Second Half of Female Life. 
Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick. pp. 143-159. 
Maynard Smith J. (1964). Group selection and kin selection. Nature 201: 
1145-1147. 
McElreath R., A. V. Bell, C. Efferson, M. Lubell, P. J. Richerson, and T. 
Waring (2008). Beyond existence and aiming outside the laboratory: 
estimating frequency-dependent and pay-off-biased social learning 
strategies. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences 363: 3515-3528. 
McElreath R., M. Lubell, P. J. Richerson, T. M. Waring, W. Baum, E. Edsten, 
C. Efferson, and B. Paciotti. (2005). Applying evolutionary models to 
the laboratory study of social learning. Evolution and Human Behavior 
26: 483-508. 
McNamara J. M., and O. Leimar (2010). Variation and the response to 
variation as a basis for successful cooperation. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 365: 2627-
2633. 
McNamara J. M., and F. J. Weissing (2010). Evolutionary game theory. In: T. 
Székely, A. J. Moore, and J. Komdeur (eds.). Social Behaviour: Genes, 





Mesoudi A., A. Whiten, and R. Dunbar (2006). A bias for social information 
in human cultural transmission. British Journal of Psychology 97: 405-
423. 
Mesoudi, A. (2008). An experimental simulation of the “copy-successful-
individuals” cultural learning strategy: adaptive landscapes, 
producer–scrounger dynamics, and informational access costs. 
Evolution and Human Behavior 29: 350-363. 
Mesoudi A., A. Whiten, A. Mesoudi, and A. Whiten (2008). The multiple 
roles of cultural transmission experiments in understanding human 
cultural evolution. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences 363: 3489-3501. 
Mesoudi A. (2011a). An experimental comparison of human social 
learning strategies: payoff-biased social learning is adaptive but 
underused. Evolution and Human Behavior 32: 334-342. 
Mesoudi A. (2011b). Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory Can 
Explain Human Culture and Synthesize the Social Sciences. University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Milinski M., D. Semmann, T. C. Bakker, and H. Krambeck (2001). 
Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: image scoring or standing 
strategy? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological 
Sciences 268: 2495-2501. 
Molleman L., P. van den Berg, and F. J. Weissing. Consistent individual 
differences in social learning strategies. (subm.).  
Molleman L., I. Pen, and F. J. Weissing (2013a). Effects of conformism on 
the cultural evolution of social behaviour. PLoS One 8:e68153. 
Molleman L., A. E. Quiñones, and F. J. Weissing (2013b). Cultural evolution 
of cooperation: the interplay between forms of social learning and 
group selection. Evolution and Human Behavior 34: 342-349. 
Molleman L., E. van den Broek, and M. Egas (2013c). Personal experience 
and reputation interact in human decisions to help reciprocally. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 280: 20123044. 
Morgan T., L. Rendell, M. Ehn, W. Hoppitt, and K. Laland (2012). The 
evolutionary basis of human social learning. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences 279: 653-662. 
Noë R., and P. Hammerstein (1994). Biological markets: supply and 
demand determine the effect of partner choice in cooperation, 
mutualism and mating. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 35: 1-11. 





Nowak M. A., and K. Sigmund (1998). Evolution of indirect reciprocity by 
image scoring. Nature 393: 573-577. 
Nowak M. A., and K. Sigmund (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity. 
Nature 437: 1291-1298. 
Nowak M. A., A. Sasaki, C. Taylor, and D. Fudenberg (2004). Emergence of 
cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 
428: 646-650. 
Ohtsuki H., and Y. Iwasa (2004). How should we define goodness?—
reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology 231: 107-120. 
Ohtsuki H., and Y. Iwasa (2006). The leading eight: social norms that can 
maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology 239: 435-444. 
Okasha S. (2004). Multilevel selection and the partitioning of covariance: a 
comparison of three approaches. Evolution 58: 486-494. 
Okasha S. (2006). Evolution and the Levels of Selection. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
Osborne M. J., and A. Rubinstein (1994). Course in Game Theory. The MIT 
Press, Cambridge. 
Ostrom E., J. Walker, and R. Gardner (1992). Covenants with and without a 
sword: Self-governance is possible. The American Political Science 
Review 86: 404-417. 
Otto S. P., and T. Day (2011). A Biologist's Guide to Mathematical Modeling 
in Ecology and Evolution. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Oyserman D., H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002). Rethinking 
individualism and collectivism: evaluation of theoretical assumptions 
and meta-analyses. Psychological Bulletin 128: 3–72. 
Panchanathan K. (2011). Two wrongs don't make a right: The initial 
viability of different assessment rules in the evolution of indirect 
reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology 277: 48-54. 
Panchanathan K., and R. Boyd (2003). A tale of two defectors: the 
importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity. Journal of 
Theoretical Biology 224: 115-126. 
Peña J., H. Volken, E. Pestelacci, and M. Tomassini (2009). Conformity 
hinders the evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks. Physical 
Review E 80: 016110. 
Pike T. W., and K. N. Laland (2010). Conformist learning in nine-spined 




Pinker S. (2010). The cognitive niche: Coevolution of intelligence, sociality, 
and language. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U. S. A. 
107: 8993-8999. 
Price G. R. (1970). Selection and covariance. Nature 227: 520-521. 
Queller D. C. (1992). Quantitative genetics, inclusive fitness, and group 
selection. Americal Naturalist 139: 540-558. 
Rand D. G., S. Arbesman, and N. A. Christakis (2011). Dynamic social 
networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U. S. A. 108: 19193-
19198. 
Ratnieks F. L., and T. Wenseleers (2008). Altruism in insect societies and 
beyond: voluntary or enforced? Trends in Ecology & Evolution 23: 45-
52. 
Réale D., N. J. Dingemanse, A. J. Kazem, and J. Wright (2010). Evolutionary 
and ecological approaches to the study of personality. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 365: 3937-
3946. 
Rendell L., L. Fogarty, W. J. E. Hoppitt, T. J. H. Morgan, M. M. Webster, and 
K. N. Laland (2011). Cognitive culture: theoretical and empirical 
insights into social learning strategies. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
15: 68-76. 
Rendell L., L. Fogarty, and K. N. Laland (2010a). Roger's paradox recast 
and resolved: population structure and the evolution of social 
learning strategies. Evolution 64: 534-548. 
Rendell L., R. Boyd, D. Cownden, M. Enquist, K. Eriksson, M. W. Feldman, L. 
Fogarty, S. Ghirlanda, T. Lillicrap, and K. N. Laland (2010b). Why copy 
others? Insights from the social learning strategies tournament. 
Science 328: 208-213. 
Richerson P. J., and R. Boyd (2004). Not By Genes Alone: How Culture 
Transformed Human Evolution. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Roberts B. W., and W. F. DelVecchio (2000). The rank-order consistency of 
personality traits from childhood to old age: a quantitative review of 
longitudinal studies. Psychological Bulletin 126: 3-25. 
Roberts G. (2008). Evolution of direct and indirect reciprocity. Proceedings 
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 275: 173-179. 
Rogers A. R. (1988). Does biology constrain culture? American 
Anthropologist 90: 819-831. 
Rogers A. R. (1990). Group selection by selective emigration: the effects of 




Scheuring I. (2009). Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural 
group selection. Journal of Theoretical Biology 257: 397-407. 
Schlag K. H. (1998). Why imitate, and if so, how?: a boundedly rational 
approach to multi-armed bandits. Journal of Economic Theory 78: 
130-156. 
Seinen I., and A. Schram (2006). Social status and group norms: Indirect 
reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment. European Economic 
Review 50: 581-602. 
Sherman P. W. (1977). Nepotism and the evolution of alarm calls. Science 
197: 1246-1253. 
Sih A., A. Bell, and J. C. Johnson (2004). Behavioral syndromes: an 
ecological and evolutionary overview. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 
19: 372-378. 
Simon B., J. A. Fletcher, and M. Doebeli (2012). Towards a general theory 
of group selection. Evolution 67: 1561-1572. 
Skyrms B. 2005. Dynamics of conformist bias. The Monist 88: 260–269. 
Soltis J., R. Boyd, and P. J. Richerson (1995). Can group-functional 
behaviors evolve by cultural group selection?: An empirical test. 
Current Anthropology 36: 473-494. 
Sommerfeld R. D., H. Krambeck, and M. Milinski (2008). Multiple gossip 
statements and their effect on reputation and trustworthiness. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 275: 2529-
2536. 
Sommerfeld R. D., H. Krambeck, D. Semmann, and M. Milinski (2007). 
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect 
reciprocity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U. S. A. 
104: 17435-17440. 
Stiner M. C., R. Barkai, and A. Gopher (2009). Cooperative hunting and 
meat sharing 400–200 kya at Qesem Cave, Israel. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences U. S. A. 106:13207-13212. 
Sugden R. (1986). The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare. 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Toelch U., M. J. van Delft, M. J. Bruce, R. Donders, M. T. Meeus, and S. M. 
Reader (2009). Decreased environmental variability induces a bias 
for social information use in humans. Evolution and Human Behavior 
30: 32-40. 
Traulsen A., and M. A. Nowak. (2006). Evolution of cooperation by 
multilevel selection. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 




Traulsen A., M. A. Nowak, and J. M. Pacheco (2006). Stochastic dynamics of 
invasion and fixation. Physical Review E 74: 011909. 
Traulsen A., D. Semmann, R. D. Sommerfeld, H. J. Krambeck, and M. 
Milinski (2010). Human strategy updating in evolutionary games. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U. S. A. 107: 2962-
2966. 
Trivers R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review 
of Biology 46: 35-57. 
Ule A., A. Schram, A. Riedl, and T. N. Cason (2009). Indirect punishment 
and generosity toward strangers. Science 326: 1701-1704. 
Valone T. J. (2007). From eavesdropping on performance to copying the 
behavior of others: a review of public information use. Behavioral 
Ecology and Sociobiology 62: 1-14. 
Van de Waal E., C. Borgeaud, and A. Whiten (2013). Potent social learning 
and conformity shape a wild primate’s foraging decisions. Science 
340: 483-485. 
Van den Berg P., L. Molleman, and F. Weissing (2012). The social costs of 
punishment. Reply to: Guala, F. Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What 
punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences 35. pp. 42-43. 
Venables W. N., D. M. Smith, and the R development core team (2005). An 
Introduction to R: A Programming Environment for Data Analysis and 
Graphics. 
Vilone D., J. J. Ramasco, A. Sánchez, and M. San Miguel (2012). Social and 
strategic imitation: the way to consensus. Scientific Reports 2: 686. 
Volk S., C. Thöni, and W. Ruigrok (2012). Temporal stability and 
psychological foundations of cooperation preferences. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 81: 664-676. 
Wakano J. Y., K. Aoki, and M. W. Feldman (2004). Evolution of social 
learning: a mathematical analysis. Theoretical Population Biology 66: 
249-258. 
Wallace B., D. Cesarini, P. Lichtenstein, and M. Johannesson. (2007). 
Heritability of ultimatum game responder behavior. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences U. S. A. 104: 15631-15634. 
Wedekind C., and M. Milinski (2000). Cooperation through image scoring 
in humans. Science 288: 850-852. 
Wedekind C., and M. Milinski (1996). Human cooperation in the 




Generous Tit-for-Tat. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
U. S. A. 93: 2686-2689. 
Weissing F. J. (2011). Animal behaviour: Born leaders. Nature 474: 288-
289. 
West S. A., A. S. Griffin, and A. Gardner (2007). Social semantics: altruism, 
cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection. 
Journal of Evolutionary Biology 20: 415-432. 
West S. A., A. S. Griffin, and A. Gardner (2008). Social semantics: how 
useful has group selection been? Journal of Evolutionary Biology 21: 
374-385. 
Whiten A., and D. Erdal (2012). The human socio-cognitive niche and its 
evolutionary origins. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences 367: 2119-2129. 
Wilson D. S. (1975). A theory of group selection. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences U. S. A. 72: 143-146. 
Wilson D. S., and E. O. Wilson (2007). Rethinking the theoretical 
foundation of sociobiology. Quarterly Review of Biology 82: 327-348. 
Wilson D. (2008). Social semantics: toward a genuine pluralism in the 
study of social behaviour. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 21: 368-
373. 
Wit J. (1999). Social learning in a common interest voting game. Games 
and Economic Behavior 26: 131-156. 
Wolf M., and F. J. Weissing (2012). Animal personalities: consequences for 
ecology and evolution. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 27: 452-461. 
Wolf M., G. S. Van Doorn, and F. J. Weissing (2008). Evolutionary 
emergence of responsive and unresponsive personalities. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences U. S. A. 105: 15825-15830. 
Wolf M., G. S. van Doorn, O. Leimar, and F. J. Weissing (2007). Life-history 
trade-offs favour the evolution of animal personalities. Nature 447: 
581-584. 
Wolf M., and F. J. Weissing (2010). An explanatory framework for adaptive 
personality differences. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences 365: 3959-3968. 
Wolf M., G. S. Van Doorn, and F. J. Weissing (2011). On the coevolution of 
social responsiveness and behavioural consistency. Proceedings of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences U. S. A. 278: 440-448. 
Yamagishi T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public 
good. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51: 110-116.
   
238 
 




Wat maakt de mens zo’n succesvolle soort? Welke factoren zorgen ervoor 
dat mensen kunnen overleven onder de meest uiteenlopende 
omstandigheden op aarde? Een verklaring hiervoor schuilt in het feit dat 
de mens een buitengewoon sociaal dier is. Twee sociale eigenschappen 
springen bijzonder in het oog. Ten eerste zijn mensen goed in staat om 
samen te werken in groepen, veel beter dan onze naaste verwanten, de 
gorilla en de chimpansee. Door efficiënte coördinatie van taken en 
effectieve samenwerking zijn mensen in staat om het hoofd te bieden aan 
uitdagingen, waartegen geen enkel individu in zijn eentje opgewassen is. 
Ten tweede hebben mensen een bijzondere aanleg voor sociaal leren: 
door te observeren hoe anderen omgaan met specifieke situaties kunnen 
mensen hun gedrag snel aanpassen aan een groot aantal uiteenlopende 
omstandigheden. In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik het samenspel tussen 
samenwerking en sociaal leren en kijk ik hoe deze twee eigenschappen 
bijdragen aan het succes van de mens. Voordat ik het werk uit mijn 
proefschrift beschrijf, is een nadere toelichting van de concepten 
samenwerking en sociaal leren op zijn plaats. 
Samenwerking tussen mensen doet zich voor in veel verschillende 
vormen. Geen enkel ander dier lukt het om acties in een groep op elkaar af 
te stemmen in zo’n breed scala aan verschillende situaties; van het helpen 
bij de opvoeding van elkaars kinderen tot de gecoördineerde jacht op 
grote prooidieren, en van het verzorgen van de zieken tot het verdedigen 
van een dorp tegen bedreigingen van buitenaf. Deze samenwerking is 
veelal gebaseerd op het feit dat mensen bereid zijn iets op te geven voor 
anderen in hun omgeving. Deze bereidheid om te investeren in 
samenwerking met anderen levert voordelen op die ervoor gezorgd 
hebben dat groepen mensen zich konden aanpassen aan bijna alle 
leefomgevingen op aarde. Echter, vanuit een evolutionair perspectief is 
onze aanleg tot samenwerking niet vanzelfsprekend. Charles Darwin 
realiseerde zich al dat investeren in samenwerking vaak problemen met 
zich meebrengt. Namelijk, samenwerking kan vaak worden geëxploiteerd 




zelf de kosten te dragen. Met andere woorden: natuurlijke selectie 
bevoordeelt free-riders ondermijnt samenwerking. Sinds de tijd van 
Darwin hebben evolutiebiologen tal van mechanismen onder de loep 
genomen die de evolutie van samenwerking zouden kunnen verklaren, en 
laten zien dat free-riding op de korte termijn vaak voordelig is, maar op 
langere termijn juist nadelig kan zijn. Een bekend voorbeeld van een 
mechanisme dat samenwerking kan bevoordelen is ‘groepsselectie’. Dit 
treedt op als selectie niet alleen plaatsvindt tussen individuen, maar ook 
op het niveau van de groep. Samenwerking kan er bijvoorbeeld voor 
zorgen dat een groep grotere kansen heeft te overleven of niet uiteen te 
vallen, of om conflicten met andere groepen te winnen. Hierdoor kan 
samenwerking bevoordeeld worden boven free-riding. Ook kunnen 
verwante individuen elkaar helpen zodat hun gemeenschappelijke genen 
worden doorgegeven aan volgende generaties. Een derde manier waarop 
samenwerking kan lonen, is gebaseerd op wederkerigheid: partners 
kunnen profiteren als ze beurtelings iets voor elkaar over hebben. 
Sociaal leren stelt individuen in staat hun gedrag aan te passen door 
observatie van – en interacties met – anderen. Dit kan veel voordelen 
hebben: door anderen te observeren en hun gedrag te kopiëren, wordt het 
mogelijk om waardevolle informatie te verkrijgen over van allerlei 
aspecten van de omgeving, zoals de locatie van voedsel, waar natuurlijke 
vijanden zich ophouden, en hoe je met anderen dient om te gaan. 
Evolutionaire modellen suggereren dat het vaak loont om op een 
strategische manier om te gaan met de informatie uit je sociale omgeving. 
Een ‘sociale leerstrategie’ wordt over het algemeen gemodelleerd als een 
set regels die beschrijft hoe een individu van anderen leert. Deel van zo’n 
strategie kan zijn dat een individu zijn gedrag baseert op het gedrag van 
anderen, als hij zelf niet zeker is wat hij moet doen. Ook kan zo’n strategie 
beschrijven hoe van anderen geleerd wordt; bijvoorbeeld door te 
conformeren aan de meerderheid in de sociale omgeving, of door het 
gedrag te kopiëren van een succesvol of invloedrijk individu. Sinds de 
jaren 1970 hebben auteurs als Richard Dawkins betoogd dat sociaal leren 
aan de basis ligt van een systeem van overerving dat op veel manieren 
lijkt op genetische overerving. Mensen geven namelijk niet alleen hun 
genen door, maar ook ideeën, meningen of overtuigingen hun gedrag 




populatie, en deze variatie kan ontstaan als individuen bijvoorbeeld 
experimenteren met nieuw gedrag, of een verbeterde techniek ontdekken. 
Zulke ‘innovaties’ dragen, net zoals mutaties in het genetische systeem, bij 
aan de variatie van ideeën in de populatie. Bovendien verspreiden 
sommige ideeën zich gemakkelijker dan andere, met name als ze 
geassocieerd zijn met gedrag dat leidt tot succesvolle aanpassing aan de 
heersende omstandigheden, of gedrag dat leidt tot een hoge sociale status. 
Zulk ‘payoff-gebaseerd’ leren doet sterk denken aan natuurlijke selectie. 
Net als natuurlijke selectie, leidt payoff-gebaseerd leren vaak tot de 
verspreiding van gedrag dat is toegesneden op de vereisten van de 
omgeving. Het besef dat culturele en genetische overerving grote 
overeenkomsten vertonen, leidde tot de ontwikkeling van een theorie van 
‘culturele evolutie’. Deze theorie bouwt voort op inzichten uit genetische 
studies en kijkt naar variatie, selectie en overerving, om te begrijpen hoe 
gedrag evolueert over de tijd, onder invloed van sociaal leren. 
Wat hebben samenwerking en sociaal leren met elkaar te maken? Er is 
gesuggereerd dat sociaal leren de sleutel is tot de evolutie van 
samenwerking bij mensen. Een invloedrijke reeks modellen ondersteunt 
het argument dat vergeleken met genetische evolutie, culturele evolutie – 
onder invloed van sociaal leren – een betere verklaring kan geven voor de 
diversiteit en het niveau van menselijke samenwerking. Deze modellen 
gaan ervan uit dat conformistisch leren een grote rol speelt bij het in stand 
houden van samenwerking in groepen. Vervolgens kan, volgens deze 
modellen, samenwerking zich verspreiden door een proces dat ‘culturele 
groepsselectie’ wordt genoemd: in competitie tussen groepen 
(bijvoorbeeld door een conflict) zijn coöperatieve groepen in het voordeel, 
en door deze selectie op het niveau van groepen, kan free-riding worden 
onderdrukt. Hieronder zal ik uiteenzetten hoe dit argument in elkaar 
steekt, en de logica ervan tegen het licht houden met verschillende 
modellen van culturele evolutie. 
In dit proefschrift gebruik ik een combinatie van experimenten en 
theoretische modellen om het samenspel van sociaal leren en 
samenwerking te onderzoeken. In twee experimentele studies 
(hoofdstukken 6 en 7) bekijk ik welke strategieën mensen toepassen in 
een samenwerkingssituatie. Met behulp van modellen (hoofdstukken 2 en 




beïnvloed door sociale leerstrategieën en vormen van culturele 
groepsselectie. Met nog eens twee experimenten (hoofdstukken 4 en 5) 
bekijk ik op welke manieren mensen van elkaar leren, om bij te dragen 
aan een empirische grondslag voor de theorie van culturele evolutie. Ik 




Ik begin dit proefschrift met het in kaart brengen hoe de dynamiek van 
culturele evolutie wordt beïnvloed door verschillende vormen van sociaal 
leren. Hiertoe ontwerp ik een aantal modellen die culturele evolutie van 
samenwerking nabootsen die in kaart brengen hoe de dynamiek van 
culturele evolutie wordt beïnvloed door verschillende leerstrategieën. Als 
startpunt van alle modellen neem ik payoff-gebaseerd leren, en bekijk hoe 
de dynamiek van culturele evolutie wordt beïnvloed als andere vormen 
van sociaal leren – waaronder conformisme – een rol gaan spelen. 
Zoals boven gezegd, leidt payoff-gebaseerd leren tot een dynamiek van 
culturele evolutie die lijkt op genetische evolutie onder natuurlijke 
selectie. Groepen waarin wordt samengewerkt lopen hierbij altijd het 
risico om uitgebuit te worden door free-riders, omdat deze een hogere 
payoff behalen. Hierdoor wordt samenwerking snel ondermijnd, en de 
meeste modellen – net als die van genetische evolutie onder natuurlijke 
selectie – voorspellen dat groepen dan ook snel zullen worden 
overgenomen door free-riders. Echter, payoff-gebaseerd leren is niet de 
enige sociale leerstrategie die mensen gebruiken; vaak hebben mensen 
een neiging om zich te conformeren aan de meerderheid in hun sociale 
omgeving. Met behulp van een reeks theoretische modellen hebben 
verschillende onderzoekers betoogd dat juist dit conformisme aan de 
basis ligt van de culturele evolutie van menselijke samenwerking. 
Conformisme draagt er namelijk aan bij dat in sommige groepen 
samenwerking kan stabiliseren, en free-riders buiten de deur worden 
gehouden doordat individuen zich conformeren aan de meerderheid, en 
goed blijven samenwerken. Vervolgens kan deze coöperatieve groep een 




van dit argument beweren dat zo’n proces van culturele groepsselectie 
van grote invloed is geweest op de evolutie van menselijke samenwerking. 
In hoofdstukken 2 en 3 van dit proefschrift houd ik deze argumentatie 
op basis van theorie van culturele evolutie tegen het licht. 
In hoofdstuk 2 analyseer ik culturele evolutie in samenwerkingssituaties 
die dagelijkse sociale interacties van mensen weerspiegelen. Ik maak 
gebruik van het ‘sociale dilemma’, een bekend model waarin de belangen 
van een individu tegengesteld zijn aan de belangen van zijn groep: een 
investering in samenwerking levert het beste resultaat op voor alle 
betrokkenen, maar de verleiding bestaat om te profiteren van andermans 
investeringen zonder zelf bij te dragen. Ik stel hierbij de vraag hoe de 
dynamiek van culturele evolutie verandert als conformisme een rol gaat 
spelen in het leergedrag van individuen, die in principe payoff-gebaseerd 
leren. Dit payoff-gebaseerd leren leidt over het algemeen tot ondermijning 
van samenwerking, omdat binnen een groep free-riders een hogere payoff 
halen door de samenwerking van anderen te exploiteren. Conformisme, 
van de andere kant, zorgt ervoor dat individuen zich gaan schikken naar 
gedrag van de meerderheid. In de literatuur wordt sterk benadrukt dat 
conformisme ervoor zorgt dat het idee van ‘free-riding’ in groepen niet 
makkelijk van de grond kan komen in groepen die sterk samenwerken. Op 
deze manier zorgt conformisme ervoor dat samenwerking in een 
coöperatieve groep stabiel zou kunnen blijven. Mijn model laat echter zien 
dat het omgekeerde ook geldt: het idee van ‘coöpereren’ kan in groepen 
van free-riders niet makkelijk van de grond komen. In groepen van free-
riders werkt zowel payoff-gebaseerd leren als conformisme tot de 
ondermijning van samenwerking, want free-riders halen een hogere 
payoff, en zijn ook nog eens in de meerderheid. Het initiëren van 
samenwerking in een groep free-riders blijkt daardoor praktisch 
onmogelijk. Dit effect zorgt ervoor dat conformisme – in tegenstelling tot  
conclusies van bestaande theorieën gebaseerd op culturele groepsselectie 
– de evolutie van samenwerking lang niet altijd bevordert, en vaak juist 
bemoeilijkt. Dit inzicht draagt bij aan een breed gevoerde discussie in de 
literatuur over de rol van conformisme in de culturele evolutie van 
samenwerking.  
Verder onderzoek ik met dit model de effecten van conformisme in twee 




‘coördinatiespel’ (waarbij het voordelig is als individuen hun gedrag op 
elkaar afstemmen), kan conformisme de richting van culturele evolutie 
veranderen, vooral als er weinig overeenstemming in een groep bestaat 
over welk gedrag nu moet worden aangenomen. In een ‘anti-
coördinatiespel’ (waarbij het voordelig is om juist af te wijken van de 
meerderheid) kan conformisme ook grote effecten hebben: als individuen 
leren op basis van payoffs, kan er een stabiel patroon ontstaan waarbij 
verschillende individuen verschillende rollen vervullen. Wanneer 
individuen echter leren op basis van conformisme, dan kan dit patroon 
worden verstoord: conformistisch leren leidt namelijk tot homogeniteit, 
en kan er voor zorgen dat diversiteit aan gedrag snel verloren gaat. In een 
situatie waarin het afwijken van de meerderheid voordelig is, kan 
conformisme de uitkomst van interacties voor alle individuen 
verslechteren. 
De modellen uit hoofdstuk 2 zijn relatief eenvoudig opgezet. Dit maakt aan 
de ene kant, dat ze voor een groot deel wiskundig geanalyseerd kunnen 
worden. Van de andere kant blijven er, door de simplificaties die daarvoor 
gemaakt moeten worden, een aantal aspecten uit de realiteit onderbelicht. 
In hoofdstuk 3 ontwerp ik een simulatiemodel dat meer realistisch is, om 
de invloed van culturele groepsselectie op de evolutie van samenwerking 
te belichten. Ik bekijk verschillende vormen van culturele groepsselectie 
die in de literatuur worden beschreven. Uit het simulatiemodel blijkt dat 
de manier waarop competitie tussen groepen precies plaatsvindt, 
essentieel is voor de uitkomst van culturele evolutie. Als coöperatieve 
groepen een grotere invloed hebben in de hele populatie, en hun ideeën 
zich makkelijker verspreiden naar andere groepen, heeft conformisme een 
negatief effect op de evolutie van samenwerking. Hoewel voor deze vorm 
van culturele groepsselectie enkele groepen een stabiele samenwerking 
kunnen bereiken, verspreidt samenwerking zich maar moeilijk naar 
andere groepen. Door conformisme krijgen nieuwe ideeën in een groep 
nauwelijks een voet aan de grond, en zullen groepen van free-riders 
onveranderd blijven. Dit bevestigt de conclusies uit hoofdstuk 2. 
Conformisme kan de evolutie van samenwerking alleen bevorderen als 
coöperatieve groepen een grotere kans hebben een conflict met andere 
groepen te winnen, en vervolgens hun ‘cultuur’ opleggen aan verliezende 




als individuen geneigd zijn een leider in een groep te volgen, in plaats van 
te conformeren aan een meerderheid. 
Samengevat laten de modellen uit de hoofdstukken 2 en 3 zien dat de 
manier waarop individuen van elkaar leren essentieel is voor de uitkomst 
van culturele evolutie. Culturele groepsselectie leidt lang niet altijd tot de 
evolutie van samenwerking; de richting en uitkomst van culturele evolutie 
is afhankelijk van het samenspel tussen vormen van sociaal leren en de 
manier waarop groepscompetitie plaatsvindt. 
Steeds meer modelmatig onderzoek richt zich op het begrijpen van hoe 
verschillende leerstrategieën het verloop van culturele evolutie 
beïnvloeden. Echter, ons begrip van het proces van culturele evolutie blijft 
beperkt. Dit komt vooral doordat er tot dusver niet veel systematisch 
empirisch onderzoek is gedaan naar hoe mensen in de praktijk van elkaar 
leren. In de hoofdstukken 4 en 5 neem ik een aantal stappen om deze 
gaten in onze kennis op te vullen, en draag daarmee bij aan een theorie 
van culturele evolutie met een empirische grondslag. Hiervoor heb ik 
enkele experimenten uitgevoerd, waarbij het doel is om sociale 
leerstrategieën van mensen te bestuderen in verschillende sociale 
situaties. Hiervoor gebruikte ik methodes uit de experimentele economie, 
waarbij proefpersonen krijgen betaald voor hun deelname. Hoeveel ze 
precies verdienen, hangt af van hun eigen beslissingen en de beslissingen 
van anderen. In een computerlaboratorium worden mensen in 
verschillende groepen ingedeeld, en communiceren alleen met elkaar via 
hun scherm. De groepen worden geconfronteerd met verschillende sociale 
situaties (zoals een sociaal dilemma, een coördinatiespel en een anti-
coördinatiespel, zoals die uit hoofdstuk 2), en speciale software houdt bij 
welke beslissingen de deelnemers maken. Het doel van de experimenten is 
om in beeld te brengen hoe mensen sociale informatie gebruiken om deze 
beslissingen te maken. Voordat ze een beslissing maken, kunnen 
deelnemers informatie verzamelen over de voorgaande beslissing van de 
anderen in hun groep. Deelnemers kunnen er bijvoorbeeld voor kiezen om 
de beslissingen van een aantal groepsgenoten te bekijken (hierdoor wordt 
bijvoorbeeld conformisme mogelijk), of om ook de opbrengst van deze 





In hoofdstuk 4 laat ik zien dat mensen sterk van elkaar verschillen in hun 
sociaal leergedrag. Sommigen laten zich in het maken van hun 
beslissingen vooral leiden door hun sociale omgeving, terwijl anderen zich 
hier weinig tot niets van aantrekken, en op zichzelf vertrouwen. 
Bovendien zijn er grote verschillen tussen de mensen die zich laten leiden 
door hun sociale omgeving: waar sommige mensen zich concentreren op 
welk gedrag tot de hoogste payoffs leidt, negeren anderen dit soort 
informatie in het geheel, en hebben slechts aandacht voor wat de 
meerderheid doet. Dit is een verrassende uitkomst: theorieën van 
culturele evolutie gaan er doorgaans vanuit dat ieder individu in een 
populatie op dezelfde manier leert. Nog verrassender is de uitkomst als 
we kijken naar leergedrag van individuen in de verschillende sociale 
situaties. De resultaten laten zien dat mensen niet zo flexibel zijn in hun 
sociaal leergedrag als wel wordt gedacht, maar eerder vuistregels 
gebruiken om te bepalen wat ze doen. Geconfronteerd met zeer 
uiteenlopende situaties, zijn onverwacht veel mensen consistent in hun 
sociale leerstrategie: óf zij richten zich op het gedrag van de meerderheid, 
óf zij leren op basis van payoff. Om de gevolgen van deze individuele 
verschillen in sociale leerstrategieën voor culturele evolutie te 
onderzoeken, ontwikkel ik in dit hoofdstuk ook verschillende modellen. 
Hierin vergelijk ik heterogene groepen (waarin sommigen altijd payoff-
gebaseerd leren, en anderen altijd op basis van wat de meerderheid doet) 
met homogene groepen (waarin alle individuen leren door een mix van 
deze twee vormen van sociaal leren). Deze modellen laten zien dat in 
sommige omstandigheden – zoals het anti-coördinatiespel – groepen met 
een diversiteit aan leerstrategieën beter kunnen functioneren, doordat zij 
op een efficiënte manier een patroon kunnen bewerkstelligen waarin 
verschillende individuen verschillende rollen vervullen. 
In hoofdstuk 5 onderzoek ik met een soortgelijk experiment of sociale 
leerstrategieën van individuen stabiel zijn over de tijd. Hiertoe meet ik de 
sociale leerstrategieën van proefpersonen op twee verschillende 
momenten (met vier weken ertussen), in twee verschillende 
experimenten. De vergelijking van de twee metingen laat zien dat 
leerstrategieën relatief stabiel zijn over de tijd. Dit ondersteunt het idee 
dat metingen in mijn experimenten gedrag uit het dagelijks leven – buiten 




mensen zich toevallig in één experiment gedragen. Verder bekijk ik met 
dit experiment of leerstrategieën van invloed zijn op samenwerking in een 
groep. Dit blijkt het geval te zijn: groepen van individuen die zich richten 
op het gedrag van de meerderheid, bereiken een hoge mate van 
samenwerking, vergeleken met groepen van individuen die vooral 
aandacht hebben voor de payoffs van groepsgenoten. 
Samengevat laten de experimenten van hoofdstuk 4 en 5 zien dat mensen 
sterk verschillen in hun sociale leerstrategieën. Deze leerstrategieën zijn 
consistent over verschillende sociale situaties en stabiel over tijd. Ook  
hangen ze samen met een neiging tot samenwerking. Dit doet vermoeden 
dat deze strategieën onderdeel zijn van een persoonlijkheidsstructuur, en 
zouden gerelateerd kunnen zijn aan andere karaktereigenschappen zoals 
die wel in de psychologie worden onderzocht. In box 5.1 doe ik een eerste 
stap om dit te onderzoeken, en laat ik zien dat competitieve individuen 
minder geneigd zijn om met anderen samen te werken. 
Hoofdstukken 6 en 7 gaan niet over sociaal leren, maar over de vraag 
welke gedragsstrategieën mensen toepassen in een 
samenwerkingssituatie. Ik laat hier de resultaten zien van een set 
experimenten die inzicht geven in de toepasbaarheid van het idee dat 
samenwerking tussen mensen kan worden bevorderd door wederkerig 
helpen. In theorieën van samenwerking worden twee vormen van 
wederkerigheid intensief onderzocht: i) ‘directe wederkerigheid’, waarin 
directe ervaringen uit voorgaande interacties bepalen of iemand bereid is 
een ander te helpen; en ii) ‘indirecte wederkerigheid’, waarin de reputatie 
van de partner bepaalt of hij geholpen wordt. Deze theorieën wekken de 
suggestie dat samenwerking gestabiliseerd wordt als mensen hun 
beslissing om een ander te helpen baseren op gedrag uit het verleden. 
In hoofdstuk 6 stel ik de vraag hoe directe en indirecte wederkerigheid 
tezamen menselijke samenwerking kunnen ondersteunen. Deelnemers 
aan het experiment konden er herhaaldelijk voor kiezen een ander te 
helpen (‘helpen’ betekent hier: een bedrag aan de partner overmaken), of 
om dat niet te doen. Ze konden deze beslissingen baseren op het gedrag 
van hun partner richting henzelf (directe ervaring uit interacties met een 
partner, waarop directe wederkerigheid kan worden gebaseerd), of 




wederkerigheid kan worden gebaseerd). De resultaten wijzen erop dat, 
gemiddeld genomen, directe interacties zwaarder wegen in een besluit om 
te helpen. Interessant genoeg kunnen directe ervaring en reputaties 
elkaar compenseren in het in stand houden van samenwerking: als een 
partner voorheen geweigerd heeft te helpen in directe interacties, kan een 
goede reputatie toch nog tot samenwerking leiden. Andersom heeft een 
slechte reputatie relatief weinig effect, als de directe interacties maar 
positief waren. Dit wijst erop dat deze twee mechanismen niet 
onafhankelijk zijn; om hun rol in menselijke samenwerking goed te 
kunnen begrijpen, moeten onderzoekers zich richten op het samenspel 
van directe en indirecte wederkerigheid, en ze niet langer apart van elkaar 
onderzoeken. Een interessante bevinding is verder dat, net als bij de 
sociale leerstrategieën, mensen sterk van elkaar verschillen. Sommigen 
richten zich vooral op directe interacties, terwijl anderen hun beslissingen 
alleen baseren op de reputatie van hun interactiepartners. 
In hoofdstuk 7 ga ik dieper in op het idee van indirecte wederkerigheid. 
In hoofdstuk 6 werd dit begrip namelijk op een vrij simpele manier 
benaderd, simpeler dan hoe dit in de realiteit kan werken. Er wordt 
namelijk alleen maar naar het gedrag van een interactiepartner in het 
verleden gekeken, en niet naar de motivaties achter dat gedrag. Echter, 
hetzelfde gedrag kan totaal verschillende oorzaken hebben; een free-rider 
kan weigeren anderen te helpen omdat hij intrinsiek niet geneigd is tot 
samenwerking, terwijl een coöperatief individu een keer kan weigeren om 
hulp te geven aan een free-rider om hem daarmee te straffen. In hoofdstuk 
7 onderscheid ik deze twee gedragsstrategieën van elkaar in een laatste 
experiment. Deelnemers kunnen nu ook meewegen of hun partners 
voorheen hulp gaven aan individuen met een goede of een slechte 
reputatie. Theoretische modellen laten zien dat het maken van dit 
onderscheid een sterk stabiliserend effect kan hebben op samenwerking 
in groepen; namelijk, als het bestraffen van free-riders wordt beloond, 
kunnen coöperatieve individuen onderling blijven samenwerken, en een 
goede reputatie behouden. De resultaten van dit experiment laten zien dat 
mensen sterk verschillen in de mate waarin zij belang hechten aan de 
motivaties van hun interactiepartners. Sommigen vinden het belangrijk 
dat een partner ‘rechtvaardig’ handelt, en bestraffen free-riders door ze 




het gedrag van hun partners mee in hun beslissingen: velen baseren hun 
samenwerkingsgedrag alleen maar op het gedrag van hun partner, en niet 
in de motivaties erachter; ze zijn niet geïnteresseerd of het gedrag van 
hun partner bijvoorbeeld was bedoeld om iemand met een goede 
reputatie te helpen, of iemand met een slechte reputatie te straffen. Het 
type individuen waaruit een groep is samengesteld kan een sterke invloed 
hebben op de dynamiek van samenwerking. Zo kan het bijvoorbeeld 
essentieel zijn om een aantal ‘rechtvaardige’ individuen in een groep te 
hebben om free-riders onderdrukken, en daarmee stabiele samenwerking 
in stand te houden. 
Samenvattend laten de hoofdstukken 6 en 7 zien dat mensen sterk van 
elkaar verschillen in hun gedragsstrategieën. Sommigen laten hun 
samenwerking afhangen van directe interacties, terwijl anderen naar de 
reputatie van hun partners kijken. Grote diversiteit is ook terug te zien in 
de mate waarin belang wordt gehecht aan de motivaties achter het gedrag 
van hun partners: waar sommigen belang hechten aan de 
rechtvaardigheid van hun partners, speelt dit voor anderen geen rol in het 
aangaan van samenwerking. 
 
Conclusie 
De theoretische resultaten laten zien dat de culturele evolutie van 
samenwerking afhangt van de sociale leerstrategieën die mensen 
gebruiken. De ideeën uit de literatuur, waarin wordt betoogd dat culturele 
groepsselectie gemakkelijk tot de evolutie van coöperatie leidt, zijn 
voorbarig: de uitkomst van culturele evolutie wordt bepaald door het 
samenspel van sociale leerstrategieën en specifieke manier waarop 
groepsselectie plaatsvindt. 
De experimentele resultaten geven inzicht in zowel sociale leerstrategieën 
als gedragsstrategieën in de context van menselijke samenwerking. Het 
opmerkelijkste aspect dat uit de experimenten naar voren komt zijn de 
grote individuele verschillen tussen mensen. Er bestaat grote variatie in 
zowel de manier waarop mensen van anderen leren, als in hun 




kunnen grote consequenties hebben voor de uitkomst van interacties, en 
nader onderzoek is vereist om deze in kaart te brengen. 
Sociaal leren heeft een grote invloed op menselijk gedrag. Om deze 
invloed te kunnen doorgronden, is een solide begrip van culturele evolutie 
vereist. Hiervoor is zowel theorievorming als gedegen empirische kennis 
van sociale leerstrategieën noodzakelijk. Uiteindelijk zal onderzoek naar 
het samenspel tussen sociaal leren en samenwerking leiden tot een dieper 
begrip van datgene wat ons mensen zo uniek maakt: ons sociale karakter. 
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